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The Youth’s Trust in Institutions

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Jack Chen-chia Wu
Political Science, National Taiwan University

Yutzung Chang
Political Science, National Taiwan University
yutzung@ntu.edu.tw

Mark Weatherall
Political Science, National Taiwan University

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Jack Chen-chia Wu, Yutzung Chang & Mark Weatherall

Introduction

Political trust has been a subject of attention among political scientists over a long period of time. Generally speaking, political trust has been regarded as a vital input that functions to maintain the stability of the political system. In addition, political scientists have examined whether falls in political trust threaten the continuity or consolidation of democracy. Political trust reflects whether the actions of the government or the political system win the support of ordinary citizens. In other words, when political trust is high, the regime has legitimacy and faces fewer impediments to effective governance.

In the past, research on political trust was rooted in the West. In particular, studies in the United States has tried to identify the sources of and fluctuations in political trust as well as their political consequences. However, research on political trust outside the West only emerged later. For instance, Asia includes a diverse range of political systems and cultures, including Confucian cultures, post-communist systems, authoritarian systems, and new third wave democracies. Often, these different types of political systems are in competition with each other. After the recent rise of China, issues of governance capabilities and economic success have, in some cases, given rise to positive feelings regarding enlightened authoritarianism. In this context, existing research on political trust came under challenge.

In this paper, we examine how the contents of political trust among the youth in the region has evolved. Political trust among the region’s youth has a major implication for the future development of the region. Political trust is an indicator of government legitimacy, and also impacts on trust in the political community and system. In East Asia, democracy is still developing and the issue of whether it can be consolidated remains. Are electoral democracies deepening or re-embracing authoritarianism? Will electoral authoritarian regimes democratize in the future or continue to limit the political rights of their citizens? Can communist states in transition (in particular China) produce a new form of government? These questions are closely related to the political choices of the next generation of youth, with political trust as a key factor.

The aim of this paper is to reveal the current state of political trust among the Asian youth. The paper distinguishes between political institutions, enforcement institutions, and the mass media to measure the institutional trust of individuals aged 30 years or under when compared to the population as a whole.
Political Trust in Political Theory

Political scientists focus on two dimensions of trust: social trust and political trust. The concept of social trust derives from Putnam’s (1993) theory of social capital. Putnam’s research on Italy shows that the presence of social trust, civil society, and social networks increases government performance. On the other hand, political trust has a close relationship with political stability. A low level of political trust reflects a political system that has lost the support of citizens, making policy formation and implementation difficult, and even causing political chaos and the collapse of the political system.

Much of the research on political trust can be traced to David Easton’s (1965; 1975) systems approach. Political trust is a variable in the political system and also a dimension of political support. According to Easton, political support can be divided into diffuse support and specific support. Specific support refers to how members of a political community evaluate the political authorities. Specific support reflects perceptions of the policy initiatives of the political authorities. A positive evaluation indicates the presence of political trust, which in turn produces political support, providing a basis for the efficient operation of the political system. Diffuse support, is directed towards the regime or constitutional order and the political community. Diffuse support is not produced from the delivery of fixed rewards or benefits to members of the political community, but instead is the result of a process of socialization. This socialization produces patriotism among the members of the political community, which forms the basis of trust and loyalty toward the constitution and national leaders. According to Easton’s systems theory, a stable political system requires diffuse support to provide a measure of system flexibility. However, political systems still rely on “specific support” produced from a feeling that the individual needs of community members are satisfied.

Systems theory is closely related to the persistence of the system, or in other words, the demand for political stability. In this, political trust plays a key role. Following Easton, a large number of studies on political trust appeared. This research can be largely divided into three categories: the origin of political trust, changes in political trust, and the political consequences of political trust.

First, in terms of the origin of political support, most research from the United States is in agreement that social background, including ethnic group, level of education, generation, and gender has an influence on political support. In addition, specific or major events in international politics and foreign relations can have a significant effect on political support (Abramson, 1983). However, the most important environmental factors determining political support are evaluations of the incumbent government and party identification1 (Feldman, 1983; Williams, 1985). Hetherington’s

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1 On this, Feldman argues that the low level of political trust in the United States is the result of dissatisfaction with the incumbent elected politicians and regime. Williams also argues that political trust is influenced by party identification and evaluation of the incumbent regime.
A comprehensive study shows that citizens’ evaluation of the president or legislature, evaluation of political performance, and evaluation of overall economic performance affects feelings of political trust. Next, studies on changes on political support have primarily focused on the reasons for the long-term decline in political support in the United States. Hetherington (1998) has pointed out that over recent decades, a feature of American politics is the steady decline of trust in the government. At the same time, his work expresses a concern that this trend may threaten the legitimacy of the political system. However, other research has pointed out that although trust in the government is falling, there has been no corresponding drop in support for the democratic system of government (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). At the same time, the political consequences of the contents of political trust is also a focus of scholarly research. Political trust clearly influences the political behavior of citizens. For instance, a high level of political trust makes it more likely that voters will back incumbent candidates at the polls (Hetherington, 1999), support an expansion in government expenditures (Chanley, 2002), and pay their taxes more honestly (Scholz & Lubell, 1998). In addition, Gamson (1968), argues that from the perspective of government officials, the level of political trust among citizens has a close relationship with their space for policy discretion. When citizens have a high level of trust in the incumbent government, they will give the government discretion to allocate limited resources without first securing agreement from citizens, delivering more efficient governance.

The key debate surrounds the influence of the level of political trust on democratic political systems. Some scholars believe that continued low levels of political trust represent dissatisfaction with national policy direction. A lack of trust in power leads to dissatisfaction with institutions and the functioning of the community, leading citizens to consider apparently better alternatives, harming the development of a robust democracy (Miller, 1974). However, this theory has not been universally accepted. While Gamson has pointed out that high political trust makes the operation of government easier, some scholars believe that high levels of trust will lead citizens to give up their rights to supervise the government and unconditionally support government actions, leading to undesirable political consequences (Batto, 2004; Hardin 1998, 1999).

Overall, the concept of political trust has influenced political theory on two major dimensions. Since political trust and political stability are closely related, a feeling of political trust is clearly advantageous for the maintenance the political system, regardless of its type. In new democracies, since some aspects of the democratic system are not fully developed, citizens tend to express trust in certain politicians or political parties in overall political trust. In this situation, low political trust may result in democratic reversal. In contrast, an effective enlightened authoritarian regime may win political trust through economic success. Regardless of the type of government, when citizens have a

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2 Craig, Niemi, and Silver have shown that although trust in incumbent government has been on a downward trend since the 1960s, there has been no corresponding fall in trust for the political system or constitutional regime. This finding confirms the results of Citrin’s earlier research. A low level of trust in the government simply reflects dissatisfaction with incumbent officials rather than the system as a whole.
certain level of trust in political authority, they trust that the government understands their needs, responds effectively to their demands, and is generally clean and transparent. In this situation, government can be run more efficiently and effectively. However, when trust in the political authorities is low, citizens will deny the government discretion in implementing government policies and limit government authority, leading to political failure and even a collapse of the system.

The second dimension is the relationship between political trust and democratic support. Political scientists have been interested in whether there is a positive relationship between trust in the government and trust in the democratic system, in particular in new democracies. Research by Western scholars has generally accepted that democratic systems are conducive to the development of social and political trust, while such trust is not likely to develop under authoritarian regimes (Uslaner, 1999; Levi, 1998). However, current research has discovered that when compared to mature democracies and even high-performing authoritarian regimes, political trust in new democracies tends to be low. For instance, Chu, Diamond, and Shin (2001) point out that trust in political institutions in Taiwan and South Korea is low and has actually declined during the period of democratization. This decline threatens regime stability and produces the threat of democratic reversal.

**Political Generations**

Early research on political socialization stressed the importance of the transmission of political culture between generations for the stability of the political system. However, more recent research on political socialization has instead focused on the failure to transmit political culture between generations. In particular, changes in the socioeconomic and political environment are a source of intergenerational differences, particularly with regard to values.3

However, whether changes are simply cyclical or the result of actual intergenerational differences is a question that deserves attention. In the literature on political socialization and political culture, two theories to explain differences between individuals of different ages can be identified: life-cycle and generational shift. In the first approach, political feelings, attitudes, and positions are transmitted between generations. The more rebellious attitudes of the younger generation change as individuals get older and are faced with everyday realities. The cyclical approach argues that differences related to age are only temporary, and ultimately culture is formed through transmission between different generations. However, the generation difference approach

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3 In his revisions to modernization theory, Inglehart introduced new a new explanation for social change (Inglehart: 1977; 1990; 1997; 2004). This approach categorizes changes in industrialized countries since the 1970s as post-modernization or post-materialism. It argues that value systems in the West have shifted from a focus on material needs to post-material needs. Materialism is concerned with basic material and security needs, while post-materialism instead stresses quality of life issues, including environmental protection and the rights of minority groups. Post-materialism implicitly assumes that the basis for political and social change is a shift in values.
argues that the transmission of political culture between generations is not always smooth. Structural changes or the occurrence of major events mean that each generation shares their own collective experience, producing a hidden process of political socialization outside the formal transmission of political culture and leading to actual changes in values between generations.4

The Asian youth under 30 years of age reached voting age at the beginning of the twenty-first century. By reaching voting age, the youth gained the right to a voice in the political, economic, social, and cultural conversation. The most important factor in political change is a change in values among the new generation. In this paper, we focus on a single aspect of political values among the youth– political trust, examining the political implications of differences between generations.

Indices of Trust in Institutions

The existing literature shows that political trust has a significant influence on political stability. However, previous research has often failed to distinguish between political trust and political support. Although a minority of scholars have pointed out the difference between political trust and political support, operationalizing this distinction is problematic. Although conceptually Easton distinguished between two types of political support (diffuse and specific) and three levels of political support (community, regime, and authorities), he does not clearly distinguish political support from political trust. Easton believes that two dimensions of general political support can be identified: political trust and legitimacy, in other words whether a citizen trusts the political system and accords it political legitimacy. Therefore, political trust is viewed as an aspect of political support. In terms of specific political support, Easton also believes that it is difficult to distinguish between political support for and political trust in a government. Norris (1999) and Dalton (1999) develop this research by looking at different levels of political support, however they use the terms “political support” and “political trust” interchangeably.

The result is that when attempting to measure political trust, researchers are actually looking at political support. Hetherington (2005) points out that, over a long period, the National Election Studies (NES) survey in the United States has included diffuse and specific regime support in its item measuring political trust. This paper instead uses third wave data from the Asian Barometer Survey, which includes a battery of questions on political trust that directly ask respondents their level of trust in institutions. The questions are as follows: "I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them?" There were four possible answers: “A great deal of trust”, "Quite a lot of trust", "Not very much trust", and "None at all.” The coding process is as follows: first, according to common practice, a positive answer is coded as “1”, and all other answers are coded as “0”, with the index of trust measured as a

4 The research on the Western post-War baby boom is representative of this perspective. The high birth rate after the war led to a wave of population increases, and the collective views of this generation drove political change.
Using the ABS battery on institutional trust, we can distinguish between three types of political trust. The first type of trust in political institutions, including the president or prime minister, parliament, the courts, and political parties. These institutions cover the key institutional features of the political system, including the institutions associated with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Although political parties are not formal institutions, in the modern state, politics is carried out by parties, regardless of whether the country is a single-party authoritarian state (such as China, Vietnam, and Cambodia) or a liberal democracy (such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). Institutions of the second type are less political in nature, but are essential for ensuring the normal functioning of the state. These institutions can be referred to as governance institutions, and include the national government, local government, the civil service, the military, and the police. Aside from the national government (since control by different parties may have political implications), these institutions have neutral or non-political roles. Trust in these institutions reflects public views of government officials and the state machinery. Institutions of the third type are the least political, but are essential for the formation of a public space for popular consultation. This category includes mass media organization such as newspapers and television.

The analysis below explores the level of institutional trust on the basis of the categories below. The analysis puts particular focus on two independent variables: generation and the political system. First, we look at differences in institutional trust between different generations, in particular the young generation. Second, as East Asia has a diverse range of political systems and the basis for political support under each system is different, we should not compare institutional trust in different systems as if they were alike. The analysis shows that there is a large difference in institutional trust between different political systems, but little variation within systems.

Data Analysis

In order to measure the level of political trust among the youth, we use data from the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey. The survey was carried out between 2010 and 2012 in twelve countries and regions. In total, the survey covered four regime types including liberal democracy (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan); electoral democracy (Mongolia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand); electoral authoritarianism (Malaysia and Singapore); and one-party authoritarianism (Cambodia, Vietnam and China). We define “youth” as those thirty years-old or younger, and compare with other age cohorts, including adults aged 30-64 and seniors aged 65 and over. The paper does not discuss in detail the differences between generations within each country, instead focusing on the relationship between the political system and generational difference between the youth (30 and under) generation and other generations. Figure 1-3 shows the differences in institutional trust between generations in Asia, distinguishing between three different indices of institutional trust.
Figure 1 shows trust in the three main branches of government as well as political parties. Political parties in this case does not refer to a single party, but overall views on the role of the party. The table shows institutional trust in policy-making institutions, including the executive, legislature, and judiciary. In addition, since the main political actors in the modern state are political parties, which recruit and nominate individuals for office, we also regard parties as a policy-making institution in our analysis. Overall, Asian youth have a much higher level of trust in judicial institutions than other generations, with an inverted-J distribution. Trust in executive and legislative institutions showed similar patterns, with similar levels of trust found among youth and adults, and lower levels among seniors. Institutional trust in political parties showed a fairly flat inverted-U shape, with little difference between the three generations.

Figure 2 shows institutional trust in the local government, civil servants, military, and the police. We define this as trust in enforcement (or governance) institutions. Political theory generally expects that governance institutions play a politically neutral role. These institutions have functional roles in the everyday running of government, and should therefore be less politicized. We find that the youth have lower levels of trust in local government and the police than other generations, with the distribution showing a J-shape. However, trust in the military remains high across generations. In contrast, trust in civil servants is marginally higher among the youth than other generations.

Figure 3 shows trust in newspapers and television, which we label as trust in media institutions. In modern societies, the mass media acts as a key channel for mass communication, playing a vital role for both the government and ordinary citizens. Television has now become the major source for political news, playing a hugely influential role in the politics of both developed and developing countries. Aside from television, newspapers are the next most popular type of media. The reporting and commentary of powerful newspapers can have a major influence on politics. Our data show that trust in the media among the Asian youth is higher than the preceding two generations, and 6% higher than the preceding generation.

Overall, Asian youth show more trust in policy-making institutions than other generations. Most notably, their support for judicial institutions was 6% higher than the adult group and 9% higher than the senior group. More research is needed on the influence of other factors, including party identification and level of education, on institutional trust in policy-making institutions. Turning to trust in enforcement institutions, trust in the military that was similar across generations, while trust in local government and the police was lower among the youth. In contrast, the youth had higher levels of trust in civil servants. Finally, the youth have higher levels of trust in media institutions than other generations.
Figure 1 Trust in Policy-making Institutions across Generations

Figure 2 Trust in Enforcement Institutions across Generations

Figure 3 Trust in Media Institutions across Generations

Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Third Wave
Institutional Trust: Cross-National Comparison

The overall scores for institutional trust do not tell us about the picture in each country. Therefore, we now look at individual countries and ask what particular factors in each countries are responsible for variations in scores. Figure 4-13 shows the institutional trust measured in each country. We identify a pattern based on the system of government in each country. In the table below, the ranking of countries is based on the Freedom House score of each country at the time of the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey. Regimes are divided as follows: liberal democracies (Japan, South Korea), electoral democracies (Mongolia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand), electoral authoritarian regimes (Singapore and Malaysia) and one-party authoritarian regimes (China, Vietnam, and Cambodia).

For the executive, we asked the level of trust in the main national leader (president or president). However, since this question was not asked in mainland China and Vietnam, we used trust in the national government for our cross-national comparison. In Figure 4, we find that in Asian liberal democracies, trust in executive institutions is young. In particular, South Korea has the lowest level of youth trust in the executive leadership, showing a precipitous J-shape. This finding is similar to electoral democracies, although overall trust in the liberal democracies remains lower. The gap between the youth and adult generation in Japan is not large (13% and 16%), but there is a more substantial gap with the adult generation. Taiwan and the Philippines show a flat U distribution. The pattern of executive trust among Thailand’s youth, however, shows a different pattern, being clearly higher than the adult and senior generations. In authoritarian countries, trust in executive institutions is high, at over 70% in each case. In Malaysia and Cambodia, trust in executive institutions among the youth is lower than the preceding generation. The gap with Singapore is larger at 7%. Finally, we find that youth trust in executive institutions in Vietnam and China is marginally higher than the preceding generation.

Figure 4 Trust in the Executive by Country
For trust in legislative institutions, ABS asked the level of trust in the national parliament. The results are shown in Figure 5. Trust in the national parliament ranges from 6% and 12% in South Korea and Japan respectively, to 88% in China. Generally speaking, the greater the level of liberal democracy, the lower the level of trust in legislative institutions. In the first group of countries, trust in legislative institutions among the youth is no different from the overall population. However, in South Korea, trust in legislative institutions among the youth is 6%, 5% lower than the overall population. Overall, Taiwan shows a different pattern. Trust in legislative institutions among the youth is 7% higher than the preceding generation, and the highest among the liberal democracies at 25%. In the electoral democracies trust in legislative institutions is higher than in the liberal democracies. Youth trust in legislative institutions in Mongolia is 29%, broadly similar to the preceding generation but markedly different with the senior generation. Youth trust in legislative institutions in Indonesia is 46%, 5% lower than the preceding generation and 22% lower than the senior generation. However, in the Philippines and Thailand, youth trust in legislative institutions is higher than the preceding generation, at 49% and 52% respectively. In most authoritarian regimes, trust in legislative institutions is high. However, in the electoral democracies, legislative trust among the youth is lower than the preceding generation at 64% in Malaysia and 77% in Singapore (7% lower than the preceding generation in each case). Although at trust in the legislature in Vietnam and Cambodia is lower than the executive, it is still in the range of 75%-88%, a figure broadly similar to the preceding generation.
Figure 6 shows trust in judicial institutions. The question asks respondents about their trust in the courts. In almost all the surveyed countries, trust in judicial institutions among the youth was higher than the preceding generation. In these results, the gap between the youth and preceding generation was most marked, showing a precipitous J-curve. In Japan, youth trust in the courts was 66%, 12% higher than the preceding generation. In Taiwan the same figure was 45%, 18% higher than the preceding generation. The gap in South Korea was lower at only 4%, with 39% of youth expressing trust in the courts. The overall trust in the courts in Mongolia was the lowest among surveyed countries, however the Mongolian youth did trust courts more (26%) than preceding generations. The pattern in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, and China was similar, with relatively high levels of trust in the courts. In addition, youth trust in the courts was higher than the preceding generation in Malaysia (8%) as well as Thailand and Cambodia (12%). However, in Singapore and Vietnam, trust in the courts among the youth showed no obvious difference with other generations, with trust high across all age ranges.

Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Third Wave
Trust in political parties is shown in Figure 7. A number of different patterns emerged. Trust in political parties in the three electoral democracies as well as one electoral democracy (Mongolia) is lowest among the surveyed countries. At the same time, the difference between the youth and adult generation in these countries is lower than that than the gap with the senior generation. Indonesia has higher overall levels of trust in political parties, but also shows a similar patterns. However, the pattern in other electoral democracies does not follow this pattern. Malaysia and Singapore both showed a precipitous J-shaped distribution, with trust among the youth the lowest of all generations. In one-party states (Cambodia, Vietnam, and China), trust in political parties is high, but the gap between the generations is not large.

Figure 7 Trust in Political Parties by Country
Figure 8 shows trust in local government among respondents. Among the liberal democracies, the gap between generations is not obvious, showing a shallow U-shaped distribution with trust at between 49%-56%. In South Korea, the gap between the youth and adult generation is also very small (28% and 27%), but there is a much larger gap with the senior generation. Electoral democracies (Mongolia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) show a very similar pattern to South Korea, with a small gap between the youth and adult generation, but a much larger gap with the senior generation. In Malaysia, Singapore, and China, trust in local government was slightly lower than the preceding generation, showing a level J-shaped distribution. However, in Cambodia and Vietnam, there was a U-shaped distribution in trust.

Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Third Wave

Figure 8 Trust in Local government by Country
Youth trust in the civil service was broadly similar or slightly higher than other generations. The results in Figure 9 show that in South Korea, trust in civil servants among the youth is significantly lower than other generations at 26%. Taiwan and China also show low levels of trust in civil servants among the youth, but youth trust is within 5% of other generations in each case. In addition, aside from the similar levels of trust between generations in Malaysia and Thailand, Japan, Mongolia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam showed higher levels of youth trust in civil servants than other generations, with the gap ranging from 1% (Singapore) to 13% (the Philippines).

Figure 9 Trust in the Civil Service by Country
Trust in the military between generations showed a flatly sloping J-distribution, and was generally at 70% and above. Countries with this distribution included Japan, Mongolia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and China. In these countries, although trust in the military among the youth was lower than other generations, the gap was not large. In Singapore, trust in the military among the youth was higher than the adult generation, but the gap was not large. In South Korea, youth trust in the military was relatively low, at 4% lower than the adult generation and 16% lower than the adult generation. There was little generational difference in Taiwan, but overall trust in the military in Taiwan was lowest among all surveyed countries. Two electoral democracies, the Philippines and Thailand showed an interesting pattern, with youth trust in the military 12% and 8% higher respectively than other generations. However, the Philippines showed a U-shaped distribution, while Thailand showed an inversed J-shaped distribution.

Figure 10 Trust in the Military by Country

Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Third Wave

Turning to trust in the police, among the liberal democracies, we find similar patterns in Japan and South Korea, with a slightly sloping J-shaped distribution. In both countries, trust among the youth was noticeably behind other generations. Turning to the electoral democracies, Malaysia also showed lower trust among the youth generation, but similar results for the adult and senior generation. Taiwan, Mongolia, and Indonesia showed similar patterns, with a relatively small gap.
between the youth and adult generation, but a more noticeable difference with the senior generation. Two countries (the Philippines and Cambodia) show a V-shaped distribution, with youth trust higher than the other two generations. Other countries, including Thailand, Singapore, and mainland China have very flat distributions, showing little difference between the youth and other generations.

Figure 11 Trust in the Police by Country

![Graph showing trust in the police by country.]

Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Third Wave

The final index of institutional trust measures trust in the mass media. From comparative data on the twelve countries, we can see that trust in newspapers among the youth is different from preceding generations. The largest gaps were found in Taiwan (level of trust 33%, 13% higher than the preceding generation), Mongolia (level of trust 38%, 10% higher than the preceding generation), Indonesia (level of trust 66%, 9% higher than the preceding generation), the Philippines (level of trust 77%, 15% higher than the preceding generation), Thailand (level of trust 54%, 9% higher than the preceding generation), and Malaysia (level of trust 68%, 11% higher than the preceding generation). However, Singaporean and South Korean youth showed lower levels of trust in newspapers. However, in one liberal democracy (Japan) and all the one-party authoritarian regimes, although there was little difference in institutional trust between the youth and adult generations, there was a clear difference with the senior generation.

Figure 12 Trust in Newspapers by Country

![Graph showing trust in newspapers by country.]

Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Third Wave
Figure 13 shows trust in television, revealing several distinct patterns. Only South Korea and Singapore have a J-shaped distribution, with the youth having the lowest levels of trust. In Taiwan and Mongolia, trust in television among the youth was higher than the adult generation, but similar to the senior generation, producing a U-shaped distribution. However, the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia showed a J-shaped distribution. In addition, the gap between the youth and adult generation in Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and China was relatively small.

Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Third Wave
Three Factors Analysis

This paper distinguished between policy-making institutions, enforcement institutions, and media institutions. Aside from its theoretical justification, this categorization also has a statistical basis. We carry out an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on ABS data on institutional trust. To carry out factor analysis on the ten question items on institutional trust, the paper uses principal component analysis and the varimax orthogonal method to carry out factor extraction. The results are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 1 shows that in the EFA model Goodness of Fit Test, the KMO value is .868, exceeding .5 and close to 1, demonstrating that these variables are suitable for factor analysis. In addition, the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity value is 58609.072 at .000 significance, demonstrating suitability for factor analysis.

In Table 2, from the ten measures of trust, we identify three components. The first component includes items on trust in the executive, parliament, judicature, and political parties, which we refer to as trust in policy-making institutions. The second component includes items on trust in the local government, civil service, military and police, which we refer to as trust in enforcement institutions. The third component includes items on trust in newspapers and television, which we refer to as trust in media institutions.

Next, the spatial distribution map showing the results of the factor analysis demonstrate that the newspapers and television (media institutions) and local government, civil service, military and police (enforcement institutions) form distinct groups (shown by the red circles in Figure 14). However, among the policy-making institutions, the item of the courts leans towards an enforcement institution, possibly demonstrating expectations of political neutrality among ordinary citizens. Overall, the results of the factor analysis fit the different indices of institutional trust used by this paper.

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<tr>
<th>KMO and Bartlett's Test</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of</td>
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<td>Sampling Adequacy</td>
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<td>Bartlett's Test of Approx. Chi-</td>
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<td>Sphericity df Sig.</td>
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Table 2 Three Factors Analysis of Institutional Trust

Rotated Component Matrix
Table 3 shows ANOVA results for the four regime types and three generations across the three generations. Across all regime types, youth trust in policy-making institutions (-.023) is lower than adults (0.13), but slightly higher than seniors (-.036). However, youth trust in enforcement institutions (-.035) is lower than both adults (-.004) and seniors (0.92). At the same time, the youth tend to be
more trusting of media institutions (.075) than adults (-0.034) and seniors (.052). Overall, although the variance is not large, when compared with other generations, the youth are less trusting of policy-making institutions and enforcement institutions, but more trusting of media institutions.

When we look only at liberal democracies, we find that adults have the lowest level of trust in policy-making institutions (-.765), while trust among the youth was only fractionally higher (-.745). There was a more significant difference, however, with seniors (-.648). A similar trend was observed for media institutions. Trust among adults was lowest at -.290, showing little difference with the youth (-.263) but a larger gap with seniors (.011). Turning to enforcement institutions, although the youth showed the lowest level of trust (-.293), there was little difference with adults (-.233), but a larger gap with seniors (-0.079). This result is because two out of the three liberal democracies in the region, Taiwan and South Korea are new democracies that emerged in the third wave. The younger two generations (youth and adults) have been more influenced by democracy, showing very similar levels of trust. Seniors who lived most of their lives under authoritarianism show a very different pattern.

Turning to electoral democracies, we find significant differences in institutional trust between generations. Looking at institutional trust in policy-making institutions, the youth generation showed the lowest levels of trust -.433, followed by adults at -.345 and seniors at -.274. We also found similar results when we looked at enforcement institutions, with youth showing the lowest levels of institutional trust (-.160), compared to adults (-.079) and seniors (.108). However, we found a reverse trend when we looked at trust in media institutions, with the youth showing the highest level of trust (.204), followed by adults (-.019) and seniors (-.080).

When compared to democratic systems, the intergenerational differences in institutional support in authoritarian regimes are less marked. In electoral authoritarian regimes, a significant generational difference was found in institutional trust in policy-making institutions and media institutions. For policy-making institutions, the youth showed the lowest level of trust (.204), followed by adults (.356) and seniors (.434). Adults had the lowest levels of trust in media institutions (-.124), followed by youth (-0.017) and seniors. Finally, for one-party authoritarian regimes, we only found a significant intergenerational difference in policy-making institutions, with institutional trust among the youth (.705), adults (.847), and seniors (.952).

Overall, we find that intergenerational differences in institutional trust are more significant in democratic regimes than authoritarian regimes. Regardless of the political system, institutional trust among the youth tends to be lower. However, in democratic countries, the substantive difference occurs between seniors and the younger two generations, although this difference is less significant in liberal democracies. Overall, in Asia there is an inverse relationship between the level of institutional trust and the level of freedom, a pattern repeated when we look only at the youth.
First we look at whether institutional trust benefits political stability. To measure demands for institutional change, we use the following question:

- q84. Compared with other systems in the world, would you say our system of government works fine as it is, needs minor change, needs major change, or should be replaced?

Coding is as follows: “should be replaced” recode to “4”, “needs major change” recode to “3”, “needs minor change” recode to “2” and “works fine as it is” recode to “1”. In order to verify the relationship between political stability and institutional trust, we look at the correlation between demands for institutional change and institutional trust as measured in this paper. The results are shown in Table 4.
Political scientists generally believe that if institutional trust is high, demands for political change will be lower. If our data matches this hypothesis, there should be a negative correlation between demand for political change and institutional trust. We can also infer that the negative correlation between the youth and other generations will be particularly marked among the youth. Table 4 shows that overall there is a negative correlation between institutional trust and demand for political change. However, only institutional trust in policy-making institutions corresponds to our hypothesis that the negative correlation should be higher for the youth generation. In addition, there was only a significant relationship for policy-making institutions and enforcement institutions among the youth, showing a weaker relationship than other generations.

Looking at differences between regime types, there are fewer flag significant correlations between trust in different institutions and demands for political change among the youth. For electoral democracies, institutional trust among the youth generation also showed a lower correlation with demands for political change than other generations. Turning to authoritarian regimes, although there are fewer flag significant correlations among the youth, the flag significant correlations we find are slightly stronger than other generations for both electoral authoritarian regimes and one-party authoritarian regimes.

Overall, the institutional trust of youth living under democratic regimes does not have any significant relationship with demand for political change. This result may reflect a low level of political involvement and social experience among the youth. In comparison, most of the authoritarian regimes in the region are in a key period of structural change caused by economic growth and environmental change. For youth living under these regimes, the relationship between institutional trust and demands for political change is more obvious.

Table 4 Analysis of the Relationship between Political Change and Institutional Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Adults</th>
<th>Seniors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>policy-making institutions</td>
<td>-.311**</td>
<td>-.301**</td>
<td>-.283**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enforcement institutions</td>
<td>-.216**</td>
<td>-.224**</td>
<td>-.249**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media institutions</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-.058**</td>
<td>-.061*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Democracy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy-making institutions</td>
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<td>-.248**</td>
<td>-.216**</td>
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<tr>
<td>enforcement institutions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>media institutions</td>
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<td>-.130**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Democracy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy-making institutions</td>
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<td>-.226**</td>
<td>-.208**</td>
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<tr>
<td>enforcement institutions</td>
<td>-.154**</td>
<td>-.174**</td>
<td>-.194**</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
media institutions  
Electoral Authoritarianism  
- policy-making institutions  
- enforcement institutions  
- media institutions  
One-Party Authoritarianism  
- policy-making institutions  
- enforcement institutions  
- media institutions  

Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Third Wave

Youth Institutional Trust and Political Support

Next, we look at the relationship between institutional trust and democratic support. This is an important issue for the UNDP, given the organization’s concern with young people’s perceptions and attitudes towards democratic principles. It is also related to the question of the future development of democratic governance. In the third wave of the ABS, items related to democratic support (emphasizing preference for democracy among competing regime types):

- q89. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in [Country].
- q126. If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important?
- q127. If you had to choose between reducing economic inequality and protecting political freedom, which would you say is more important?
- q128. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government."

From these items, we constructed an index for preference for democracy. In Table 5, the dependent variable is preference for democracy (as an indicator of democratic support), while the independent variable included the indicators of institutional trust and demand for political change.

However, in most cases the relationship between support for democracy and indicators of institutional trust and demand for political change. For the youth, overall there was only a significant relationship with institutional trust for policy-making institutions and enforcement institutions. The relationship was positive, showing the higher the level of institutional trust, the greater the level of democratic support. However, when we break the results down by regime type, we find a significant relationship between political support and institutional trust only in the case of policy-making
institutions under electoral democracies. These results show that, at least for citizens in Asia, there is no clear positive relationship between institutional trust and democratic support as predicted in the literature. The relationship between institutional trust and democratic support is influenced by a number of intervening variables.

Table 5 Analysis of the Relationship Between Political Support and Institutional Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in Institution</th>
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<th>Adults</th>
<th>Seniors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>.016</td>
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<tr>
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<td>political change</td>
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<td>One-Party Authoritarianism</td>
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<tr>
<td>policy-making institutions</td>
<td>.043</td>
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<tr>
<td>political change</td>
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</table>

Resource: Asian barometer survey third wave

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we examined the contents of institutional trust among the Asian youth. We hoped
to identify the unique features of institutional trust among the youth by comparing it with other generations. We carry out an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on ABS data on institutional trust. We define three different components depending on type: trust in policy-making institutions, trust in enforcement institutions, and trust in media institutions.

Overall, we find that in democracies, generational differences in institutional trust are more significant than authoritarian regimes. For authoritarian regimes, there was only a significant intergenerational difference for trust in policy-making institutions. In addition, institutional trust among the youth tends to be low, regardless of the economic system. Finally, institutional trust in Asian democracies is low. In Asia, there is an inverse relationship between the level of institutional trust and the level of freedom, a pattern repeated when we look only at the youth.

Overall, the low level of institutional trust among Asian youth is striking. In particular, the low level of trust in policy-making institutions may be a tipping point for future political change. In addition, the difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes is worthy of further attention. In the former, trust in the executive is lower among the youth, but in the latter, trust in the legislature and political parties is lower among the youth.

In addition, we are also interested in whether the difference between institutional trust among the youth and other generations is reflected in demand for political change and support for democracy. The results of our study show that although institutional trust has some effect on democratic support and demand for political change, for the youth generation, this relationship is rather weak. In other words, differences in institutional trust between the youth and other generations are not necessarily reflected in greater desire for political change or support for democracy. From this result, it is clear that if the youth are to become the agents of future generation, it is not clear that it will be the result of the particular contents of political trust among the youth.

References


