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Disappearance of Median Voter in Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Campaign: The Spatial Theory of Voting Revised

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消失的中間選民：二零零四年總統大選對空間理論的檢討

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Abstract: Taiwan’s Presidential campaign of 2004 fits the archetype of the spatial  
theory of voting. However, the incumbent party violated the median voter theorem by  
winning through a radical approach via the single issue of Independence vs.  
Reunification. This paper recruits alternative interpretations from cognitive  
dissonance theory and cultural theory of postcolonial hybridity. It argues that the issue  
space defined by the campaigning parties is not always the same as understood by the  
voters. While having their own issue space, voters nonetheless alternate their position  
to follow the leaders whom they trust.

大綱：二零零四年大選中定位選民的因素，是依據對台獨支持與否與對現狀不滿  
與否，從而可以有兩種面向。在第二面向上，如何定義現狀卻向來不是選民片面  
能決定的。更多選民在選戰中，後期逐漸信任陳水扁的領導，此一信任感的建立，  
恰恰是受到陳水扁對現狀定義的影響，於是吸引了在現狀維護上有雙趨衝突的選  
民。所謂雙趨，便是同時趨統與趨獨，或同時避統與避獨。簡言之，雙趨選民或  
是不希望改變統獨之現狀，或是希望改變以獲得任何一個穩定的身分，但可以不  
計較是統或獨。可是，統獨的現狀是由能夠堅定提出定義現狀的人所詮釋。雙趨  
選民的存在，大大修正了空間理論的適用。即在一對一選舉中的議題空間上，可  
以不存在所謂的中間選民。

關鍵字：中間選民，空間理論，認知協調理論，後殖民理論，總統大選，台獨

Keywords: median voter, spatial theory, cognitive dissonance, cultural theory,  
presidential campaign, Taiwan independence
Disappearance of Median Voter in Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Campaign: The Spatial Theory of Voting Revised

Given the structure of policy preference of the constituency, both the spatial theory of voting and the median voter theorem provide explanations of how competing parties maximize the vote received. Basically, the median voter theorem proposes that median voter always casts vote for the winning policy. Furthermore, in a one-on-one campaign, the median voter’s most preferred policy always wins. Recently, the spatial theory of voting has been applied to the case of Taiwan’s election and has been confirmed. Despite the difference in political culture (as well as the factor of campaign issues), once candidates identify the issue space created from the combination of the voters’ policy preferences, they tend to adjust their policy positions respectively to compete for the support of the median voter. However, the 2004 Presidential campaign in Taiwan witnessed a seeming anomaly. While the campaign took place as defined in the archetypal one-on-one model with only one salient issue (Independence vs. Reunification), the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was able to win by running under a style of campaigning that most commentators considered to be ‘radical’. There was no apparent attempt by the DPP to win over the median voter. Instead, DPP’s strategy to dichotomize the constituency to the extremity was counter-intuitive from the vintage point of the spatial theory.

The dominant issue in the campaign was about Taiwan’s identity--its future relationship with China. The incumbent DPP or the supporting pan-green coalition, favored an independent identity while the opposition Kuomintang, or the supporting pan-blue coalition, would like to keep it open, henceforth a relatively pro-unification stand by comparison. Other issues vanished as the campaign continued. By focusing on the identity issue and posing a loyalty challenge to the opposition, the pan-green’s pro-independence campaign was regarded by most observers as being extremely radical. This is because this approach contradicted the understanding that most voters in Taiwan would like to avoid confrontation with Beijing leaders, who had threatened to stop Taiwan independence at any cost. Previous polls had continuously indicated that the constituency favored keeping of the status quo, in which Taiwan stopped short of claiming formal sovereign independence. The pan-blue thus accused the DPP candidates, President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annetta Lu, of sacrificing national security for the unrealistic goal of independence.

However, the pan-green was able to gain considerable grounds, despite initially poor showing in the poll. The widespread impression that the DPP was incompetent in
governing national affairs became increasingly marginal, forcing the pan-blue to adjust its identity position by conceding that independence will become a legitimate option for future generations and the current status of Taiwan vis-à-vis China was state-to-state relationship. This is, in actuality, conforming to the position long held by the DPP. Spatial theorist of voting are eager to solve the mystery of how and why incumbent candidates were able to win through a strategy that should have alienated the median voter.

The In-between Voters

The spatial theory of voting predicts that voters cast votes for the candidate whose policy position is closest to theirs. There can be many different policy dimensions in the mind of the constituency, e.g. eagle vs. dove in foreign policy, liberal vs. conservative in social welfare, and degree of federalism in central-local division of power, and so on. Whether or not issues debated can be narrowed down to one single dimension determines the complexity of the policy space. In many developed countries, association among issues is so strong that they can be narrowed down to the fault line of liberalism vs. conservatism. For one-on-one campaigns, the strongest support for each party should group at the two ends of the policy space. This is especially for issues that can be narrowed down to a single dimension. Voters are distributed among the single-dimensioned space, each according to their policy preferences. The median voter is the voter whose choice becomes the threshold of winning. A weak version of the median voter theorem proposes that the winning policy position is always the position chosen by the median voter. When the competition takes place exclusively between two candidates, both sides strive to win over median voters’ support. As a result, the strong version of the median voter theorem predicts that, in such a competition, the median voter’s initial policy preference will likely define the winning position.

The spatial theory of voting makes one important assumption about the voters’ policy preference. It assumes that the voters form their policy preferences independently, so that the structure and dimension of the policy space are fixed constraints that all competing candidates face together. Voters’ preferences are exogenous and formed prior to the candidates’ campaigning activity. Candidates choose their policy positions afterwards. Today, cognitive psychologists challenge this assumption. The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that voters want to maintain a balanced relationship between affective attitude and policy preference. This means that either the voters will read the favored candidates’ policy position as being much closer to their own than actually is, or they would shift their policy preferences toward the favored candidates’’. Maintaining such a balance motivates voters to perceive the
candidates’ policy positions in ways that can avoid cognitive dissonance. In other words, the motivation thus derived is a more fundamental drive than the prior policy preference the voters have. It is possible that voters form policy preference to adhere to the preferred candidate’s policy position. This proposition reduces the median voter’s choice to a result of the candidates’ campaign strategy.

The theory of cognitive dissonance and the spatial theory of voting are supplemental to each other if one treats both voters and candidates as endogenous to the explanation of voting behavior. In other words, the voters and the candidates adapt to each other’s policy preference. For the voters, they want to resolve the dissonance between liking and policy preference. For the candidates, they want to shorten the distance between voters’ preference and their own policy position. Between cognitive dissonance and policy preference, the “ultimate” factor that ends up determining voters’ choice may vary case by case. Regardless, both the median voter and the median voter’s policy preference are susceptible to change, making the spatial theory decreasingly relevant. The revised version of the spatial theory should acknowledge that the candidates have some influence over where or who the median voter is. The changeable median voter position implies that any potential median voter is in an embarrassing (rather than a privileged) position—Since the preferred candidate’s position may not be perfectly matched, or the disliked candidate’s position always further away, there is usually some dissonance in presence.

The theory of cognitive dissonance is further questioned by the cultural theory, which sees dissonance as the nature of life. For both the spatial theory and the cognitive theory, the voters always want to maintain internal balance. Although the cognitive theory conceives of “liking” as a more fundamental drive, so that individual candidates’ policy position is an explaining (instead of ‘explained’) variable, the arguments are similarly premised upon an internally balanced condition. Yet, the cultural theory has no such premise. Rather, the cultural theory holds that it is possible that cognitive dissonance does not trigger defensive reaction in certain cultures. For example, there is the observation that Chinese political culture is capable of tolerating cognitive dissonance. Likewise, there can be hybrid juxtaposition between modern and traditional values, rather than resolution, of inconsistent needs. Postcolonial writers are especially sensitive to identity strategy that enables the local community to move back and forth comfortably between colonial and indigenous values. Finally, there is also the feminist epistemology that justifies the widespread androgynous phenomena, whereby actors abide by completely different gender rules contingent upon the situations. In short, the cultural theory finds no need of coping with dissonance in various occasions. The implication for the spatial theory is that median voter, who is theoretically in between the two ends, can shift to either side whenever
an appropriate clue appears.

The cultural theory adds an uncertain element to both the spatial and the
cognitive theories. If in a postcolonial society those voters not grouping at the two
ends are culturally hybrid, their adjustment in accordance with the liked candidates’
position can be drastic. This is because a hybrid voter is culturally prepared for an
opposite position. Since they can take position at both ends, they should not be
conceptualized as someone between the two ends. The spatial theory, which portrays a
single dimensional space, is not appropriate for describing these voters. Even though
the candidates see the campaign issues debated as being highly associated with one
another, the voters’ space can still be two-dimensional, acceptable to both sides’ claim.
The possibility that the voters’ space differs from the candidates’ space gives the
spatial theory a powerful locus of application. When applied together, the spatial
theory explains how the candidates manage the distance between the voters’ and their
own policy preferences, thus privileging the voters’ preference; the cognitive theory
analyzes how the voters manage dissonance between liking and policy preferences,
thus allowing the candidates to influence the voters’ preferences; and the cultural
theory discovers how voters communicate between different spaces in ways that the
candidates cannot do and, therefore, possibly alienate from those who thought they
were moving closer.

The Issue Space of the 2004 Taiwan Presidential Campaign

There were two major issues at the beginning of the presidential campaign. One
of the issues raised by the opposition candidates questioned the competence of the
incumbent party. The incumbent DPP responded with a call for in-depth reform. This
was an issue related to governing capacity. This issue lost intensity as the other issue
the incumbent raised dominated the headlines – the issue about Taiwan’s relationship
with China. From the Taiwan-China issue, one can derive many sub-categories. These
may include whether or not Taiwan should hold a national referendum to exhibit its
separate sovereignty from China, write a new constitution to indicate that Taiwan is
independent from the Chinese state, or delay direct navigation between Taiwan and
China to avoid too much economic and cultural involvement of Taiwan in China. The
incumbent DPP engineered these debates primarily for the purpose of promoting a
distinctive Taiwan identity and sovereign jurisdiction vis-à-vis China. The issue is
invariably how to choose between Taiwan independence and China reunification. In
the face of the independence vs. reunification argument, no other major policy
differences can attract the media, with the exceptions of sporadic negative
campaigning aimed at the candidates’ personality.
The Issue of Taiwan Independence has always played a significant role in Taiwan’s electoral history. For example, during the presidential election during the year 2000, the issue was intensively debated. In the 2000 campaign, pro-independence candidates often charged competitors as “Traitors of Taiwan” in order to paint the latter into the pro-unification camp. Indeed, three major runners were divided by their more radical supporters on the independence issue: the opposition stereotyped as pro-independence, the independent as pro-unification, and the incumbent as the status quo. No of the candidates were willing to present a clear-cut position on Taiwan’s future status. Polls consistently showed that the majority of voters preferred no change to the status quo. While avoiding taking specific position themselves, the running candidates attempted to accuse their opponents of trying to upset the status quo. The incumbent Kuomintang, for example, accused opposition DPP of being war-prone, suggesting that its pro-independence position would cause armed conflict with Beijing. Likewise, DPP labeled the independent front-runner as a ‘China walker’, suggesting that the latter would betray Taiwan. However, since none dared to take a position on this topic, the other issue of reform vs. stability became lively debated. Here, the DPP and the independent runner were allies in denouncing the Kuomintang as a corrupt force. In any case, the issue space in 2000 was multi-dimensional with three major running candidates. In comparison, for the spatial theory, the 2004 campaign was archetypal.

In 2004, the poll showed no significant different result concerning the majority voter’s preference for the status quo, meaning not to support a quick resolution on the independence issue. Arguably, there could have been a slight move toward the pro-independence end of the dimension, but overall the median voter should have sat somewhere in the middle. The spatial theory pointed out that both candidates should have carried out a moderate campaign on the independence-reunification issue and forced the other side to take the more radical stand.

The incumbent DPP did not adopt such a moderate strategy. On the contrary, they raised all controversial matters that were traditionally associated with radical pro-independence candidates when they run for a slot in the multi-seated campaign. For those in such a multi-seated campaign, the extreme approach could well be a rational strategy, since they only required the support of a minimal portion of the constituency to win a seat. In comparison, running a national campaign by making assertions on radical issues is not. However, incumbent candidates were able to catch up quickly from over 20% behind, after they adopted the pro-independence stance. The strategy did not meet the expectation of the spatial theory. Voters did not respond...
in ways that confirmed to the spatial theory, either. In fact, the spatial theory failed to analyze the campaign of 2000. None of the three major candidates that year tried to distinct themselves from opponents on the independence issue, as rational campaigner should have done. In 2000, the victorious DPP candidates also failed to distinguish themselves from the independent runner on the reform issue, or from the Kuomintang on the independence issue.

The DPP campaign strategy appeared extremely radical in 2004, compared with 2000. The DPP candidates used the term “the middle way” to characterize their China policy in 2000, hoping to persuade voters that they were at most moderate on the independence issue. In 2004, they no longer stressed the importance of reform. They did not even bother to have a policy platform. It is true that voters do not usually read these platforms, but having platforms is traditionally considered an important part of image competition. DPP claimed that their candidates needed no platform, because the government annual budget was their platform. This ran the risk of alienating middle-class voters who wanted to know the specific. It might be more convincing if we explain the situation as DPP deliberately bypassing platform competition, in order to avoid distraction from the independence issue.

As early as 2002, Chen Shuibian commented on the radical independence proposition, that each side of the Taiwan Straits was a state by itself. To prevent angry Beijing from resorting to military means, Washington intervened and pressured Chen to tone down his proposition. Chen reiterated that he had no intention to declare Taiwan independence or change the status quo. During the campaign, however, he repeatedly appealed to the “each side a state” (yi bian yi guo) proposition. Both the opposition and Washington considered this a move toward independence. The DPP candidates denied this charge. They claimed that the “each side a state” proposition was a ‘correct’ statement that described the status quo. Since it was a statement describing the status quo, it was not an active statement on Taiwan independence. Rather, it simply ‘consolidated’ the status quo. In response, Washington announced that it would judge for itself what the status quo meant without counting campaign remarks in Taiwan, and the status quo was that Taiwan was not an independent country. In any case, the DPP’s proposition is anything but a moderate strategy. Little wonder that related discussion and debates made daily headlines during the campaign period.

A second radical move taken by the DPP was to push for a new constitution, despite repeated warnings from Beijing who promised military retaliation in face of the writing of a new constitution. Under the pressure of a changing campaign atmosphere, opposition candidates responded by proposing an agenda of constitutional amendment. The contents of proposed changes to the constitutional
frame were never the focus of either party. They wanted to know whether the DPP wanted to add “amendments” or to draft a “new” constitution. Chen later took the clear position that he wanted a new constitution, not just amendment. He suggested that there should be the birth of a new country under the new constitution. Chen said to Washington Post during an interview that the current constitution was never enforced in actuality and Taiwan needed a new constitution in order to be a normal country. To make it clear that this was a new constitution, the DPP concentrated its effort on the push for a national referendum. This proved to be the final highlight of the 2004 campaign.

The DPP decided that a national referendum should be called to approve the new constitution. This would happen presumably in 2008, the same year that Lee Denghui, Chen’s predecessor, proposed for Taiwan to declare independence. The DPP’s calendar for new constitution echoed Lee’s independence timetable. It would be the year for the Beijing Olympic Games, hoping that they do not want to ruin the occasion with a war in the Taiwan Straits. Lee argues that the Games, as well as the investment opportunities associated with the preparation for the Games, could become lethal attraction to Taiwan. Therefore, the chance for independence would vanish after 2008. In order to prepare for independence in 2008, the Taiwan constituency should begin to practice referendum as early as possible. Besides, holding a referendum would be a significant move toward independence by itself.

Chen would like to hold a national referendum at the date of the Presidential election. He hoped that doing so would strengthen the image of national unity. At first, the DPP insisted that this should be arranged outside the current legal frame, to signal this was some sort of self-determination for new state. Chen argued that referendum was a natural right; therefore it needed no constitutional or legal clause to provide for. This argument purported to insinuate that presently Taiwan was under no state, thus outside of China. Nevertheless, upon the insistence of the opposition, the Legislature passed the Referendum Law, which had the authority to forbid the holding of referendum on presidential Election Day. This did not stop President Chen. Washington opposed the holding of this referendum for obvious reasons; this was too much like a declaration of independence. In fact, the DPP candidates wanted the referendum so much that they were willing to pay any price, as long as the national referendum could be executed on presidential Election Day.

The pan-green camp never concealed their real intention behind holding a referendum, effectively a step towards independence. DPP spokesmen accused those who opposed the referendum of being pro-China. Moreover, they repeated the assertion that the election was about the choice between Taiwan and China—those who voted for the opposition would be tantamount to voting for China, hence a move
of defection. Chen then declared that he would rather not run for the Presidency if he could not hold the referendum on Election Day. In response to Washington’s fear that pro-independence activities were getting out of control, Chen assured them that the referendum was an attempt to maintain the status quo, which was one country on each side. Those who could destroy the status quo, Chen charged, were those who pointed missiles at Taiwan. This insinuated the Beijing authorities.

A Cultural Theory Proposition

The DPP’s campaign strategy was entirely opposite to the expectation of the spatial theory. When compared with the opposition candidates, who refused to take side on the issue of independence vs. reunification, the DPP appeared radical and extreme. On several occasions, the DPP suggested that its candidates were running ‘against China’. Washington feared possible military escalation throughout the campaign. The oppositions denounced the DPP for provoking Beijing recklessly. Strangely, approaching the end of the campaign and witnessing a drop of their popularity, the opposition candidates also began to talk about independence. During the final stage, opposition parties acknowledged that independence would be a legitimate choice in the future. At one point, the opposition candidates agreed that the current situation was one country on each side. All these adjustments made by the opposition angered Beijing, because there were no longer pro-reunification candidates in Taiwan. The voters’ position on the independence-reunification dimension showed a fast shift toward independence, following the DPP’s policy position taking, and followed by the opposition’s policy position taking.

The spatial theory could not have successfully anticipated the radical independence strategy that assisted the DPP candidates to catch up. Opposition candidates adapted to the rising support for the incumbent by also moving toward the independence end of the spectrum, hoping to maintain its seemingly median position. The incumbent party, instead of the voters, became the force that defined the structure of the issue space. The implication is that the voters’ policy preference was either not present in the first place, or vulnerable to the persuasion of the incumbent candidates. The situation where the candidates are the leaders and the voters are the followers is not what the spatial theory intends to explain. The theory of cognitive dissonance can supplement here. It states that voters want to shorten the policy distance between the liked candidates and their own. If voters like Chen, they may want to move closer to Chen’s policy position.

Not everyone adapted to the radical independence campaign. Both strong pro-independence and pro-reunification voters did not have to shift their position. The pro-reunification voters, who found the pan-green policy position further away from
theirs, feels no uncertainty or any need to adapt. On the other hand, pro-independence voters had no reason not to support Chen. Those who make adjustment had to be those in the middle of the independence-reunification spectrum. However, it not possible that these voters became DPP supporters, because they were in the middle of the spectrum and the DPP was moving away from the middle. In other words, these are the voters to whom the theory of cognitive dissonance can apply. When the DPP’s position turned radical, they wanted to balance their liking of the DPP candidates by adapting to the new DPP policy position. One problem still left in this supplementing explanation is this; if voters preferred the DPP candidates in the first place, why had they not expressed support for them before the DPP turned radical? To explain this emerging support for the DPP candidates, one suspect that it was the more radical policy that made the voters prefer the DPP candidates, and they then wanted to keep abreast with the new radical policy in order to maintain cognitive consonance. In brief, the radical policy generated positive attitude toward the DPP, the pressure to defend against cognitive dissonance led to the shift of policy preference toward pro-independence policy.

The reason that radical policy generates acceptance and popularity has to do with Taiwan’s uncertain identity. The Chinese civil war that spit China into two separate jurisdictions in 1949 contextualizes contemporary Taiwan’s identity complex. The complex inherited Taiwan’s fifty years of colonization under Japan before the defeated Kuomintang fled to Taiwan. On one hand, the Japanese postcolonial legacy convinced the local elite to see the Chinese origin of the Kuomintang as inferior and backward. On the other hand, the Kuomintang’s Chinese legacy treated anything associated with the Japanese in local elite stratum as shameful. With the Kuomintang losing the civil war and, fifty-five years later, the presidential campaign, the identity enigma has resurfaced once again. The puzzle is particularly poignant, concerning the relationship with China. If Taiwan continues to regard itself as part of China (as depicted by the Kuomintang’s Chinese historiography), postcolonial Taiwan could only be an inferior member of China. On the other hand, if the pro-independence identity prevails, the self-image of the Chinese Han-immigrant community in Taiwan would have no respectful treatment. In fact, this Chinese self-image has prompted all-round connections between Taiwan and China since the 1980s.

Consequently, the typical postcolonial indetermination in the areas of cultural and political identity registers markedly in Taiwan. Voters feel the lowering of self-esteem, being either Chinese or anti-Chinese. Therefore, they prefer the choice ‘both’ or ‘neither’. Some maintain strong emotional ties with China while being extremely critical of the Chinese way of governing; others feel alienated from the Chinese identity, yet are intensively connected with China economically and socially.
It is possible for an individual in Taiwan to feel comfortable with both independence and reunification, whichever works for the time or the situation. On the other hand, a person who is alienated from the uncertainty associated with either cause may want to avoid any shifts away from status quo, which appears least risky in comparison with any other proposed solution. The issue space composed of the spectrum between independence and reunification is not adequate in placing these ambivalent yet flexible voters.

The postcolonial voters torn between independence and reunification experience an internal split when external conditions compel them to choose sides. In the 2004 Presidential election, the DPP’s campaigning served as this external pressure that threw the voters into endless loops of self-doubt. When the DPP candidates appeared to be firm, this could become a solution. At least it was a better answer than the deliberate indecision of the opposition candidates who refused to take side, having followed the spatial theory. The opposition therefore aroused the anxiety among voters, to the extent that the opposition strategy reflected and therefore exposed the embarrassing position of the voters, who desired but received only ambiguous response. In contrast, the firm stand offered by the DPP rang the bell because independence was among the acceptable options to those in the middle of the independence-reunification spectrum. The opposition’s strategy to show the voters that the opposition candidates were equally uncertain about Taiwan’s future fell upon deaf ears.

The incumbent candidates named the status quo “one country each side.” By naming the status quo as one version of Taiwan independence, they could follow up with the claim that they were neither changing the status quo, nor promoting Taiwan independence. Even though this appeared to be a move toward independence in the eyes of Washington, Beijing and opposition leaders, for those voters who felt alienated from any platform of change, this claim sounds reasonable. In comparison, the opposition accepts both independence and reunification as a possible future solution, but refused to name the status quo or even honor the maintenance of it. The contrast between naming the status quo as independence and not naming it for the sake of future possibilities could easily push those voters who are suspicious of any platform of change toward the incumbent.

Clearly, the cultural theory contributes to the spatial theory. The spatial theory identifies the issue space in the Presidential campaign. In the middle of this space, these are voters who are either alienated from both ends, or torn between the two ends. The cultural theory explains why these middle voters are undetermined voters. Their positions on the spectrum are not fixed, or prior to the candidates’ side taking, hence not the same median voter that the spatial theory would have expected. Furthermore,
some of these voters feel anxious and need a solution. The cognitive theory helps in explaining how these middle voters moved with the candidates who were willing to offer a firm solution, thereby changing the position of the median voter.

The Issue Space for the Hybrid Voters

How many hybrid voters are there on the independence-reunification spectrum? The result of polls provides a clue as to how voters feel about changing the status quo and how would cost-benefit calculation affects their feeling toward change. Regarding the feeling toward change; when asked if changing the name of the country from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan and accepting Beijing’s reunification model of one country two systems would endanger Taiwan, the number of those who answered ‘possibly yes’ or ‘definitely yes’ to both questions amounts to 814 among totally 1,674 respondents. 88 answered ‘possibly no’ or ‘definitely no’ to both questions. The presence of both categories of “both are acceptable” and “neither are acceptable” is a clue to the existence of hybrid voters. Hybrid in terms of identity can be mediated by cost-benefit concerns. Regarding the relevance of cost-benefit calculation, two questions that lower the cost of change were proposed. When asked whether or not reunification could be accepted if Taiwan and China reach similar levels of development on all aspects and whether or not independence could be accepted if Taiwan could maintain peace with China, 365 answered ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ to both questions. 267 answered ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ to both.

Tables I. and II

For those who answered positively to both questions and negatively to both questions, the single dimension of independence vs. reunification does not accommodate well. A two-dimensioned space can resolve this, with the horizontal axis stands for independence, the vertical axis, reunification, resulting in four logic categories: independence acceptable but reunification not, reunification acceptable but independence not, both acceptable, and neither acceptable. Table I. suggests that nearly half of the respondents find change toward any direction to be unacceptable. However, Table II further indicates that a change toward a certain and acceptable future is acceptable to over 20% (i.e. 365)) of the respondents. The two-dimensioned space addresses to the concerns of the cultural theory to conceptualize the voters in the middle to be hybrid voters. For those who fall in the category of both acceptable, the cultural theorists would consider them to be expressing anxiety about the uncertain identity in the status quo. For those who belong to the category of neither
acceptable, the cultural interpretation would be that they are anxious about the potentially inferior position caused by a single-directional change as measured by either axis.

Figure II

Hybrid voters from both categories demonstrate that pro-independence is not the same as anti-reunification, or vice versa. In order to anticipate where a voter would fall on one axis by his or her position on another axis, a third dimension should be introduced. This is the dimension between the status quo and change. If a voter does not support independence or reunification, his or her attitude toward the status quo is necessarily positive. On the other hand, if a voter is in agreement with both independence and reunification as long as the cost is low, his or her attitude toward the status quo should be negative. If a voter is pro-independence but anti-reunification, or vice versa, his or her attitude toward the status quo is partially positive and partially negative. In other words, the attitude toward the status quo could be equally relevant, compared with the attitude measured by the conventional independence-reunification spectrum, to the determination of the voters’ choice. The opposition candidates’ refusal to name the status quo and deliberately keeping the status quo open to uncertain future changes could not address to the voters’ concerns for certainty. For the DPP candidates, the status quo had the name of “one country on each side.” This was minimally acceptable to those who supported independence as well as those hybrid voters, whether they desire certainty in the certain state of independence or in the relative certainty that the status quo could provide.

At the time of the polling, the DPP was behind the opposition by a large gap. There were 323 respondents who expressed their choice for the DPP, in comparison with 492 for the opposition. Note that the majority of undecided voters came from the two hybrid categories. Judging from the result of the election that each side procured roughly 50% of the total votes, the majority of the hybrid voters who remain undecided or silent at the time of the polling backed the opposition. Indeed, as the DPP turned radical on the independence-reunification spectrum, the party’s rating increased. This is in line with the cultural theory’s interpretation that the radical campaign for the cause of independence provided the sense of certainty to the hybrid voters.

Table III.

The major reason for the DPP’s gains should have been the increase in support
among the hybrid categories. In fact, those who remained suspicious of both the formula of “one country two systems” and renaming the Republic of China into the Republic of Taiwan accounted the largest number of undecided voters at the time of the polling, amounting to 251, in comparison with 325 expressing support for the opposition and 152, for the incumbent. It is safe to infer that those who later narrowed the gap for the incumbent candidates came primarily from the hybrid voters. For those who belonged in the category of “reunification acceptable but independence not” yet still said they would support the DPP, they must have made their decisions on those grounds unrelated to the identity issue at hand. This is why a radical pro-independence adjustment of the DPP would not alienate this group of voters. Similarly, those who accepted both peaceful independence and democratic reunification, as well as who were wary of both, witnessed a higher ratio of undecided voters. They accounted for the shift towards the DPP.

Table IV.

To further test the cultural interpretation, six other questions measuring the attitude toward independence and reunification are added to make a total of ten questions, to which a factor analysis is applied. Two major factors are obtained from principal component analysis of these ten questions. The first one is related to the strength of the attitude toward independence and reunification. The second one is the attitude toward change and the status quo. The new two-factored (or two-dimensioned) space is not the same as the two-dimensioned space composed of the independence and reunification axis’s of Figure II. Interestingly, the second factor, which concerns the attitude toward change and the status quo, is positively associated with both pro-independence and pro-unification attitudes. This suggests that, at one end of this dimension is both acceptable and, at the other end, neither acceptable. The two non-hybrid categories—independence acceptable but reunification not, and reunification acceptable but independence not---which compose the independence-reunification spectrum according to the campaigners’ issue space appears distinctive. Regarding the second dimension concerning the attitude toward change and the status quo, the attitude precisely points to the postcolonial kind of choice, reflecting the indecision of the voters’ hybrid identity. The attachment to the status quo at one end implies a suspicious attitude toward any change; at the other end, the desire for change reveals a preference for any change that might work. For those in the middle who are neither “both acceptable” nor “neither acceptable,” they accept only one direction of change. However, the middle voters on the second dimension are comparatively moderate in their attitude toward independence or reunification,
because the stronger believers should be located in the first dimension.

Figures III. and IV.

The DPP candidates were successful, because their advocacy for independence could attract the attention of voters high on both dimensions. The opposition’s campaign strategy avoided taking side on the independence-reunification spectrum. This puts its candidates in a disadvantaged position, perhaps even denying them any position, in the second issue space. These candidates provided no clue to voters as to the direction of change, nor did they commit themselves to the maintenance of the status quo. The strategy of deliberately ambiguity could not resolve the anxiety of either the status quo voters, who were suspicious of any potential change, or the change voters, who disliked the uncertainty of the status quo. In contrast, although the DPP’s radical policy contradicted the positive attitude toward reunification, it nonetheless satisfies the hybrid attitudes revealed by the second dimension. According to the candidates’ issue space, voters with hybrid attitudes would be placed in the middle of the independence-reunification spectrum. Presumably the median voters belong here, yet in actuality they are subject to the persuasion of firm DPP campaigning. Contradictive to the prediction of the spatial theory, the median voter on the campaigned issue space was probably among those who were most vulnerable to the seemingly radical policy.

The gunshot incident on the day before election, which injured the incumbent candidates, resulted in the shift of a significant number of votes to the DPP. This is plausible from the statistics shown in the tables. Statistics suggested that voters were anxious about the un-sustainability of the status quo or the inaccessibility of a certain future. The gunshot incident apparently increased the anxiety toward uncertainty and the desire for some form of certainty. Given the independence-reunification being the only issue space during the campaign, it is natural that voters wanted to assign meanings to the incident on the same issue space. The incumbent’s solution to the identity crisis in Taiwan appears much more attractive than the opposition’s evasive answer to the voters, who are under the pressure of uncertainty. In fact, the gunshot incident was suspected as the work of Beijing after it took place. This was in line with the DPP campaign discourse. In contrast, the opposition did not have any ready narrative available. If the DPP had taken a moderate attitude toward independence, it would be very difficult to know how the gunshot incident can be interpreted. Institutionally, the incumbent was the representative of the status quo; the DPP reinforced this image through discursive means. The gunshot, which symbolized a degree of destruction of certainty, could raise the concern over the status quo and the
support for the incumbent accordingly.

The Disappearing Median Voter

The voters for the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan can be broken down into four categories. While two of these groups appear apart on both ends of the independence-reunification spectrum, the other two categories are actually composed of a second issue dimension, the one measuring the attitude toward change and the status quo. This explains why the opposition strategy to win the median voter through a deliberately ambiguous identity position did not work well. There weren’t any ‘median voter’ to be attracted on the independence-reunification spectrum. The hybrid voters, instead of the median voter, were those with the decisive votes in this particular election. They decided to follow the incumbent candidates because the latter’s determined campaign style provided a relatively more certain solution to the hybrid voters’ indecision on their identities, which is torn between Taiwan and China. The sense of certainty, which might have improved trust or liking toward the incumbent candidates, may further explain the movement of the hybrid voters toward the independence end of the spectrum.

The cultural theory contributes to the spatial theory by pointing out the difference between the voters’ issue space and the candidates’ issue space. The hybrid voters can empower themselves by making a decision that is faithful to their own issue space, where there are no candidates competing. The cognitive theory contributes to the spatial theory by showing how the candidates could lead, intentionally or otherwise, the voters into a certain policy preference not taken in the beginning. With the supplement of both the cultural theory and the cognitive theory, a status quo-change dimension has been discovered and interpreted. This dimension explains why the median voter on the independence-reunification spectrum did not exist and why a radical policy won a single-issue, one-on-one campaign.
Table I. The attitudes toward identity change in abstraction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some People think that we should change the Republic of China into the Republic of Taiwan. Do you think this would cause damage to our society?</th>
<th>Definitely</th>
<th>Possibly</th>
<th>Possibly not</th>
<th>Definitively not</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibly</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibly not</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitively not</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table II. The attitudes toward identity change with a low cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some people say if the Chinese mainland reaches the same economic, social and political conditions, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should be reunified. Do you agree or disagree?</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>1674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III. The attitudes toward identity change in abstraction and vote preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Neither identities</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Reunification</th>
<th>Both identities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstaining</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


“Neither” is the sum of those answering definitely or possibly to both questions in Table I. “Both” is the sum of those answering definitely not or possibly not to both questions in Table I.

“Independence” is the sum of those answering definitely and possibly only to column not to row.

“Unification” is the sum of those answering definitely and possibly only to row not to column.

Table IV. The attitudes toward identity change with a low cost and vote preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Neither identities</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Reunification</th>
<th>Both identities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstaining</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>1376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


“Neither” is the sum of those answering strongly disagree or disagree to both questions in Table I. “Both” is the sum of those answering strongly agree or agree to both questions in Table II.

“Independence” is the sum of those answering strongly agree and agree only to row not to column. “Unification” is the sum of those answering strongly agree and agree only to column not to row.
Table V. Factor analysis of issue space—Two Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some People think that we should change the Republic of China into the Republic of Taiwan. Do you think this would cause damage to our society?</td>
<td>-.542</td>
<td>-.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people say Taiwan could accept the Chinese Communist Party’s model of “one country two system.” Do you think this would cause damage to our society?</td>
<td>.364</td>
<td>-.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people say if Taiwan can declare independence and yet maintain a peaceful relationship with the Chinese Communist, Taiwan should become a new country. Do you agree or disagree?</td>
<td>.604</td>
<td>.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people say if the Chinese mainland reaches the same economic, social and political conditions, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should be reunified. Do you agree or disagree?</td>
<td>-.551</td>
<td>.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>However backward China is, I feel most proud to be a Chinese.</td>
<td>.602</td>
<td>.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To control Taiwan’s own fate is to sever relations with China and establish a life community for the twenty-three millions people of Taiwan.</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We must patiently overcome the difference in the way of life between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland in order to achieve reunification of the country.</td>
<td>-.589</td>
<td>.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China being China and Taiwan being Taiwan, China has no reason to intervene in Taiwan’s quest of autonomous independence.</td>
<td>.701</td>
<td>6.054E-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan must join China in order to have a future.</td>
<td>-.708</td>
<td>.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chinese history belongs to China; we ought to create Taiwan’s own history.</td>
<td>.681</td>
<td>.222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure I. The independence-reunification spectrum

Reunification

| Independence |

Figure II. The two-dimensional space of independence vs. reunification

Reunification

| Independence |

Figure III. The second issue dimension of the constituency

The status quo

| Change |

Figure IV. Two-dimensional space of the constituency

Reunification

| The second Dimension

The First Dimension

| Independence |