Working Paper Series: No. 24

Economic Development and Political Participation: Comparison of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

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Issued by
Asian Barometer Project Office
National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica
2004 Taipei
Asian Barometer

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

Working Paper Series

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The ABS Working Paper Series is issued by the Asian Barometer Project Office, which is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science of National Taiwan University and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. At present, papers are issued only in electronic version.

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One of the most widely accepted themes in social science is that the emergence and the stability of democracies are associated in certain way with economic development (Almond and Verba 1963; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Deutsch 1961; Lipset 1959; Paige 1971; Rural Desk of the Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 1994; Schmid 1992). Although the theory has been “supported and contested, revised and extended, buried and resuscitated, (Diamond 1992; Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 156)” proponents and opponents of the modernization theory both agree that economic development would lead to higher level of citizen participation, if not democracy.

Among the reasons offered for the empirical connection between economic development and political participation, a common idea is that the process of economic development leads to clusters of social change that will drastically alter social structure, organizational, and political culture of a nation--and that these are associated with new forms of political behavior. The causal chains consist of sequences of industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, mobilization, and political incorporation, among innumerable others: a progressive accumulation of social changes that ready for people to get involved in political lives in a society.

In this chapter, we use the data gathered from these three soceities to explore the relationship between economic development and political participation. Although the topic of this chapter is associated in some way with the central issue in comparative politics—the relationship between economic development and political democracy, this chapter is not designed to answer that particular question directly. Instead, we confine our analyses to the impacts of economic development on social structure, people's political attitudes and political behavior. It is true that the changes in people's political behavior may closely relate to
democratization, but many other factors may contaminate such a process.

We divide our analysis into five sections. The first of these provides evidence on the relationship between economic development and general level of political participation in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. These data are used as the baseline for our study. In the subsequent three sections, we will try to sort out the impacts of structural, institutional, and cultural factors on mass political behavior in these societies. The last section analyzes the relative weight of these factor on political participation and try to map the causal mechanism between economic development and political participation.

Economic development and political participation: theoretical discussion

Economic development can bring many changes in a society. Among them, the most important one is that it usually creates a condition favor higher level of political participation. Among many theories offered to explain the empirical connection between economic development and political participation, a common idea is that the process of economic development leads to clusters of social changes that will drastically alter the class, organizational, cultural, and social structure of a nation--and that these are associated with new forms of political participation.¹

Students of political participation see the decision for political actors to participate in politics is function of cost-benefits calculation. Any changes in either side of the equation, i.e., to increase the benefits or reduce the costs of participation would influence the decision of political actors to participate (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 6-10). Because economic

development influences both sides of the equation, scholars believe it increases general level of political participation through the following mechanism.

*Economic development and changes in social structure:* When it comes to the analysis of political participation, the standard socio-economic model comes to our mind immediately. The model states that certain socio-economic resources have crucial impacts on political participation. Those with more education, higher income, and higher-status occupation participate more than those who are poor, uneducated, and in low-status occupations in society of different institutional settings (Lukes 1974; Rokeach 1960; Weber 1947).

The supply of these structural resources in different societies varies with the level of their respective levels of economic development. As a nation develops economically, the shape of its social stratification structure will be gradually altered. Economic development expands the proportion of higher status roles in a society, more more people become educated. Increased requirements for training labor, the growths of opportunities in social mobility, and the expansion of formal education usually lead to a change of the social structure in a society--i.e., the pyramidal class structure associated with peasant and peasant-worker societies give rise to a more diamond shaped structure--the middle stratum expands and eventually becomes the majority class as greater numbers of citizens become members of the educated white-collar class. With the increases in the supply of those resources, general level of participation increases naturally.

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2 Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, p. 362.

3 To this, Huntington and Nelson add another point--economic and social development also creates social conflict and group consciousness which in turn mobilize people to various political activities and collective political actions (Rural Desk of the Department of Grassroots
Economic development and changes in people’s psychological orientation: Political actions are constrained by structural conditions and motivated by an actor's preferences and internal process (Elster 1986; Elster 1989). Such psychological resources as people's beliefs, attitudes, and affects are central determinants of political participation in various societies (Nie; Powell, and Prewitt 1969a; Nie; Powell, and Prewitt 1969b; Rokeach 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba; Nie, and Kim 1978; Weber 1947).

Although psychological orientation of political actors are relatively stable, the “idea that rapid, large-scale contextual changes are personally disorienting and culturally disruptive is hardly new (Eckstein 1988, 796).” Increases in education, media access, and wealth usually make people to become interested in politics, efficacious, and trust their fellow citizens. By dramatically changing the relationship between citizens and state and increasing socio-economic resources for individuals, economic development may gradually transform people’s psychological orientation toward political objects. Modernization also helps to spread democratic aspirations among a variety of people (Dahl 1989). The changes of political values and orientations among population have significant impacts on people’s political behavior (Barnes 1988; Inglehart 1997).

4 Note that the consequences of evolving economic and social structure do not fall equally on a population. New cohorts with relatively short memories and open minds are more vulnerable and susceptible to the effects of change brought about by the process of modernization. With new generations gradually replacing the older ones, political culture in a society may change.

5 Among different aspects of psychological orientation toward social objects, some, such as cognition and feeling are relatively easy to be influenced by changes in the social environment, while others, especially orientation labeled as system culture, are more difficult to change.
Economic development and changes in the functions of government: although political scientists have long realized that people political behavior are constrained by the institutional settings in which they operate, few studies tried to actual explore institutional effects on people's behavior. Thus situation make Rosenstone and Hansen criticize the current literature of political participation that the reigning theories of participation as, "amazing as it may seem, do not have much to say about politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 3)." To understand people's behavior, we must not take them in theoretical isolation. Instead, we should place them in a political contact and try to identify aspects of social and political life that push them to deal with authorities to influence its distribution of social goods and values.

Economic development partly requires and party produces a notable expansion of the functions of government. As a nation develops, its socialized economy requires government to get involved in more promotion, regulation, and redistribution. Within such a process, individuals' relationships with nation-state become critical. If taxes are collected and regulations controlling for economy are imposed, individuals are very likely to respond to defend themselves against the state. Increases in the scope of government activities usually accelerate level of political participation.

In addition to the level of economic development, speed of economic development may also influence people's political behavior. Rather than unified process, different speed of

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6 For exception, see among others, (Jackman 1987; Powell 1986).

7 For discussion of the impact of government output on political participation, see {Weiner 1971 #671 /ft", 173-175". It should be pointed out that not only the increases in the government activities can stipulate people to participate in politics, the retreat of the government from the areas which it had been involved previously, as the case in mainland China, may also accelerate people to ask for continuing government intervention.
economic development usually produces different changes in people's political behavior. The findings that rapid economic development is associated with the “extremist movement”--fascism and communism are not new to students of politics. “Wherever industrialization occurred rapidly” that “introducing sharp discontinuities between the pre-industrial and industrial situation, more extremist working-class movements emerged (Lipset 1981, 54).” While rapid economic development tends to mobilize low class to get involved radical movement to challenge existing political order, gradual development transform people’s political behavior through the continuing supply of socioeconomic, organizational, and psychological resources thus encourage people to participate in politics in conventional ways.

When a nation becomes developed, these two processes would converge. As the lower strata people would either be demobilized or become higher social class themselves thus incorporated to the existing political process, they no longer have intention to challenge the existing political system. The key to the success or failure of this conversion, according to Huntington, is level of institutionalization (Huntington 1968).

These theoretical considerations suggest that economic development influences the way chosen by people to pursue their interests when dealing with public authorities. Specifically, economic development may lead to an increase in the mobilized participation at its early stage but those mobilized political acts eventually will become autonomous ones. Researches in India, Turkey, Pakistan, and the Philippines show that early economic development in these traditional societies provides a tremendous stimulus for mobilized voting participation. Then socio-economic development changes the distribution of statuses with a society and increases the importance of autonomous participation (Rural Desk of the Department of Grassroots
Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs  1994, 54). The experiences in these societies make Huntington and Nelson conclude that “in general, the level of mobilized participation in a society probably has an inverted U-shaped relation and the level of autonomous participation in a linear relation to the level of socio-economic development.”

Finally but no less important is that economic development usually produce another crucial change—a displacement of more traditional modes of participation, i.e., patron-client and communal group based political acts by more modern ones, i.e., class and party based ones (Rural Desk of the Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs  1994, 55). In traditional societies, families, tribes, and grassroots organizations control social resources. To compete for social resources, actors in traditional societies need to rely on personal ties, family relationship, and various connections. Social scientists since Weber realized that economic development usually transform the way by which social resources is organized and distributed in a society (Almond and Coleman 1960; Gerth and Wright 1946). Unfortunately, an even more important but usually neglected change caused by economic development is that public authorities usually turn from the sole supplier and distributor of material and nonmaterial social resources to regulators of resource distribution. Such a change will alter the incentive structure for political actors. When interests in a society reorganized in a different way, the strategy for political actors to pursue their interests will also change. Rather than relying on patron client ties and personal relationship, political actors now need to rely on different strategies to pursue their interests (Shi 1997, chap. 1).

We can deduce four hypotheses regarding to the relationship between economic development and political participation based on the previous discussion:
1. Economic development increases general level of political participation in a society.

2. Economic development changes the strategy utilized by political actors to pursue their interest.

3. Not only the level of economic development influences general level of participation, speed of economic development also matters. In society or places of rapid economic development, engagement in unconventional political acts may dramatically increase.

4. The social base of participation is linked to economic development. While people belong to lower strata are more likely to participate in less developed societies, higher socioeconomic stratus people are more active in developed societies.

**Does modernization theory have capability to "travel" to communist societies?**

Since mainland China is still a communist society, we must answer another question before we can proceed with our analyses, that is, does modernization theory have the traveling capacity? This question has two dimensions. The first is whether we can apply this theory to study political development of communist societies. Many scholars strongly against using the theory developed in other society to the context of communist societies.8 Because institution arrangements in communist societies are different from those in West Europe, they argue, the concepts developed in other societies should not be applicable to communist societies (LaPalombara 1978; Sharlet 1969).

Note that this problem also exists in other non-communist societies. The modernization theory has been purposefully cast as timeless and irrelevant of institution. Not only the dependent

8 For example, Bollen and Jackman (Bollen and Jackman 1985d) deliberately exclude communist nations in their study of the relationship between economic and political development.
variable of the theory is institution but essences of the theory itself is about the relationship between economic development and the possible change of political institution. If the theory is correct, the communist leaders should not be able to defend itself against the trend predicted by the theory. Thus, whether the modernization theory travels or not to the communist societies is an empirical question and political development in those should be considered as its "critical test." If autonomous political acts in communist societies increases with economic development despite the regimes worked hard to prevent people from participating in politics to articulate their private interests, the power of the theory would be greatly strengthened.

Documentary researches in communist societies seem to confirm the applicability of the theory. Many researches show that the mobilized political acts of lower social class at the early stage of economic development in Russia and China helped communist parties gain political power (Bianco 1967; Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979). After the establishment of the new regime, the ruling elites in both societies worked very hard to prevent people from getting engaged in autonomous political acts to articulate their interests deviated from those defined by the communist parties (Arendt 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956; Skilling and Griffiths 1971). Despite the efforts of the regime, autonomous participation flourished in communist societies with their economic development (Falkenheim 1978; Friedgut 1979; Hough 1976; Jennings 1997; Millar 1987; Shi 1997). In the Soviet Union and East European countries, the tension created by economic development finally knocked down the communist regimes in 1990s. In mainland China, economic reform led to a redistribution of economic power between the state and individuals (White 1993, 198). Even the impacts of such changes on the regime type remain to be seen, such shift did make people become more assertive in articulating their own interests.
(O'Brien 1996; O'Brien and Li 1995). In fact, including communist regime in the empirical test of the relationship between economic development and democratic performance does not change the "iron laws specified by modernization theorists (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994)."

The second dimension of this problem is whether we can apply the term "political participation" to the communist societies. Some scholars strongly oppose the attempt to use the term "political participation" in communist countries because it will cause a serious problem of concept-stretching. "Because political participation ... as a concept that helps us define a particular kind of polity," wrote Joseph LaPalombara, "it does not serve comparative analysis well to find the concept used to describe polities that are manifestly not democratic of any kind (LaPalombara 1978, 171)." Noticed that the existing political institutions in communist countries can only perform specific functions -- e.g., policy implementation and political socialization, Sharlet argues that the "definition of political participation in the literature of political science are inadequate for the study of communist systems (Sharlet 1969, 250)."

We fully agree with their concern of the potential danger of "concept-stretching" when using the term "political participation" in communist societies. However, the assumption of their argument--that people in communist societies cannot articulate their private interests and participation in those societies can only perform such function as policy implementation and political socialization may not be incorrect. Many recent studies of mass behavior in communist societies reveal, as political terror and mass mobilization subside, an accompanying revival of genuine political competition emerged in communist societies within the framework of political controls to articulate and pursue their shared interests (Bahry and Silver 1990; DiFranceisco and Gitelman 1984; Falkenheim 1978; Skilling and Griffiths 1971; Skilling and Griffiths 1971). Even
the nature of the regime in those societies remains unchanged, voluntary political acts aimed at influencing the decision of the government rather than mobilized by the regime flourished in mainland China (Burns 1988; Jennings 1997; Manion 1996; Shi 1997). As long as we can include only political acts that are aimed at voluntary inputs into the system and exclude ceremonial mobilization or coercive support from our study, we run little risks of concept-stretching.

**The relationship between economic development and political participation: empirical findings**

Most studies on the relationship between economic development and mass participation are based on comparison either across countries or over time. We can not deny that cross country comparison has many advantages, but it also has several disadvantages which limit our exploration of the impacts of economic development on people's political behavior.

Cross country study does not allow us to control for effects of political culture when we study the relationship between economic development and people's political behavior. If we find variation in people's political behavior associated with economic development, we are unable to identify the sources of such a variation. Moreover, since the societies included in this study range from authoritarian mainland China, to colonial Hong Kong and newly democratic Taiwan, regime type may play an important role in shaping people's behavior. When we find similarity or differences in people's political behavior in these societies, we do not know whether the regime type or economic development is responsible for such variation.

Fortunately, economic development within a country may also be unequal. Some areas developed faster than others for various reasons. The regional differences in the level of economic development only lead to an unequal distribution of socioeconomic and psychological
resources among population in different areas in a country but also create differences in scope of
government activities. These differences give researchers a wonderful opportunity to hold regime
type constant to exam impacts of economic development on people's political behavior, a luxury
not available in cross country study. If we find systematic differences in people's political
behavior in areas of different economic development in the country, we know for sure that it is
the economic development, rather than the regime type that causes these differences.

Despite the apparent advantage of inter-regional comparison, few researchers have tried to
make such comparison. A major reason for this neglect is that the test cases are difficult to find.
To qualify for such kind of comparison, the country must be large enough to allow for regional
disparity in their level of economic development. The disparity must also be large enough to
induce variation in behavior of political actors.

The data gathered from mainland China allows for such comparison. The country
includes developed coastal areas, middle developed inland provinces, and backward northwest
regions. The scope of the disparity among these regions is large enough to produce meaningful
variances for us to manipulate. The 1993 per capita GDP of the counties included in this study
ranges from 1036 to 48,035 Yuan. We also collected data of the 1982 per capita GDP of those
counties. Based on the data gathered at two time spots, we can calculate speed of economic
development in those places. In the following analysis, we use both cross-society and cross-
regional data to examine impacts of economic development on people's political behavior.

**Impacts of economic development on the level of political participation**

For those who threw doubts on the traveling capability of the social mobilization theory to
communist societies, the core concern is about institutional effects. We can translate such
concern into the following theoretical statement, that is, the regimes in communist societies can effectively use state power to meddling the relationship between economic and political development.\(^9\) One way to test this theory is to examine whether economic development make people more actively engage in various autonomous political activities.

Figure 1 plots level of political participation for people living in counties or cities of different levels of economic development in mainland China. We evenly divide sampling counties into five categories based on their per capita GDP. The per capita GDP for the poorest counties ranges from 1,036 yuan to 2,208 yuan, for poor counties ranges from 2,209 to 3,434 yuan, for mid-developed counties ranges from 3,435 to 5,000 yuan, for rich counties ranges from 5,001 to 8,763 yuan, and for the richest counties ranges from 8,764 to 48,035.

The analysis reveals a nearly perfect linear relationship between economic development and level of political participation in mainland China. While 89.4 percent of people living in most developed areas report that they have engaged in at least one political act, 80.5 percent people residing in the least developed areas reported that they have engaged in at least one political act to pursue their interests. With every increase in the level of economic development, we can find a statistically significant increase in the general level of participation. The finding confirms the hypothesis I.

Comparing impacts of economic development on political participation across societies is more difficult. We need to create a common index to measure political acts across society. For

\(^9\) For debate on this issues, See among others, (White 1993;White 1994) and (McCormick 1994).
this purpose, we use the overall participation index built in the previous chapter. In addition, we also need to find a proper way to compare level of economic development across societies.

Traditionally, scholars use the official foreign exchange rates to convert GNP of different countries into U.S. dollars to facilitate such comparison. Using such method, the per capita GNP of mainland China is $530 in 1994 and $620 in 1995. The per capita GNP of different areas in mainland China ranges from $126 to $5,858.

Recently, economists in World Bank realized that the method significantly underestimates the GNP in developing countries and deflate their level of development. This problem is especially serious for country like mainland China. To adjust for the differences, experts in World Bank developed the purchasing power parity (PPP) approach to measure the GNP of developing countries. The method takes account of the fact that price for services in developing countries are usually lower than those of the developed countries. It makes adjustment based on such differences.

Although economists in the West continue to debate the accuracy of the PPP method in

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10 At the exchange rate $1=8.2 Yuan.

11 Among the problems with this method are the non-tradable goods and services are undercounted, while exchange rate fluctuations can distort comparisons from one year to the next. To adjust for exchange rate fluctuation, World Bank developed the Atlas method which use a three-year weighted to average official exchange rate.

12 PPP is defined as the number of units of a country’s currency required to buy the same amounts of goods and services in the domestic market as $1 would buy in the United States. In theory, the PPP methodology requires extensive price surveys that measure a country’s output. Prices for different components of GNP in one country are then compared with prices for comparable goods and services in other countries using rations, or price indexes. Many economists feel that measuring China’s GNP in this way can more accurately represent what the country’s total output is worth—and how much Chinese citizen can afford—relative to other countries. See, (Gelb 1996, 13).
facilitating cross-country comparison, they all agree that the PPP is a more accurate measure for
the total size of economy of mainland China than GNP. We therefore decide to use the PPP
approach to adjust for the differences of economy in these three societies. Measured by PPP
international dollars, the 1993 per capita GNP for Hong Kong is 24,528, Taiwan is 12,066, and
mainland China is 2502.\textsuperscript{13} The per capita GNP for different areas in mainland China ranges from
$863 to $40,029.\textsuperscript{14}

Figure 2 is about here

Figure 2 plots general level of participation in these three societies.\textsuperscript{15} For the comparative
purpose, we also plot the data on level of participation in different areas in mainland China. If we
compare participation in mainland China and in Taiwan, we will find that general level of
participation in these two societies increases with economic development. The level of economic
development in Taiwan is higher than that of mainland China, so do level of participation in
Taiwan as compare to that of mainland China. Including Hong Kong in the comparison changed
the picture. While Hong Kong takes the lead in its economy among three societies, level of
participation among people in Hong Kong is the lowest in these three societies. The general level
of political participation in Hong Kong is even lower than that of the poorest areas in mainland
China.

One possible explanation attributes this deviation to the less developed electoral system in
Hong Kong. Hong Kong was a British colony at the time of the survey. Hong Kong has both the

\textsuperscript{13} Central Intelligence Agency, 1994, The World Fact Book, data for Taiwan, p. 473,
mainland China, p 89, Hong Kong, p. 177.

\textsuperscript{14} According to PPP method, the Dollar-RMB rates would be around $1=1.2 Yuan.

\textsuperscript{15} The per capita GNP is converted to international dollars by PPP method.
legislative and the executive council. However, members of these governing bodies were appointed by the governor designed by Queen of Britain, rather than elected by people in the territory. During 150 years British control, People in Hong Kong had neither the right to vote for public officials nor legislators. Although this situation began to change after the Sino-British joint declaration in 1984, especially after Chris Pattern assumed the position as governor in 1993, electoral development in Hong Kong is still in its very early stage (Mesquita; Newman, and Rabushka 1996, 40). Given the short time of the Pattern reform, voters may have yet to become familiar with the electoral process to use such opportunity to pursue their interest.

To find out whether institutional constraints can explain the deviation in Hong Kong and more important, to study impacts of economic development on methods chosen by people to participate in politics, we decompose the overall participation index into six participatory modes developed in chapter ?. Figure 3 presents the relationship between economic development and each participatory mode in these three societies.

Figure 3 is about here

From figure 3, we learned that electoral participation in Hong Kong is significantly lower than those of the mainland China and Taiwan. While 91 and 75.3 percent of people in Taiwan and mainland China voted in elections, only 29.6 percent of people in Hong Kong reported that they voted in elections. Political actors in Hong Kong also less active in getting involved in campaign activities as compare to people in other societies.16 Among three populations, Mainlanders is the most active one in campaign activities, followed by the Taiwanese, and people

16 Since respondents in Taiwan significantly over-report their voting, we doubt that people in mainland China are as active, if not more than people in other two societies in voting.
in Hong Kong. Nearly a quarter of the population in mainland China reported that they have engaged in campaign activities in election time, 17.5 percent of people in Taiwan campaigned in election for governors and members of the legislative council. Only 7.3 percent of the population in Hong Kong reported that they have engaged in campaign activities.

The relationship between economic development and participation in the non structured political acts are also more complicated than that suggested by modernization theorists. For appeal, we found people in mainland China are more active than people in Hong Kong, and people in Hong Kong are more active than people in Taiwan. For cronyism, we found engagement in such acts negatively associated with economic development. While people in economically developed Hong Kong are least likely to utilize such acts to pursue their interests, people in the least developed mainland China are most active in getting involve in such acts to pursue their interests. This finding confirms hypothesis II: The economic development drags political actors away from utilizing traditional and parochial method to pursue their interest.

Finally, the relationship between economic development and engagement in the new form of acts, i.e., elite-challenging ones, is U-shape. People in the most development societies--Hong Kong are not only more active in adversarial activities than people in mainland China and Taiwan, but also in protest. While more than 14 percent of people in Hong Kong reported that they engaged in protest and 9.1 percent of people chose adversarial activities to pursue their

17 Scholars have found that participation in most societies "springs from two fundamentally different processes, one being an older elite-directed mode of political participation, the other a newer elite-challenging mode." While elite-directed modes of participation take place within the framework of the established political order, elite-challenging acts take place outside the established order. For differentiation between them, see (Inglehart and Klingemann 1979, 207).
Note that the two elite-directing modes of participation are different from elite-challenging ones in two important ways. First, they usually serve for different purposes for political actors in the society. While elite-directing political acts such as appeal and especially cronyism can be aimed at influencing the way by which government policy is implemented, elite-challenging political acts such as adversarial acts and protest are usually aimed at influencing the way by which government policy is made. Second, different from elite-directing political acts, participating in elite-challenging acts usually requires political actors to assume their relationship with authorities to be reciprocal. Those believing their relationship with authority should be hierarchical may make appeals to the authorities or engage in cronyism to pursue their interest, but it is very hard for us to imagine people believe their relationship with the authorities to be hierarchical would use adversarial activities and protest to influence the decision of the government because the traditional political culture in China does not confer them the idea that they have a right to confront political leaders in the society (Katzenstein 1996; Pye 1988). For political actors to choose elite-challenging political acts to pursue their goals, transformation of orientation toward power and authority is crucial. Such transformation, we believe, should be closely associated with the modernization process. Economic development leads to the emergence of newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV. With the growth of modern communication, new ideas from other societies usually flood into the traditional society which leads to an important value change (Inglehart 1997). We believe the most important value changes associated with modernization process is people's orientation toward power and authorities.

From the analysis, we learned that the underdeveloped electoral system in Hong Kong is partially responsible for lower level of political participation in the British colony. However, lacking developed electoral system does not fully account for the lower level of political participation in that society. Beside elections, engagement in other conventional political acts, such as appeal and cronyism are also lowest in Hong Kong among people in these three societies. People in the more developed Hong Kong are substantially more active in elite-challenging political acts than people in other societies.\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) Note that the two elite-directing modes of participation are different from elite-challenging ones in two important ways. First, they usually serve for different purposes for political actors in the society. While elite-directing political acts such as appeal and especially cronyism can be aimed at influencing the way by which government policy is implemented, elite-challenging political acts such as adversarial acts and protest are usually aimed at influencing the way by which government policy is made. Second, different from elite-directing political acts, participating in elite-challenging acts usually requires political actors to assume their relationship with authorities to be reciprocal. Those believing their relationship with authority should be hierarchical may make appeals to the authorities or engage in cronyism to pursue their interest, but it is very hard for us to imagine people believe their relationship with the authorities to be hierarchical would use adversarial activities and protest to influence the decision of the government because the traditional political culture in China does not confer them the idea that they have a right to confront political leaders in the society (Katzenstein 1996; Pye 1988). For political actors to choose elite-challenging political acts to pursue their goals, transformation of orientation toward power and authority is crucial. Such transformation, we believe, should be closely associated with the modernization process. Economic development leads to the emergence of newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV. With the growth of modern communication, new ideas from other societies usually flood into the traditional society which leads to an important value change (Inglehart 1997). We believe the most important value changes associated with modernization process is people's orientation toward power and authorities.
We can think of several explanations for the variations in political participation in these societies. Following the social mobilization theory, the first explanation attributes the variation in people's participatory behavior to the variation of the sociological and psychological resources of political actors associated with economic development. The difficulty with this explanation is that the argument may help to explain why people in Hong Kong actively engaged in elite-challenging political acts to pursue their interest, but it can hardly explain why people with the same sociological and psychological resources in the same societies are less active in getting involved in conventional political acts than less resourceful people in mainland China Taiwan.19

The other two explanations attribute the variation in people's participatory behavior in these three societies to institutional effects, although the causal mechanisms are different. The second explanation attributes the differences in people's political behavior to regime suppression. The problem with this argument is that regime suppression explains why people in mainland China avoid such elite-challenging political acts as adversarial activities and protest, the variable can hardly explain why people in the same society dare to engage in conventional political acts to pursue their interests that are different from those defined by the authority.

The third explanation ascribes the reason for differences in people's participation to their respective levels of bureaucratization. Among various changes associated with economic

19 Of course, this argument is based on an important but usually implicit assumption, that is, different political acts requires similar sociological and psychological resources on the part of participants. We are fully aware that this assumption may not be true. For the purpose of argument, we temporarily assume this assumption is correct. One may also argue that general level of conventional participation testifies social economic resources of political actors in a society at a given time. But it this is true, we should expect to find participation in electoral politics in Hong Kong higher when people's engagement in other elite-directing political acts is low. Apparently, this is not the case in Hong Kong either.
development, the most important one is the nature and function of authority. Public authorities
would change from resource provider or distributor to regulators of resources distribution and
redistribution. The tribe leaders in traditional societies and officials in grassroots organizations in
less developed mainland China controlled many resources crucial to individuals in the
community.\textsuperscript{20} Officials in those societies could distribute those resources according to personal
preferences rather than rules and regulations made by higher level authorities. Economic
development in modern time is usually associated with the transformation of the economic
organization in the society to free market economy. An important consequence of such a
transformation is that the power to control social resources gradually shifts from local authority to
market. When local officials lose direct control over social resources, they are no longer able to
distribute them according to their personal preferences. Local authority in the society would
change from resource providers to regulator of resource distribution. Such transformation
has significant consequences upon 1) the nature of the benefit people can get from public
authorities; 2) the places where competition for social resources occurs, and 3) the strategy
required for political actors to compete for desired social resources.

First, economic development reduces dependence of people on the authorities. Because
economic lives were intertwined with political lives in the community, people in traditional
societies tend to depend more on public authorities than people in modern societies.\textsuperscript{21} Without

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{20} For situation in urban China, see among others (Rossi; Shirk 1982; Whyte and Parish 1984). For situation in rural areas, see (Chan; Madsen, and Unger 1984; Parish and Whyte 1978).

\textsuperscript{21} Different from the conventional wisdom, we propose that power of authorities over individuals in less economically developed society may be higher than in developed societies. The current works on the relationship between the government function and economic
\end{footnotesize}
alternative suppliers, public authority is the only place for people in traditional societies to get the desired resources. For example, when a person in rural China wants to build a house, he needs to ask village leaders allocate a piece of land to his family. If the person living in other two societies wants to build a house, he needs to purchase the land from the market rather than going to the public authority for help. Different from conventional wisdom which usually economic development would tie people with the government, we propose that the scope of the activities of public authorities in traditional societies may be broader than that in more advanced societies.

Second, the places where political actors compete for resource in traditional societies may be quite different from that of advanced societies. While resource competitions in traditional societies usually occur at the level of grassroots organizations, political struggles in modern states usually happen in geographically based administration. This leads to the third difference—the strategies required for political actors in their competition for social resources. While competition at grassroots organization usually requires political actors to deal with officials privately and try to exclude other actors from their struggle, competition at geographically based administration requires political actors to work collectively and try to include other political actors in their struggle.

development is usually built on an assumption that state capability increases with economic development. We agree. Simultaneously, we would remind our readers that from the perspective of individuals, the power of authorities may decline with economic transformation. The reason behind this apparent paradox is that the generalization confuses state power at aggregate level and power of authorities over individuals. A tribe leader may not be able to mobilize material resources to build a reservoir for their village, but they can easily punish non-comply behavior by depriving crucial livelihood resources from the person.

As to how economic development lead to the changes in the function of the government and the authority relationship in modern capitalist societies, see, (Gerth and Wright 1946).
If these arguments are correct and institutional differences are account for the differences in people's political behavior revealed previously, we would find methods chosen by people to participate vary with institutional settings under which they live. In previous analysis, we found people in less developed mainland China tend to choose parochial political acts, such as appeal and cronyism to articulate their interests and people in Hong Kong are more likely to engage in political acts that can help them to influence policy of the government, such as adversarial activities and protest. However, before we can conclude that it is the transformation of institutional settings associated with economic development that make people in these societies choose different methods to articulate their interests, we must carefully rule out a competing explanation—that is, the reason that mainlanders avoid elite-challenging political acts because they are afraid of regime suppression. To establish the relationship between institution and participation, we need to control for regime suppression.

Figure 4 is about here

One way to control for effects of regime suppression on people's political behavior is to examine participatory behavior in areas of different levels of economic development within one society. If we find variation in people's behavior in areas of different levels of economic development, we can conclude that it is the economic development, rather than the regime suppression that causes people to choose different methods when articulating their interests. In figure 4, we plot the data of political participation in areas of different level of economic development in mainland China. The analysis shows that after we hold institutional effects constant, participation still varies with economic development. However, we could not find evidence to support our theory. The analysis shows that every increase in per capita GNP leads to
a statistically significant increase in the likelihood for people to vote, to campaign, to make
appeal, and to get involved in cronysim in mainland China. Moreover, people in the richest areas
are no more active than people in poorest areas in getting involved in elite-challenging political
activities.

Based on these findings, we believe it is premature to refute this theory. Note that
mainland China is in a process of reform to transform its state-controlled economy to market
orientated ones. Since such reform started in the backward rural areas, the changes of
institutional settings brought about by recent economic development may not associate with level
of economic development as closely as in other societies. To refuse the hypothesis that
institutional settings are responsible for behavioral differences revealed previously, we need more
direct evidence.

For such a purpose, we can analyze level of participation for people belong to different
types of organizations. We can find five types of grassroots organizations in mainland China.
The first category includes people living in rural villages and without other organizational
affiliation. The relationships between those people and the government are the weakest among
whole population because the state control least part of their lives after reform. An important
consequence of recent economic reform is that public authorities in rural villages lost control over
social resources under their control before. Market, on the other hand, now replaced public
authority in supplying resources crucial to people's lives. As a result, relationship between
peasants and public authorities become similar to that found in other societies. Rather than
forced to "voice" their dissatisfaction, people belong to this category can choose to "exit" (Hirschman 1970).

The second group includes those living in rural areas and work for rural enterprises. Although rural enterprises are usually characterize those enterprises as collective ones, they have little in common with collective enterprises in urban areas. In terms of the relationship between employees and management, collective enterprises in rural areas are similar to those found in private enterprises. Different from collective enterprises in urban areas, most collective enterprises in rural areas provide their employees with no such benefits as housing and life-time employments guarantee. Most basic needs for people belong to this group are also provided by markets.

The third category of people are those belong to collective enterprises in urban China. Workers in those organizations enjoy similar benefits as those given to people working at state enterprises. Those enterprises are still responsible not only for the work of their employees but also for various aspects of their lives. Many crucial resources for people's lives are still controlled distributed by enterprises. At the time of this survey, enterprises in urban China still controlled housing and were responsible for the welfare of their employees. The nature of the relationship between workers and managers in those organizations are more similar to state enterprises. Two other groups are employees of state organizations and private enterprises. While employees of state organizations are depend on those organizations for most aspects of their livelihood, markets provides people belong to private enterprises necessity of lives.

Our theory predicts that as relationship between individuals are different from one another

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23 Many of them are joint-venture enterprises between village and foreign firms.
in alternative organizations, the methods chosen by people to articulate their interests should vary from one other. If our theory is correct, we should expect to find political actors in more organizations where authorities still control social resources directly, such as state and collective enterprises in urban China would prefer to get involved in such parochial political acts as appeals and cronyism to deal with public authorities. Simultaneously, people belong to modern sectors where the authorities lost direct control over social resources, such as people in rural areas and private enterprises in urban China would prefer to get involved in adversarial activities and protest in their interest articulation because they are the more effective ways for them to influence police formulation.

The analysis presented in figure 5 strongly confirms our expectation. It shows that employees in collective enterprises in rural areas and private enterprises in urban areas are most likely to engage in protest to articulate their interests. As expected, employees of collective enterprises in rural areas are also most active in adversarial activities. The findings strongly support our hypothesis that the transformation of government structure and the nature of governing process have significant impacts on people political behavior.

Taking together, these analyses indicate relationship between economic development and political participation is not a simple linear one suggested by some theorists. Focus on the relationship within one society, i.e., mainland China, we can find a positive relationship between economic development and general level of political participation. Decompose political acts in mainland China into different participatory modes and examine their respective relationship with economic development shows that this observation is true for all conventional political activities. People in developed regions not only more actively in electoral politics, but also more active in
making appeals and get involved in cronyism to pursue their interests than people in poor areas.

When we extend our comparison to participation in different societies, the pictures becomes blurred. As to electoral politics, people in the underdeveloped mainland China vote more than people in economically developed Hong Kong, and people in Taiwan vote most among the people in these three societies. Since it is well known that Taiwanese regularly over-report turnout in elections, using campaign activities may be a more reliable measurement of electoral participation. When we compare campaign activities in these three societies, we find they correlated to economic development negatively. While the people in the least economically developed mainland are most likely to campaign for candidates, people in the most developed Hong Kong are least likely to campaign for candidates in elections. The likelihood for people in Taiwan to engage in campaign activities falls between these two categories.

The observation that participation is negatively associated with the level of economic development in these three societies is not only true for electoral politics, but also for other conventional political activities. Involvements in appeal and cronyism in mainland China are three times more for people in underdeveloped mainland China than for people in Hong Kong. However, the relationship between economic development and elite-challenging political acts is different. People in Hong Kong are the most active not only in adversarial activities but also in getting involved in protest. Despite its more developed economy, people in Taiwan are less active in getting involved in elite-challenging political acts than people in mainland China. Within mainland China, the relationship between economic development and elite-challenging political acts is also curvilinear. While people residing in mid-developed areas are more likely to engage in adversarial activities and protest to pursue their interests, people living in poor regions
and rich regions are less likely to do the same.

The finding makes us suspect that the observed relationship between economic development and elite-challenging political acts might actually be a spurious one. The real reason behind the variation in elite-challenging political acts revealed in our analysis is whether public authority control social resources directly. Comparing political behavior of mainlanders belong to organizations where authority still controls social resources to behavior of mainlanders belong to organization where its authority lost such control reveals substantial differences in people's political behavior. Our analysis show that people in private and rural collective enterprises are most active in adversarial activities and protest. The findings clearly confirm hypothesis II that economic development is not only associated with higher level of participation but also gradually transform used by way people to articulate their interests.

More important, the findings in mainland China suggest that economic development influence participation through two separate tracks. On the one hand, development also promotes participation through boosting sociological and psychological resources of political actors. Different from the alleged institutional change, sociological and psychological resources would have direct impact on people's political behavior. More important, economic development influences participation through transformation of a society's institutional setting. The strategy of economic development chosen by elites can significantly influence the process of such transformation and through which, participation in a society. Because such a transformation is usually a gradual process, a time-lag might exist between institutional change and the changes in people's political behavior. Until the changes in a society accumulated to a point that eventually transforms the incentive structure of political actors as well as their outlooks, people in that
society may still rely on traditional ways to articulate their interests.

**Impacts of speed of economic development and participation:**

In this section, we examine the relationship between speed of economic development and participation in mainland China. The speed of economic development is measured by the ratio between per capita GDP of the sampling counties and cities in 1982 and 1993. This ratio represents the growth rate of economy in each sampling counties or cities. Among 148 counties and cities sampled in this survey, three have negative growth rate--their per capita GDP in 1993 is lower than per capita GDP in 1982. Except these three countries, the per capita GDP in all sampling places grew in the past fifteen years, although the growth rates in different places were unequal: they range from 1.06 to 27.73. The average growth rate of the country is 6.03.

To examine impacts of speed of economic development on political participation, we divide our sampling places into three categories--low growth, middle economic growth, and high growth counties. The mean score of the growth rates in high growth places is 2.47, the mid-growth places is 5.01 and high growth places is 10.42. Figure 5 plots the data on people’s political participation in clusters of counties and cities with different speed of economic development in mainland China.

Similar to the level of economic development, speed of economic development in mainland China has different impacts on different form of political activities. To our surprise, the overall level of participation in mainland China, which is again different from that predicted by modernization theory, is negatively related to the speed of economic development. The faster the economic development in an area, the lower the overall level of political participation. People
living in areas where economics developed faster than others are less likely to get involved in various political acts than people residing in areas where economic development is slower in pursuing their interests.

The relationship between speed of economic development and voting is U-shape. People from areas of low speed of economic development voted actively in elections. The turnout in mid-developed areas declines and then increases in areas of high speed economic development. The relationship between campaign activities and speed of economic development is negative. As the speed of economic development in a place increases, participation in various campaign activities declines.

Similar to voting in elections, relationships between speed of economic development and two non structured elite-directing political acts are a reversed U-shape. While level of engagement in both appeals and cronyism is highest in areas where speed of economic development is low, rapid economic development reduces the likelihood for people to get involved in those acts to pursue their interests. Finally, speed of economic development seems to have no effects on the likelihood for people to get involved in elite-challenging political acts, such as adversarial activities and protest to pursue their interests.

The pattern of association between speed of economic development and participation in various political acts revealed in figure 6 contradict the theories proposed by Huntington and Nelson on the one hand, and Lipset on the other. Rapid economic development in mainland China reduces rather than increases conventional participation. We found variation in people's political behavior and we still do not know the causes of these variations. These findings beg answers to the following questions. Why the theory correctly predicts the changes in people's
political behavior within one society, but fails to predict cross-society differences? Why the theory correctly predicts the variation in participation through some political acts but not others? Are the theory wrong, or certain "omitted variables" contaminate the relationship specified by the theory? To answer these questions, we need to carefully sort out the cause relationship between economic development and participation and compare impacts of crucial variables on participation in different societies. It is to these questions the next section turn.

**Exploring causal mechanism between economic development and political participation**

Intellectually grown from study of political participation in liberal democracies, modernization theorists usually assume the processes for people to become politicized and participation in politics in societies of different levels of economic development are similar to one another. The model used by students of political participation to explain people's political behavior in all societies has two clusters of predictors--SocioEconomic Resource Level (SERL) and civic orientation. According to this model, individuals of higher social status develop such civic orientations as concerns for politics, information, and feeling of efficacy, and these orientations will in turn lead them to participate in politics. The relationship among SES, civic orientation, and participation can be described as the following:

**Socioeconomic Status------>Civic Attitudes------->Participation**

The logic proposed by social mobilization theorists on the relationship between economic development and political participation was first developed by Michigan group. See (Rokeach 1960). Later, Verba and his colleagues borrow the Michigan model and use it in their study of participation in American (Weber 1947) and their comparative study of political participation of seven different nations (Verba and others 1978). In a later study of participation in America, Verba and his group changed the name of civic orientation to political engagement but the "political engagement" measures similar concept as "civic orientation (Verba; Schlozman, and Brady 1995)."
development and participation is that economic development leads to the increases of two sets of resources among general populace, which will in turn, increases the likelihood for them to participate in politics. Although students of participation noticed that institution may influence people's participation, few, if any of them try to study the effects of institutional development on people's participatory behavior. Instead, we usually assume that the processes for people to become politicized and participate in politics in societies of different levels of economic development must be identical. The same sociological and psychological resources play similar role on political actors in societies of different level of economic development. Economic development increase the distribution of those resources but does not change the process by which resources are converted to political activities.

As many students of political development reveal, economic development is usually accompanied by a gradual transformation of the institutional settings in a society (Gerth and Wright 1946; McCormick 1990; Moody 1988; Rural Desk of the Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 1994; Shi 1997). If institution defines the goals political actors pursue, determines the strategies for them to reach their goals, and circumscribes the outcomes of political struggles as suggested by new institutionalist (Hall 1986; Ikenberry 1988; North 1990; Parsons 1969; Skowronek 1982), we should expect economic development influences participation not only through the increases of resources, but may also alter the way by which resources are converted into participatory activities.

In this section, we systemically explore the dynamic of change in the political process brought about by economic development. The analysis are divided into four steps. First, we compare distribution of sociological and psychological resources as well as the relationship
between individuals and states in these societies. Second, we explore impacts of economic development on the above three clusters of variables. Third, with the aid of multivariate analysis, we sort out impacts of each clusters of variables on people's political behavior. Finally, we examine impacts of modernization process on the process by which those resources are converted to participation.

The relationship between economic development and sociological resources: People participate in politics because they get something out of it. Political participation usually has a price because such activities puts demands on people's scarce resources. Thus the decision for individuals to participate is a product of cost-benefit calculation.

Cross-national studies of political participation found that certain sociological resources have both direct and indirect effects on such calculation. Among them are education, income, urban resident, and white collar jobs. Economic development can increase these sociological resources in a society. As the first step of our analysis, we explore whether the distribution of sociological resources in these societies varies with their respective level economic development as suggested by social mobilization theorists.

Table 1 is about here

Table 1 presents distribution of sociological resources in each society as well as in areas of different levels of economic development in mainland China. The entries under the umbrella of income are the amount of respondents' family income converted to US dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) method. Measured by family income, people in Hong Kong and Taiwan are

\[ \text{25 According to World Fact Book published by CIA in 1994, the population of Hong Kong in July 1993 is 5,548,754 (p.177). The per capita GDP of Hong Kong is $21,500 (p. 178). The total number of the population times the per capita GDP of Hong Kong give us the GDP of} \]
28 Hong Kong is a city state. We can characterize few people there as rural population. Therefore, we code all respondents in Hong Kong as urban population.

29 The average of the proportion of white collar jobs in the workforce in 11 industrial democracies is 49 and in 7 industrial democracies is 48. See (Powell 1986, 19).

34 As nation develops, youths in rural areas usually leave the farms and small towns in search of better paying jobs in cities. Larger proportion of the population seeks employment and establishes homes in urban areas. An frequently observed consequence of economic development is urbanization (Nie and others 1969a; Nie and others 1969b; Paige 1971; Rural Desk of the Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 1994). Reflecting its relatively under developed economy, majority of people in the mainland China—nearly 80 percent of the population—still live in rural areas despite the rapid economic development in recent years. While only 36.8 percent of Taiwanese reported that they live in rural area, majority of people in Hong Kong should be characterized as urban population.

These analyses show that the population composition in these three societies are quite different from one another. The demographic nature of the population in Hong Kong and Taiwan are similar to those found in other industrial democracies. Although the proportion of white collar jobs in the workforce in Hong Kong and Taiwan are still lower than the 7 European industrial democracies average in 1970s, they are more than twice higher than that of mainland China.

Finally, we find the distribution of sociological resources of different regions within one country also perfectly reflects their levels of economic development. Comparing population in richest areas with those in the poorest ones, we find more than 3 times more of the people living in richest areas received more than 9 years of formal school education and more than 5 time more...
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Finally, we find the distribution of sociological resources of different regions within one country also perfectly reflects their levels of economic development. Comparing population in richest areas with those in the poorest ones, we find more than 3 times more of the people living in richest areas received more than 9 years of formal school education and more than 5 time more

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of them hold a white-collar job than people residing in the poorest areas.

The analysis confirms that social mobilization theorists are correct about the relationship between economic development and sociological resources. If we read table 1 in conjunction with figure 2, however, we will find these findings challenge another part of the relationship specified by social mobilization theory. While modernization process brings more sociological resources to political actors Hong Kong, neither general level of participation nor the level of engagement in conventional political acts there reflects the level of sociological resources among population in these society. All crucial sociological resources—education, income, and white collar jobs—are higher in Hong Kong than in other two societies. Yet, participation in electoral politics and conventional political acts there is much lower than in other two societies.

Since Hong Kong is British Colony at the time of survey, one may attribute the reason people in Hong Kong participate less to attitudes of the suzerain states toward autonomous participation. However, it cannot explain why participation in mainland China is higher than in Hong Kong. Despite regime in mainland China are more hostile to unauthorized political expression than regime in Hong Kong, people in mainland China are found to be more active in conventional political acts than people in other two societies. Furthermore, this explanation also contradict the finding that people in Hong Kong are most active group in conventional elite-challenging political acts among people in three societies. Even if the regime is hostile to autonomous expression, the first political acts it wants to suppress would be those protest activities.

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30 In fact, the existing suzerain and the incoming one attack each other for not giving people in Hong Kong political power to participate in politics.
The findings that sociological resources are positively correlated with economic development but negative correlated with both general level of political participation and various modes of conventional elite-directing political acts indicates two potential problems in our applying the theory to study participation in these three societies. One is that we may suffer omitted variable bias—certain ignored variables are missing from our analysis and that variable contaminates the well-documented relationship between sociological resources and participation {King, Keohane, et al. 1994 #293}. For example, students of communist politics found that regimes in those societies have been trying very hard to increase participation of lower classes and to departicipate the previously participatory groups, i.e., higher SES people (Roeder 1989). China is no exception to this rule (Munch and Smelser 1992). Such efforts, if successful, would very likely to modify the relationship between sociological resources and political participation in mainland China. As in elsewhere, economic development there increase the supply of sociological resources in the society but such increases neither transfer to psychological resources, nor to higher level of participation as found elsewhere.

Another possibility is that the process for people in less developed societies to become politicized can be different from that of the advanced societies because of the differences in their respective institutional settings. By gradually transform institutional setting in the society, economic development alter the process for people to become politicized and participate in politics. If participation in less developed societies does not require education as in more advanced economy, lack of education in mainland China would not be an obstacles for people in mainland China to participate. We will explore the reason for this deviation later in this chapter. The relationship between economic development and psychological orientation: In addition to
sociological resources, psychological resources are also believed to play an important role in prompting people to participate in politics. If participation is seen as people's response toward outside stimuli, especially toward actions of government and/or government officials, we should expect actual responses of political actors involves cognitive decoding, affective encoding, and evaluative encoding of the stimuli (Eckstein 1988, 489). Individuals actors may cognitive decode a given situation in a variety of ways that will in turn, determines how he will respond to the stimuli. Affective encoding of events leads to various feelings and those feelings supply energy needed for political actions.\footnote{Culturalists believe attitudes of political actors at individual level affect what they will do. A nation's political culture, at aggregate level, affects the conduct of both citizens and leaders in the political system. According to Almond and Powell, One way of mapping a nation's political culture is to describe citizens' attitudes to the three levels of the political system: system, process, and policy. At system level we are interested in the citizens' and leaders' views of the values and organizations that hold the political system together. How is it and how should it be that leaders are selected and citizens come to obey the laws? At the process level we are interested in individuals' propensities to become involved in the process; to make demands, obey the law, support some groups and oppose others, and participate in various ways. At the policy level we want to know what policies citizens and leaders expect from the government. What goals are to be established and how are they to be achieved (Almond and Powell 1980, 42).}

Among various aspects of psychological orientation, students of participation paid special attention to the orientation of political actors toward political process and government policy. They found two cluster of variables--psychological involvement in politics and political efficacy--have significant impacts on people's behavior.\footnote{Psychological involvement refers to the degrees to which citizens are interested in and concerned about politics and public affairs. For relationship between psychological involvement and participation, see (Berelson; Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954;Rokeach 1960;Rosenstone and Hansen 1993;Verba and others 1978;Verba and others 1995;Weber 1947;Wolfinger and}
developed by Verba and his colleagues found that part of the effects of sociological forces is through psychological route--orientation of political actors to influence their behavior.

Psychological involvement in politics has two sub-dimension, information and interest. In this study, we use four questions to measure people's access to political information. These question ask respondents to name the head of the state and head of the government in their own societies, and the name of president of the United States and Russia. Correct answers to these questions are coded as 1, all the others, include "don't know" are coded as 0. We than add them together form a political information index.

We also use four questions to measure people's political interest in each society. Three of them ask respondents whether have tried to seek any news on politics and governmental affairs through newspapers, radio, and TV news broadcasting. The last one asks respondents to report if they talk politics and governmental affairs with other people.  Positive answers to these questions are coded 1 and all the others, including "don't know" are coded 0. They were added together to form the political interest index.

Political efficacy have two dimensions--internal efficacy and external efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to beliefs about one's own competence to understand and to participate in politics. External efficacy refers to beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands. We use "I think I understand well the major political problems our country faces," and "I consider myself very capable of participating in politics" to measure internal efficacy. Positive answers to these questions indicate respondents having internal efficacy. External efficacy is measured by other two questions: "People like me have no say in what the government does," and "Government officials don't care too much about what people like me think." Negative answers to these questions are considered as having external efficacy. We code positive answers to the first two questions and negative answers to the last two questions as 1. All the other answers, including "don't know" are coded as 0. We add the answers to each set of questions together to form indexes of internal and external efficacy.

Students of political participation have been neglecting that the emotional meaning of political actors may also play an important role in shaping their responses toward outside stimuli. An important such meaning is the orientation of individuals toward power and authorities. According to Weber, there are three kinds of emotional orientation--tradition, charisma, and legal rational in modern world (Gerth and Wright 1946, 324-390). Note that

Rosenstone 1980). Feeling a duty to participate carries over strongly to political actions: several studies show that persons feeling a duty to participate in politics are more likely to do so. For the relationship between sense of civic obligation and participation, see (Luks 1974; Verba and Nie 1972; Weber 1947). Political efficacy is the feeling that one is capable of influencing the public decision-making process. Two somewhat different operationalizations of the concept have been popular in the literature. One developed by the Michigan team (Rokeach 1960) and the other by Almond and Verba in their five nation survey (Verba and Nie 1972).

33 These questions were first factor analyzed. Only one factor emerged from the analysis which tells us that they measure a dimension of people's psychological orientation.

34 The concept of political efficacy was developed by Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954, 19)(1954) when they study voting behavior of people in the United States. When they introduce this concept to election study in the US, they found that person with higher levels of
efficacy refers to beliefs about one's own competence to understand and to participate in politics. External efficacy refers to beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands.\textsuperscript{35} We use "I think I understand well the major political problems our country faces," and "I consider myself very capable of participating in politics" to measure internal efficacy. Positive answers to these questions indicate respondents having internal efficacy. External efficacy is measured by other two questions: "People like me have no say in what the government does," and "Government officials don't care too much about what people like me think." Negative answers to these questions are considered as having external efficacy. We code positive answers to the first two questions and negative answers to the last two questions as 1. All the other answers, including "don't know" are coded as 0. We add the answers to each set of questions together to form indexes of internal and external efficacy.

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\textsuperscript{35} (Converse 1972) (Balch 1974;Rural Desk of Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 1995).

The only exception is the relationship between alienation and participation. Early studies show that negative evaluations about the political system are associated with low levels of participation in conventional political activities (Dean 1960;DiPalma 1970;Madsen 1984;Templeton 1966;Thompson and Horton 1960;Verba and Nie 1972). Later studies based on probability sample gathered in the United States, however, shows no significant association between "perceived political normlessness" and political activism (Pye and Verba 1965).
people with different orientation define their relationship between individuals and state in distinctive ways. People with traditional orientation tend to believe their relationship with the political authorities should be hierarchical but people under the influence of legal rational tradition believe their relationship with the government should be reciprocal. Facing identical "outside stimuli," their response can be fundamentally different from each other. For people perceiving the power of authorities in the society comes from tradition and their relationship with the state is never "a reciprocal one in which the obligations of obedience and respect were contingent upon the model behavior of those with power (Pye 1981)" Although such orientation may not necessarily prevent people from making appeals to the authorities, such orientation does not confer on the populace an expectation that the government should respond to their demands favorably. Therefore, even if they realized that certain government decisions jeopardize their interests, they may refrain from challenging the such unpopular decisions and give up their interests voluntarily. On the contrary, people who believe the power of rulers come from the consent of the governed perceive their relationship with the government as reciprocal. Facing the same stimuli, they are more likely to engage political acts to express their opinions to pursue their goals.

Similar to other psychological resources examined previously, orientation toward power and authorities changes with economic development. Both Marx and Weber noticed that economic development can lead to a change of people's orientation, but causal mechanisms specified by them are different. While Carl Marx argued that technological revolution shapes economic system which in turn determines people's orientation toward political objects, Weber attributed the change of people's orientation toward power and authority to the emergence of
market and free enterprise (Gerth and Wright 1946, 354-358).

We use three questions to measure people's orientation toward power and authorities. They are “top government officials are like the head of a big family. Their decisions on national issues should be followed by everyone.” “The state is like a big machine and the individual is but a small cog, with no independent status,” and “even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.” The response categories are strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree. We code strongly disagree to 1.5, disagree to 0.5 and agree to -.5 and strongly agree to -1.5. We factor-analyzed these variables. Only one factor emerged from the analysis. We added answers to these questions together to create an index measuring respondents' orientation toward power and authority.

Table 2 is about here

Table 2 presents our analyses of the relationship between economic development and psychological orientation. Different from the claim made by social mobilization theorists, the analyses show that economic wealth is associated with certain psychological resources but not the others.

Political information is closely associated with economic development. We present the marginal distribution of people in each society who can correctly identify at least one national and international political leaders in the table. People residing in wealthy areas have more political information and show greater interest in politics than people in poor areas. Our analysis shows that 67.4 percent of the population in mainland China can correctly identify one political leader, as compared to 79 and 87.7 percent of the population in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In the same table, we also present the mean score for each index. This score documents how many political
figures can respondents correctly identify. Mainlanders again fall behind the people in Hong Kong and Taiwan. While on average, people in Taiwan and Hong Kong can correctly identify 2.47 and 2.15 political figures, people in mainland China can only identify 1.56 of them. More important, a similar pattern exists in areas of different level of economic development in mainland China. Taking together, these findings tell us that the relationship between economic wealth and political information is independent of institutional effects.

Political interest is also closely positively associated with economic development. In Hong Kong, 96.7 percent of respondents reported that they are interested in politics, followed by 91.7 percent of respondents in Taiwan. People in mainland China show least such interest--only 73.8 percent of mainlanders reported that they are interested in public affairs. The relationship between economic wealth and political interest is also independent of the effects of institution. Comparison of distribution of political interest within mainland China shows that people living in the under developed areas are less interested in politics than people in rich areas. While 59.4 percent of the people residing in the poorest regions reported that they are interested in politics, 84 percent of people living in the richest areas expressed political interest. The mean scores for political interest index ranges from 2.09 in the poorest areas to 4.93 in the richest areas in mainland China.

Different from the prediction of social mobilization theory, economic development is not associated with political efficacy. Political efficacy in these three societies and in different areas in mainland China is not associated with economic development. Economic wealth neither makes people become confident on their ability to participate in politics nor believe that their government would be responsive to their demands. People in the mid-developed Taiwan are
highest in internal efficacy, followed by people in mainland China. People in Hong Kong are least confident both on their ability to understand political issues and to participate in politics. More important, we could not find any statistically significant differences in internal efficacy among population in different areas of mainland China.

A more surprising and counter-intuitive finding is that external efficacy is highest among people in mainland China. Despite mainland China is still under communist rule and the level of economic development is much lower than in other two societies, more mainlanders believe their government would be responsive to their demands than Taiwanese and people in Hong Kong. More mainlanders believe that they have some say over decisions made by government and government officials care about what they think than people in both colonial Hong Kong and democratizing Taiwan. Also, we find distribution of external efficacy within mainland China is not associated with level of economic development either.

Finally, we found economic development has strong and significant impact on people's orientation toward power and authorities. Reflecting its lower level of economic development, orientation of people in the mainland China is far more traditional than people in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Among the whole population in mainland China, only 13.8 percent of people perceive their relationship with authorities as reciprocal. It tells us that 86.2 percent of the population perceives their relationship with authority as hierarchical. On the contrary, more than 65 percent of people in Hong Kong see relationship with the government as reciprocal. Orientation of people in Taiwan falls between those in mainland China and Hong Kong. While people in Taiwan are more modern than people in mainland China--nearly half population escaped from the traditional influence and characterize their relationship with the authorities as
The logic proposed by social mobilization theorists is that the relationship between education and efficacy results from the skills and knowledge one learns through formal schooling. Persons with higher levels of education may better understand the political world and recognize ways to influence government authorities. A more cynical view is that persons who have higher levels of formal education learn to accept the “norm” that people are effective and that the government is responsive (Wright 1976).

Note that scholars have found that the general level of education in the United States increased dramatically since the 1950s, but feelings of effectiveness among people in the society declined. This is true for both internal and external efficacy (Abramson 1983, 177-82). Converse (1972, 326) thus developed a “peck order” theory to reinterpret the relationship between education and political efficacy. The theory actually predicts that economic development should not increase the distribution of psychological resources as predicted by the modernization theorists.

Converse believes that the effects of education on feelings of efficacy actually result from the social “pecking order” that education represents. He suggests that there is a natural pecking order in societies which arises from a variety of individual traits and determines the ratio of wins to losses, including success at completing an education. The well-educated in modern societies are, on balance, the winners in such transactions, and the poorly-educated are the losers. The overall education levels of the society may determine how a given level of education relates to the pecking order. As educational levels rise, the standing of any given level of education within the pecking order changes. If the pecking order model is correct, Converse argues, “we encompass the static fact that education relates strongly to efficacy, but we do not expect that increasing level of education lead over time to any particular change in aggregate level of efficacy (Converse 1972, 327).

If the pecking order model is correct, we should find that the overall level of efficacy among people in areas with different levels of economic development remains roughly the same, so do the feelings of effectiveness in different societies. Unfortunately, our analysis shows that this is not the case either.

The relationship between economic development and various dimensions of psychological orientation can be summarized as follows: Economic development leads to dramatic increases in such psychological resources as political information and political interests as predicted by social mobilization theorists. In addition, we found economic development also transforms people’s orientation toward power and authority. It is true that the nature of the data at our hand does not allow us to rule out effects of institution on such orientation. Examination of distribution of psychological resources within mainland China allows us to hold institutional effects constant to examine effects of economic development on those resources. Based on such analysis, we conclude with confidence that institution is not a sole determinate of people’s orientation toward power and authorities. After we control regime type, orientation of political actors toward power and authorities is found still vary with economic development in that society.

Different from modernization theory, we found economic wealth does not necessarily make people to become efficacious. As illustrated in our analysis, economic wealth makes people to be neither more confident on their ability to understand public affairs nor to participate in politics. This is not only true for our cross-society comparison, but also true for regions of
different level of economic development in mainland China. In fact, we found people in less
developed authoritarian mainland China expect government to be more responsive to their
demands than people in other two societies. Feeling of political effectiveness in these societies
does not vary in any systematic way with economic development. This finding challenges the
logic of transformation proposed by modernization theory.37

The relationship between economic development and institutional settings: In previous

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sections, we examined whether economic development reduces costs of political participation. Although the variation of costs of participation provides important information on whether political actors participate or not, it only tells us part of the story. People participate in politics because they want to get something out of it. Thus, the other side of the equation--benefit political acts can bring people should play equally if not more important roles in shaping their decision to participate. Students of political participation have long noticed that the benefit political acts can bring play an important role in shaping people's decision to participate in politics. However, since most studies of political participation concentrate on a particular country, scholars can usually ignore effects of variation of benefits on people's political behavior and concentrate on the variation of the other side of the equation, i.e., costs for people to participate.

It is true that we can assume that benefits associated with political acts is a constant across the society in a single country study. When we compare participation in different societies, especially societies in different stages of economic development, we should aware that both the nature and the amount of benefits political actors can pursue from public authorities vary. For example, Huntington and Nelson found economic development usually leads to the expansion of government function (Rural Desk of the Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 1994). With the activities of public authorities influence more aspects of people's lives, they argue, political actors would have greater incentive to get involved in political

38 In places of machine politics, voting is a way to earn a bit of credit with the organizations. Some people vote because they are paid to do so (Wolfinger 1974, 76). Under the patron-client relationship in mainland China, activists get involved in political acts to support their patrons in order to gain tangible benefits (Rossi ).
acts to protect their own interests.

Although students of participation have realized that the variation in scope and nature of activities of public authorities influences people's behavior, few have tried to systematically study its impacts on scopes and levels of political participation. Although Almond and Verba explored "the perceived impacts of government" on people's political behavior in their study of "civic culture," they believe those variables measure cultural orientation, rather than the variation of institutional effects. Such a decision must be based on the assumption that the influence of public authorities in societies of different stages of economic development is constant but the ability for individuals' to identify such influence varies. This is apparently no true. While fully agree with Almond and Verba that people's cognitive ability plays an important role in helping them to understand impacts of government on their lives, we also strongly believed that the actual scope of government activities can play equally, if not more important role in shaping people's perception on impacts of government on their lives. Furthermore, both the scope and nature of government activities in society of different political systems and at different stages of economic development can be different from one another, so do their impacts on people’s lives.

For different research questions, these factors may play different roles. We may be able to

39 They were actually criticized for such decision. See, (Almond and Verba 1980).

40 Of course, officials ideology in a society may also influence the scope of government activities, which will in turn, influence people's political behavior. For example, the official ideology in Hong Kong does not encourage the government to get involved in people’s private lives. Reflecting such ideology, most aspects of people’s lives are regulated by market rather than by the government. The official ideology in mainland China, on the other hand, is exactly the opposite. Marxist tradition advocates intensive government intervention. To mobilize limited resources in the society for fast economic development, the regime used to control most aspects of private lives in the society. The situation in Taiwan falls in between of mainland China and Hong Kong.
ignore impacts of certain variable in our inquiry. For example, if we want to know why some people in a given society participate more than others, we can assume the influence of government on the population in the society is constant. Only the cognitive ability of political actors to realize impacts of government varies. If, on the other hand, we want to study variation in participatory behavior in societies of different institutional settings or at different stages of economic development, variation of the actual scope and consequences of government activities should play a much more significant role in shaping people's perception on the impacts of government on their lives and their political behavior.

Since we study participatory behavior for people in different societies, we believe the perceived impact of government should be used as a measurement of the actual scope and consequences of government activities rather than people's cultural orientation. The first cluster of variables presented in the table is the impact of government on people's lives.

The second cluster of institutional variables include political party and formal and informal association, including but not limited to various interest groups, cultural and religious organizations, civic and developmental associations, research and educational institutions. The emergence of political party and interest groups is usually believed to associate with economic development. The literature on civic society was built on the argument that economic development leads to the diversification of social interests which stipulate the formation of

\[ \text{equation} \]

\[ 41 \text{ It is not our intention to deny that people's cognitive ability influences their answers to this questions. In later part of this chapter, we try to control for people's cognitive ability to sort out the actual differences in government functions in these societies. Note that cognitive ability is closely associated with education. When we control for education in multivariate analysis, we actually controlled for differences in people's cognitive ability.} \]
various organizations to aggregate interests in the society. Students of participation reveal empirically that those organizations have independent effects on participation in various societies. By exposing those affiliated with those organizations or locking out those who are not, voluntary association, interests groups, and political party have significant and independent impacts on the process that socioeconomic and psychological resources convert to political activities.\(^{43}\)

The third cluster of variables measure the intention and ability of the regime to prevent people from getting involved in politics to articulating their private interests. In certain period of their respective history, regimes in all three societies used terror to punish those who dare to defy their order to articulate their interests which were different from those defined by the authorities.\(^{44}\) To achieve its goal, state tried to control three other forms of interpersonal confrontation: (a) mass communications; (b) operational weapons; and (c) all organizations, including economic ones. Terror is used as a crucial policy tool for state to pursue such goal (Friedrich; Curtis, and Barber 1969, 126). For terror to be successful, state must be able to identify dissidents in the society. Many field work in communist societies show that regime in those societies use the social and economic resources controlled by them to induce political activists to cooperate with them to monitor general populace and to identify unauthorized political expression (Roeder

\(^{43}\) Verba and his colleagues revealed in their seven nation studies, “institutions can mobilize citizens to a level of activity above that which would be predicted by their socioeconomic resource level, or institutions can inhibit political activities so that it is at a level below which one would predict on the basis of socioeconomic characteristics. Their studies reveal that variations in the nature and intensity of institutional interference explain the variation across nations in the participation disparity between the haves and the have-nots” (Verba and others 1978, 80).

\(^{44}\) Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis and Benjamin R. Barber *Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views*, New York: Praeger Publisher, 1969. p. 126
Economic development in modern world is usually associated with division of labor and diversification. When economy becomes diversified, people would no longer rely exclusively on the public authority for desired resources. An important consequences of such development is that fewer and fewer people choose to cooperate with the authorities. Since such cooperation is crucial for the regime to control its people, we should expect economic autonomy associated with economic development in a society would lead to a decline of the ability for regime to control its citizen and prevent them from engaging in political acts to pursue their interests.\textsuperscript{45}

Table 3 is about here

Table 3 examines the impacts of economic development on institutional settings. We included three questions in the questionnaire to measure influence of public authority on people's lives. The first asks respondents in mainland China to report whether grassroots organizations have any impacts on their live.\textsuperscript{46} The second question asks respondents in all three societies whether local government has any impacts on their lives and the third asks if central government has any impacts on their lives. The response categories for these questions include: no effects, some effects, and great effects. The answers of some and great effects are coded as 1. All the others, including "don't know" are coded as 0. We create an overall government effectiveness index by adding original answers to the last two questions together.

\textsuperscript{45} For discussion of the attempts of government officials in mainland China to suppress unauthorized or even authorized expression, see among others, (Li and O'Brien 1996; O'Brien 1996; O'Brien and Li 1995; Shi 1997, chap. 2).

\textsuperscript{46} Grassroots functional organizations in mainland China are not simply the place there workers took their pay check. The government uses those organizations to control its citizens. See among others, (Rossi ).
Economic development significantly increases impacts of government activities on people's lives. The proportion of people in economically developed Hong Kong who realize that government activities have certain impacts on their lives are twice as much as those in mainland China and in Taiwan. While nearly 70 percent of the respondents in Hong Kong report that activities of the colonial government have certain impacts on their lives, only 31.7 percent people in mainland China gave the same answer during the interview.

Note that this finding is contrary to a conventional wisdom in Chinese politics which believes that the regime in communist China not only has intention, but also has capability to penetrate deeply into the society (Rossi; Shue 1988). We found the influences of governmental activities in Hong Kong is higher than that of mainland China. One possible explanation for this contradiction is that the ability for a government to influence people’s lives is closely associated with economic development. Although the regime in mainland China tried vary hard to penetrate into the society, the underdeveloped economy prevent the regime from realizing its goal.

Note that two explanations are conducive to this finding. One is that the efforts of the regime in mainland China to control its citizen have no impacts on people in that society. Despite the regime tried very hard to control its citizens, majority of people still fail to realize that government activities have any impacts on their daily lives. This explanation attributes the deviation to institutional effects. An equally plausible explanation is that regime mobilization does produce certain effect, but its effects are conditioned by the level of economic development in society under such a government operates. The argument does not challenge that institution matters, but it believes institutional effects are conditioned by level of economic development. Answer to these questions have significant implications for theory of comparative politics.
To finding out if economic wealth have independent effects on scope and nature of government activities, we need to control for intention of the regime. In our sample, the per capital GNP of the most developed areas in mainland China is similar to that of Taiwan. We thus may achieve such a goal by comparing perceived impacts of government among people in the most developed areas in mainland China to people in Taiwan. The comparison shows that regime mobilization makes a difference. As the figures presented in the table shows, more people in the developed areas in mainland China reported that government activities have impacts on their lives than in Taiwan. The finding tells us that when we control the level of economic development, people in mainland China are still more likely to perceive government activities have an impact on their lives than their brothers in Taiwan. A more important lesson, however, is that the level of economic development conditions the ability for a government to control the society. Despite the regime in mainland China has been attempting to penetrate into society to control its people, underdeveloped economy is still a major obstacle for government in mainland China to achieve its goal.

Economic development in these societies leads to an emergence of groups, but the relationship between economic wealth and group formation is more complicated than we have expected. If we focus on one society, we will find the likelihood for people to join political parties or voluntary organization increases with level of economic development. In the most developed areas in mainland China, 26.4 percent of people reported that they belong to political party and 43 percent of respondents reported that they are members of certain organizations, 11.2 and 4.3 percent of people in the poorest areas in the country claim the same.

If we compare organization membership across society, the relationship becomes
different. In the most developed society, Hong Kong, only than 1 percent of the population there 
reports that they belong to any political party and 20.4 percent of people affiliating with voluntary 
organizations. Although level of economic development in mainland China and Taiwan is lower 
than that in Hong Kong, more people in mainland China associated with political parties or other 
groups. Even if one may argue that political party and groups in mainland China are different 
from similar organizations in other society, we still find that more people in Taiwan claim they 
have party or organizational membership than in Hong Kong. This finding again contradicts to 
the dynamic proposed by modernization theorists. It suggests that the higher level of party 
affiliation and organizational membership may be the product of party competition, rather than 
effects of economic development.

Different from our expectation, economic development does not help to reduce political 
fear in mainland China and Taiwan. Similar percentage of people in mainland China claim they 
are afraid of possible regime persecution if they criticize government leaders as in Taiwan. We 
could not find any statistically significant difference in answers given to our interviewers by 
people living in areas of different economic development in mainland China.

The analyses of the distribution of sociological and psychological resources among people in 
these societies show that mainlanders are the least resourceful among people in these three 
societies. People in mainland China are also under authoritarian rule. Given this consideration, 
current theory predicts that the level of citizen participation in other two societies would be 
higher than that in mainland China. Yet, people in mainland China participate more than people 
in other societies. This apparent paradox reminds us a possibility that the process for people to 
become politicized and participate in politics in societies at different stages of development can
be different from one other. Even we may call political acts in societies of different levels of economic development political participation and political acts in different societies all aimed at influencing authoritative allocation of social resources, the strategy required for people to pursue the same resources can be different, so do the process of politicization. As political processes in the less developed areas is different from that in the developed societies, the resources required for people to participate in politics can also be different. If this is true, lacking of sociological and psychological resources among population in less developed society, such as mainland China in our case, may not be an obstacle for people to get involved in political acts to pursue their goals. To explore such a possibility, we compare the similarity and differences of the processes of politicization in these societies.

The processes of politicization in each society

The findings that despite people in mainland China are short of many crucial sociological and psychological resources, they participate more remind us a possibility that participation in places of different levels of economic development requires different strategies and resources on political actors. This argument echoes the findings that “position of influence in a political and social system at a given point in time testify to the economic, technological, and ideological resources that the actors in the system command (Kaase and Marsh 1979, 38).” According to their theory, people have yet to gain resources crucial for them to use certain channels of influence may use other channels to pursue their goals. Rather than preventing people from participating in politics, lacking of certain resources may prevent them from choosing certain acts to pursue their goals, but reward them to engage in other different political acts to pursue their goals.
To further explore impacts of economic development on political participation, we need to examine the processes by which resources are converted to political acts in places of different level of economic development. We begin our analyses by comparing bivariate relationship between resources and participation in different places. Multivariate analyses will be employed in the next section to examine the relationship between resources and participation when impacts of other factors are controlled.

From institution to participation:

If we see participation as people's responses to outside stimuli, then we should be able to expect that the scope and intensity of government activities would influence the likelihood for people to participate. Economic development in the modern world is brought about by capitalist mode of production and a highly-developed capitalism requires "more government promotion, regulation, and redistribution. The more the government's actions affect people’s lives in a society, the more active they will be to influence government decision-making (Rural Desk of the Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 1994, 44)" Although generally agree with the logic behind the argument of modernization theorists, we believe the relationship specified by them ignores an important problem, that is, the influence of the nature of government decisions on people's political behavior.

Economic development in free-enterprise capitalism leads to the expansion of regulatory and redistribution activities of government. However, not every regime chooses free-enterprise capitalism to develop the economy of the government it governs. In mainland China, for example, government had been using state power to mobilize all resources in the society to develop its economy. In such society, grassroots administration replaced the markets to manage
economic lives and make distribution decisions. This difference may have significant impact on people’s political behavior.

In free-enterprise capitalist society, government decisions are usually regulatory ones. Those decisions produce collective benefits most of the time. If a participant wants to influence the government decision, he needs to persuade government to make decision favorable to him or his family. If he succeeds, the decisions of government will not only influence him and his family, but also other people in the society. Since government decisions are collective in their nature, participants cannot exclude non-participants from enjoying benefits if they succeed in getting what they wanted from the authorities. Participants under such institutional setting thus face the "paradox of participation in politics (Downs 1957, chap. 2)." If people are rational, the paradox holds, they would not participate, and for good reasons. (Barry 1970, chap. 2; Olson 1971, chap 1.). First, the probability that any one person's one lonely act will determine a political outcome is vanishingly small. The second is the problem of "free-rider"—the actor wants others to represent him to deal with the authority. Under such institutional arrangement, the "outside stimuli" are not enough to motivate people to participate in politics. Become social status and psychological orientation can change payoff structure of political actors, they become important resources of political participation.

In primitive and less developed society, however, the institutional arrangements are different. Political authorities in those societies are usually distributors, and sometime sole distributor of social resources. The most important difference between such societies where

47 Societies adopting different development strategy, such as mainland China before economic reform in 1979 can delay such a process.
grassroots authorities control resources and distribute them and societies where the major function of government is regulation of resource distribution is that decisions of public authorities in the former societies are selective. In such societies, the famous "paradox of participation" may not exist.

Remember that economic development not only changes the scope and consequences of government activities in a society but also the nature of the government decision. It is true that political actors in societies of different stages of economic development are mobilized by "outside stimuli," i.e., the decision (or non-decision) of public authority, the nature of the stimuli that mobilize political actors can vary from society to society. Although we cannot differentiate the nature of government decisions that mobilize political actors to participate in those societies, we may infer the nature of government decision from the places where people's political acts targeted. While distributive decisions are made by authorities at grassroots level, regulatory and redistribution decisions belong to higher level administrations.

Table 4 is about here

Table 4 uses institutional variable to predict political participation in three Chinese societies. On the right side of the table, we present the comparison of the institutional effects in each society. The analyses firm that political actors in these societies are mobilized by different "stimuli" to engage in political lives in their societies. In the most developed societies--Hong Kong, people participate in politics in response to stimuli from activities of both the central government in the colony and geographically based local authorities. In less developed Taiwan, decisions of local authorities are responsible primarily for mass participation. Our analysis shows that those who believe the activities of local government have significant impacts on their live
participation more than others in the island. The situation in mainland China is clearly different
from the other two societies. Even the process of separating political authorities from getting
directly involved in economic activities started in 1979, the transformation has yet to deprive
authorities at grassroots organizations the power to make distributive decisions. Many
government decisions are still selective in their nature (Shi 1997). Reflecting its development
levels, political actors in mainland China are still mobilized by decisions of grassroots
administration to participate in politics.

While the findings tell us that people in these societies are motivated by different "outside
stimuli" to participate, it does not tell if such different has anything to do with economic
development. It is true that these societies are in different stages of development—they range from
underdeveloped mainland China, mid-developed Taiwan, to highly-developed Hong Kong. Note
the important confounding factor—the strategy chosen by regime to develop economy of the
society. The developmental strategies in these societies are different from one another—they range
from lassie-faire free enterprise economy in Taiwan and Hong Kong to semi-state controlled
economy in mainland China. Such a factor may be the real reason behind the variation of the
sources of stimuli that mobilize people in these societies to participate in politics.

To demonstrate the dynamic of change caused by economic development, we need to
control for this possible confounding factor. The inquiry is crucial for us to understand the actual
effect of modernization on political participation. If economic development in and by itself rather
than through institutional development that changes people political behavior as suggested by
modernization theory, we should find economic development override impacts of institutional
settings in transforming people's political behavior. As its economy develops, the political
process in mainland China would become similar to those found in other societies. To further explore the dynamic of change, we divided mainland China into three areas—the low developed, middle developed and highly developed areas. We then examine the major stimuli that mobilize political actors in each area to participate in politics. By doing so, we hold institution setting constant to investigate if economic development plays any role in shaping the relationship between individuals and state.

We present the result of our analysis in the left side of the table. It shows while people in least and middle developed areas are mobilized by activities of grassroots organizations and/or local government to participate in politics, political actors in developed areas in mainland China are mobilized primarily by activities of central government to participate. Economic development in and by itself leads to a fundamental change in relationship between individuals and states in mainland China.

Membership of voluntary organization increases the likelihood for people to participate in politics. While party membership in mainland China and Taiwan plays a statistically significant role in mobilizing people to political lives in their society, membership of political party in Hong Kong does not make people there to be more active politically. We believe the reason behind this deviation is the political party in Hong Kong is still in its premature stage and very few people there belong to political party.48

The efforts of the regime to suppress unauthorized political expression have no effects on general level of participation in authoritarian mainland China but reduce the likelihood for people

48 As less than 2 percent of population in Hong Kong belongs to political parties, we do not have enough variances to manipulate.
in newly democratic Taiwan to participate. Despite the regime in authoritarian mainland China works very hard to prevent people from getting involved in unauthorized political acts to pursue their interests or from criticizing heads of the government, the authorities fail to prevent people from getting involved in various politics acts to influence government decisions.\textsuperscript{49} Remember that we should not interpret this finding as regime mobilization does not influence people's political behavior. Although the regime in authoritarian mainland China has been working hard to prevent people from getting involved in unauthorized political acts to influence high politics in the society, it never try to prevent people from influencing decisions of grassroots organizations.\textsuperscript{50} Decision made by grassroots administration are "low politics" issues. Political actors can influence such decisions without interfering "high politics" in the societies. Such acts are

\textsuperscript{49} This has been found by students of Soviet Politics. They found people in communist societies avoid confronting leaders and regimes in pursuing their interests. Bialer made a conceptual distinction between "high politics" and "low politics." According to him, high politics involves the principal political issues of society, the abstract ideas and language of politics, the decisions and actions of the societal leadership. Low politics involves the decisions that directly touch citizens' daily life, communal matters, and the conditions of the workplace. The Soviet citizens, according to him, are apolitical, indifferent, apathetic with regard to "high politics" but regularly involved to a very high proportion in "low politics". (Bialer 1980, 166)."

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We choose OLS model to estimate the relationship between SES and participation. Table 5 reports regression coefficients, standard error, and beta weights for impacts of sociological resources on participation in each society. The cell entries in the table tell us the increases in general level of political participation as we move, for example, from one education group to the next, in comparison with the base-line group. The analysis confirms the repeated that socioeconomic resources have significant impacts on participation. Among three major indicators of SES, education is found to have statistically significant impacts in all societies.

In mainland China, we found a 54 percent increases in the probability for people to participate in politics as we move from people without education to people attended primary school, and another 131 percent increases for people with college education. The educated also participate more than the less educated people in other two societies but with two variations. The first one is that education in mainland China seems to play a more important role in making people to participate in politics than in other two societies and the other is that the thresholds for education to have any effects on participation in Taiwan and Hong Kong are different from that in mainland China. While every increase in level of education makes people in mainland China to be more active politically, respondents' educational achievements need to beyond secondary school in Taiwan and high school in Hong Kong to be more active than other people in the society.

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one. Knowing a person earns more money helps us to predict that he will participate more than others. Different from these two societies, income is found to have no effects on political participation in Hong Kong.

While occupation has no effects on general level of participation in Taiwan and Hong Kong, farmers in mainland China participate less than other occupation groups in the society.\(^5^3\)

If we compare model R\(^2\) for models in each society, we will find sociological resources in mainland China explains about 9 percent of variance of people's political behavior in mainland China, 6 percent of variance in Hong Kong, and 11 percent of variance in people’s political behavior in Taiwan. Are these figures high or low? Does SES in these societies play similar or different roles compared to that in other societies? To learn more about the impacts of SES on participation in Chinese societies, we need to compare effects of SES in these societies with those in others. Table 6 presents data on the percentage of variances of people's political participation that explained by SES in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico and, in these three Chinese societies. Comparing R\(^2\) for models using SES as sole predictor of participation in these societies shows that the explanation powers of SES in Chinese societies are consistent with those found in other countries.

Table 6 is about here

\(^5^3\) Both control variables in the equation—age and gender—have significant impact on general level of participation. The relationships between age and participation in mainland China and Hong Kong are curvilinear ones: Middle-aged people participate more than both the young and the old. But the situation in Taiwan is some what different. The older the person is in Taiwan, the more likely he participates in politics.

The relationship between gender and participation in mainland China and Taiwan is similar to the other societies--males in those two societies participated more than males. However, we would not find gender difference in Hong Kong.
Note that the above comparison of the relationship between SES and participation across society challenges the functional claim made by social mobilization theory. Despite general level of education and income for population in mainland China is lower than in other two societies, participation in mainland China is higher than in other two societies. From the comparison of effects of SES on participation, we learned that we may attribute part of the reason for the deviation to a fact that sociological resources in mainland China play a more important role in mobilizing people to participate in politics than in other two societies. The finding suggests that economic development may not only increase resources for people to participate in politics, but also transform the process by which people become politicized and participate in politics in the society.

If the argument that economic development not only provides more resources to political actors but also transform the process by which SES converted to political activism, we should find the impacts of SES in areas of different level of development in mainland China different from one another. To explore the intra-regional variances of the impacts of SES on participation, we divided respondents of mainland China into three groups based on per capita income of the county where respondents residing and examine effects of SES on participation in each area.

Table 7 is about here

In table 7, we present our analysis of effects of education on participation in areas of different levels of economic development in mainland China, and in other two societies. The analysis confirms our expectation that education has different effects on political participation in places of different levels of economic development. While coefficient of education on general level of participation in the poorest areas in mainland China is .08, the figure increases to .16 in
mid-developed areas but declines to 0.7 for most developed areas in mainland China. However, education has the strongest effects in Hong Kong, but weakest effects in Taiwan. Although the above analysis suggests that political process in different places vary, we do not know why education plays different roles in different areas, a puzzle we will explore later.

From psychological resources to participation:

While socioeconomic resources explain why someone might or might not be able to participate in politics, subjective factors explain why individuals might or might not want to participate (Verba and others 1995, 343). Although participation is irrational behavior, not every political actor thinks that way. For example, those who believe that they can influence decision of the government participate more than those who believe otherwise. To make any sense, explanation of participation must move beyond the worlds of social resources to include psychological orientation of political actors as those orientation plays a key role in bridging socioeconomic resources to participation (Barnes and others 1979; Berelson and others 1954; Jennings; Deth; Barnes; fuchs; Heunks; Inglehart; Kaase; Klingemann, and Thomassen 1990; LaPalombara 1978; Nie and others 1969a; Paige 1971; Rokeach 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Weber 1947)(Nie and others 1969b).

Table 8 is about here

In table 8, we present the analysis of relationship between psychological resources and participation. Political information and political knowledge are powerful predictors of political attitude that connect individual to political process in a society.54 Previously, we found citizens

54 John Zeller considers political information to be a measure of affective engagement with politics (Zaller 1992, 42-43); See also (Verba and others 1995, 347-368).
vary substantially in their political information or knowledge and such variations are determined by the level of the economic development of the places where respondents residing. To our surprise, the analysis shows political information has no effects on participation in all three societies. To present the finding in a non-technical way, the finding refutes another claim made by social mobilization theory. Although economic development spread information about politics and governmental affairs to people in each society, political information does not make people to get involved in politics. Different from political information, political interest has statistically significant impact on participation in these societies. Those who are interested in politics participate more than those without such interest.

Mounting evidences link internal and external efficacy to political participation in various societies (Lukes 1974, 58-59; Rokeach 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Weber 1947, 133-36). Confidence on one's ability to understand politics and the belief in the influence of one's actions on decisions of government help political actors to overcome the famous paradox of participation. Remember that the reason that efficacy determines why political actors “might or might not want to participate” due to certain institutional arrangement in the society. When majority of government decisions are transferred from distributive to regulatory and redistributional and bureaucracy becomes institutionalized, government decisions become collective in nature. Under such an arrangement, the probability for any one person's one lonely act will determine a political outcome in such societies is vanishingly small. To make their voice heard, political actors need to act collectively. It is exactly because collective actions are required for political actors to achieve their goals, political action for individual actors become irrational. Under such a situation, "a psychological sense of political efficacy helps to overcome the very natural suspicion
that nothing one can do could possibly make very much difference (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 79).

An important, but usually forgotten question facing student of political development is, what if decisions of public authorities remain divisible? What if resource competition in the society requires political actors to exclude rather than include other actors?\textsuperscript{55} Individuals in primitive society, such as in certain Africa countries can influence decision of tribe leaders without invoke collective actions. Certain individuals in mainland China can also influence decision of leaders in grassroots organizations on resource distribution without changing the policy made by the government before current reform (McCormick 1990; Shi 1997; Shue 1988). Urban workers can persuade leaders of his work units to allocate a house to himself rather than to his coworkers. Peasants in rural villages can persuade head of the village to allocate a piece of land to build a house for his family. Because social resources at the disposal of "government" under such an institutional settings are usually limited, effective participation requires actors to persuade government officials to allocate resources that have already allocated to the organization to themselves rather to other people. To get the desired resources, political actors do not need to change the rules and regulation made by the government. As a result, the "natural suspicion" of the ability of individuals to influence decisions of public authorities may not be an obstacle for people to participate in such societies. External efficacy in such institutional environment may not be an important psychological resource that connects sociological resources to participation, although internal efficacy, a feeling of personal competence may play an role in prompting actors to participate.

\textsuperscript{55} For discussion of the political logic in mainland China, see (Shi 1999).
The analyses presented in table 8 confirm the above expectation. In all three societies, those who are confident on their ability to understand and to participate in politics are more active than people who are not. Internal efficacy is an important psychological resources for people to participate. The functions of external efficacy, however, are different from society to society. In the most developed societies–Hong Kong, external efficacy helps participants to overcome the "natural suspicion." It is an important psychological resource that makes people to participate. Different Hong Kong, external efficacy makes no differences on the likelihood for people in both mainland China and Taiwan to participate in politics.

Finally, orientation toward power and authorities have a statistically significant role in making people to participate in politics in all three societies. Those who view their relationship with authorities as reciprocal participate much more than those who perceive their relationship with authorities as hierarchical.

**Multivariate analysis of political processes in places of different levels of economic development.**

The bivariate analyses show that although the relationships between sociological resources and participation are similar in these societies, the relationship between psychological and participation vary from one place to another. Institutional factors also play different roles in different places in these societies. It is true that bivariate analysis provides us with important information. However, several problems need to be resolved before we can make tentative conclusion on the relationship between economic development and participation. First, our measurement of institutional effects, perceived impacts of government, is correlated with sociological resources of political actors, especially education. The ability for political actors to
realize that governmental activities have an impact on their lives can be a function of the nature and scope of governmental activities in the society and their cognitive ability. Second, psychological resources themselves can be the product of sociological resources. For example, political information and interests in politics might be the function of educational achievement of individuals. We found psychological resources correlated with political participation. Bivariate analysis does not tell us whether it is the psychological orientation that causes people to participate in politics, or sociological resources that causes the differences. The third problem derived from the classical debate on the relationship between institution on the one hand, and political culture on the other. For example, we found connection between external efficacy and their political behavior in Hong Kong but not in mainland China. What we don’t know is whether it is the external efficacy that causes people in Hong Kong to participate, or the external efficacy itself is shaped by the institutional setting in that society. We don't know whether there is an interactive effect between institution and people's psychological orientation. For our purpose, the crucial question is whether the impacts of people’s orientations on their behavior are effects of economic development, or a product of institutions?56

We are going to resolve these puzzles in this section. The first two issues can be resolved by multiple regression analysis. Such analysis allows us to control impacts of certain variables to examine impacts of others. In the following analysis, the model with SES as predictors presented in table 6 will be used as our base model and we are going to add, first, psychological orientation and than institutional variables to that model. Three types of information can be derived from this

56 For the relationship between culture and institution, see among others, (Barry 1970, 48-52; Elkins and Simeon 1979).
analysis. First, the coefficients of the new variables (in this case, psychological orientation of political actors) tell us whether they have independent effects on participation in each society. Second, the changes of coefficients of socioeconomic variables on participation when psychological variables are added to the model provide us with information on how socioeconomic variables influence political participation. If we found impacts of SES disappeared when measurement of people’s psychological orientation are entered into the model, we know that SES influences participation through psychological orientation. If, on the other hand, impacts of SES remains after psychological variables are entered into the model, we know that SES has independent effects on participation. It tells us effects of SES do not go through psychological orientation. Finally, comparing models in each society and regions of different levels of economic development allows us to compare the processes of politicization in different localities. It tells us if such processes are similar or different in these three societies and in places of different levels of economic development.

Table 9 is about here

Table 9 presents the model using both SES and psychological orientation to predict political participation. When we introduced people’s psychological orientation into the model, effects of income and occupation in all three societies vanished. The finding tells us that income and occupation do not have independent effects on political participation. Note that the result should not be interpreted as occupation and income do not have any influence over political participation. They do, however, income and occupation influence participation through political engagement.

Although education plays significant roles to involve people to political lives, effect of
education on participation varies from society to society. In Taiwan and Hong Kong, education influences participation through political engagement. When political engagement is introduced into the model, effects of education on participation disappear. Education does not have independent effects on political participation. The situation in mainland China, however, is different. Introducing psychological orientation in the model reduces rather than eliminates effect of education.

To find out whether the level of economic development or institutional settings explain the difference of the impacts of education on participation in these societies, we need to control for institution. Again, we compare models for data gathered in different areas of mainland China. Within mainland China, education has direct effect on participation in the poor and middle-income areas but not in the richest areas. In areas where their economic development levels are equal or higher than Taiwan, the political process become similar—education in those areas no longer has an independent effect on political participation. This finding tells us that it is the level of economic development, rather than institutional settings that cause the differences of political processes in those societies. The finding that education works through different paths in different places needs further exploration. In bivariate analysis, we found perceived impacts on government have significant influence over people’s political behavior. People's cognitive ability can also be closely associated with education. Thus, the “institutional effects” may also be the proxy of education: Education increases the ability for political actors to understand impacts of government, which in turn make people to participate in politics. To find if this is the case, we add institutional variables to the model presented in table 9 and rerun the analysis. This finding can be translated into the following theoretical statement—economic development can change the
relationship between education and participation. While education and psychological involvement jointly matter for participation in places of lower level of economic development, education becomes a proxy for psychological factors in rich areas in mainland and economically developed Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Table 10 is about here

The result presented in table 10 shows that when institutional variables are added to the model, effects of education on political participation in mainland China also vanished. Apparently, education in mainland China help people to understand impacts of government on their lives, which in turn, make them to participate in politics. Although education increase general level of participation in all three societies, the findings tell us that the actual path of its influence varies with economic development. In Hong Kong, Taiwan, and rich areas in mainland China, education influences participation through psychologically mobilizing people to political lives in the society. In under-developed areas of mainland China, education increases the likelihood for people to participate in politics by helping them to understand impacts of government decisions on their lives.

Among various psychological resources tested in the model, political interest and internal efficacy have strong and positive effects on general level of political participation across all societies. Political information, on the other hand, reduces the likelihood for people in mainland China to participate but has no effects on participation in other societies. If we agree with Zaller's argument that political information measures people’s affective engagement with politics (Zaller 1992, 42-43), we would conclude that affects in mainland China refrain political actors from participating in politics. Give the fact that mainland China is still under the authoritarian rule,
Some scholars may argue against this claim because external efficacy in many other liberal democracies, especially in the US, play an important role in making people participate in politics. Note that those analyses are based on multiple regression. Use multiple regression to analyze the data acquired from these societies yield the same result.

Different from multiple regression model, orientation toward power and authorities are found to have independent effects on political participation in all three societies. The finding clearly demonstrates that people’s psychological orientation plays different roles in these societies. In newly democratic Taiwan, people participate in politics regardless of their perception on the responsiveness of their government. Believes that the government is non-responsive to people’s demands in Taiwan do not prevent political actors from participating in politics as in mainland China and Hong Kong. Because people in Taiwan are provided with an institutionalized way to replace the government they do not like as the consequences of democratization, we can assume that those who believe the government is non-responsive to their demands may take advantage of election to replace the government that are deemed non-responsive to its constituents. Without such an institutional arrangement to provide people with periodical opportunity to “get the rascal out,” those in mainland China and in Hong Kong who believe their government are non-responsive to people’s demands would have no other choice but retreat to private lives.

When we shift attention from individual level explanation to politics, we could also find significant variations in the impacts of political circumstances on people’s political behavior in these societies. As a general rule, individuals who realize their stake in the system participate more than people without such understanding. More important, we found people in different societies are mobilized by activities of government at different levels to participate. In under-

People’s orientation toward power and authority across all three societies have statistical significant impacts on participation and such effects can neither be reduced to education nor to institution. Those who perceive their relationship with political authorities as reciprocal in both authoritarian mainland China and newly democratic Taiwan are more active in various political acts than people believing their relationship with authority should be hierarchical. To our surprise, such orientation has no effects on people’s political behavior in Hong Kong.

Path model of political participation: before any conclusion can be made, we should aware another potential problem of our analysis—a problem associated with multiple regression. Although multiple regression allows us to examine effects of a particular variable while holding others constant, it does not allow us to take into account of effects of the changes of one pair of variables on the relationship among others. For example, the method allows us to examine effects of education on participation by holding psychological orientation constant. In real life, however, those variables may not change with education. Education makes people to be confident in their ability to understand and participate in politics and such confidence may influence the relationships among education, political interest, and participation. To fully understand the impacts of economic development on the relationship among education, orientation and participation, we need a dynamic model which allows us to calculate, for example, impacts of the relationship between education and political efficacy on the relationship among education, orientation toward power and authority, and participation. We use structural equation model for our inquiry.

Figure 7.1-7.3 present the structural equation models for political participation in
mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Different from multiple regression model, orientation
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analyze the data acquired from these societies yield the same result.
developed mainland China, the outside stimuli that mobilize people to participate come primarily from grassroots organizations and local government. On the contrary, if people attribute the problems facing them to central government, they tend to give up and refrain from getting involved in political acts to pursue their goals. In mid-developed Taiwan, while activities of local government are the major stimuli that mobile people to participate, activities of central government plays little role in mobilizing people to political lives in the society. The situation in economically developed Hong Kong, however, are different from those in the previous two societies. In Hong Kong, political actors are mobilized by activities of local and central government to participate in politics.

Furthermore, the mobilization processes in these societies are also different. In mainland China, political party plays the major role in mobilizing people to participate in politics. Membership of voluntary association does not have independent effects. One explanation for his phenomenon attributes the deviation to institutional settings in mainland China. As we have pointed out earlier, effective competition for social resources in mainland China at its current stage of economic development requires participants to exclude rather than include other actors. Under institutional arrangement in mainland China, interest aggregation is not necessary for effective resource competition. The situations in Taiwan and Hong Kong are different from that in mainland China. In those societies, effective interest articulation requires someone to aggregate interests in the society. Reflecting their institutional arrangement, membership of organizations plays an important role in mobilizing people to participate in politics.

Note that these societies are different from each other not only in levels of economic development but also in regime type. Thus, a competing explanation is that organizations and
groups in mainland China are designed for the regime to control its citizens rather than to help private citizens to aggregate various private interests and represent them to articulate those interests with the authorities. We do not know if we should attribute group membership in mainland China does not make people to be more active politically to regime type or to level of economic development. The real question here is whether the effects of economic development can transform political processes in mainland China, or elites can defend the system design against the changes caused by economic development. If the thesis proposed by modernization theorists is correct, we should expect to find the political process in mainland China would convert to those found in other two societies when its economic development reaches their levels.

To test these competing hypotheses and to explore the cause of the differences in political process in these societies, we run the same model for data gathered in areas of different levels of economic development in mainland China. These analyses of the data gathered in areas of different levels of economic development in one society allow us to control for regime type to study effects of economic development. If political process in rich areas in mainland China becomes similar to those found in other two societies, we know that 1) it is the difference in the level of economic development that causes the differences of the function of groups and membership of organizations in the political process in these societies; 2) economic development will convert political process into a similar one regardless of the intention of the regime. This finding will provide us certain indication on the relationship between economic development and democratization by showing how economic development changes the governing process in a society.

The results of analysis of political processes in areas of different levels of economic
development presented in figure 8.1–8.3 convene several important messages. Among them, the most important one is that it is the level of economic development, rather than the regime type that causes the differences of political processes in these societies. The analyses not only reveal that psychological orientation plays different roles in areas of different levels of economic development in mainland China, but also demonstrates the pattern of variation of the effects of psychological orientation on participation in mainland China is consistent with the pattern of variation among three societies. Within mainland China, internal efficacy has strongest effects on participation in poor areas, but less important effects in rich areas. Similar to the finding in cross-societies comparison, the analysis of political process in areas of different levels of economic development shows that effects of self-confidence of political actors on participation also declines as economy develops.

Different from internal efficacy, economic development cannot explain variation of the impact of external efficacy in mainland China. Careful examination of the data, however, shows that impacts of external efficacy on participation vary with the sources of outside stimuli that stipulate actors to participate in politics. When activities of local or central government stipulate political actors to participate in politics, such as in both the poor and rich areas in mainland China, external efficacy appears to be a crucial psychological resource that bridge sociological resources and political participation. When the decisions of grassroots administration stipulate political actors to participate, external efficacy do not play any role in pushing actors to political actions. We can translate this important finding into a non-technical statement: Confidence on responsiveness of government is not a prerequisite for political actors in certain societies to get involved in parochial political acts to compete for social resources at grassroots administration.
Note that this seemly paradox finding is constant with rather than contradict to the logic proposed by modernization theorists. However, it is exactly because the finding is consistent with logic proposed by the theory, it reminds us a possibility that the economic development is a confounding effect of the institution change. It is well known that economic development will transform the nature of decision of public authority and such transformation will alter the political logic in the society. Although social mobilization theorists usually take such transformation as starting point of their study, few of them have ever explored the causal mechanism behind the change of people's political behavior. For a theoretical purpose, differentiating whether economic development, or the institutional transformation associated with economic development that causes the changes in people's political behavior is crucial for us to understand modernization process.

The major reason for the failure of modernization scholars to explore the reason behind the change is that the institutional transformation usually associates closely with economic development. When economy develops, institutional settings in the places will transfer. The primary function of public authorities will change from resource distributors to regulator of resource distribution. To test whether it is the economic development itself or the transformation of institutional settings that cause the changes of people's political behavior, we need to find places with developed economy but the function of government remains traditional. Such places can be easily found in mainland China.

Starting from late 1970s, the government in mainland China introduced household responsibility system into rural areas. Such reform revolutionarily changed the relationship between individuals and state in rural areas. Before reform, the grassroots organizations—the
production brigades control all resources in Chinese villages. Because social resources at the
village level are limited in supply, effective interest articulation required participants to exclude
rather than include other political actors to the game. When government in China distributes
lands to farmers and allows them to work individually, public authority in rural areas lost direct
control over social resources. Under the new system, the major function of public authorities at
grassroots levels becomes regulators of social resource distribution.

Note that this is the process that happens in many societies with economic development.
However, what is unique in mainland China is that this transformation started from the poor rural
areas, but not small towns. At the time of survey, large scale ownership reform has yet to start in
mid-developed small towns. Public authorities at the grassroots level, i.e., work units still
represent state to allocate social resources among employees. Moreover, governing processes in
some developed rural areas also retain traditional style. Economic development in many villages
in rural areas is based on collective enterprise rather than private ones. The wealth created by
collective enterprises provides public authorities at grassroots level to control social resources and
to distribute them among citizens. Such a split between economic development and institutional
transformation allows researchers to test among the competing theories. To find whether
economic development in and by itself brings the changes in people's political behavior, we can
compare political process in the mid-developed areas with that of the poor. As institutional
settings in mid-developed areas remains to be traditional and fails to change with economic
development, is the political process there remains traditional or changes because level of
economic development in those areas are higher than others?

Our analysis shows that activities of different level of government stipulate people
residing in areas of different levels of economic development to participate in politics. Similar stimuli induce different behavior of political actors in areas of alternative stages of economic development. Different from actors residing in poor and rich areas, actors in mid-developed regions are mobilized primarily by decisions of grassroots administrations to political lives. If actors in those areas attribute the problems facing them to decisions of central government, they would refrain from getting involved in political acts. Nonetheless, stimuli from central government increase rather than reduce the likelihood for people residing in rich areas to participate in politics.

This finding is important, but more important is the finding that participation in mid-developed areas requires different resources on political actors as compare to those in other areas. While external efficacy increases the likelihood for political actors in both the rich and the poor areas to participate in politics, external efficacy plays no role in make people to deal with authorities of grassroots organizations. Taken together, the findings confirm our hypothesis that economic development not only increase resources among population in a society, but also transform political process in the society. Moreover, our analysis reveals such a transformation may or may not associate with economic development in the society.

Conclusion

From analyses presented in this chapter, we may draw the following conclusions on the relationship between economic development and political participation. The first one is that economic development not only increases resources of political actors as suggested by modernization theorists, but also transforms the function of public authority. Although such transformation may be and usually associate with economic development, economic development
may not necessarily produce such a change. For example, while economic development based on free-market enterprises transformed institutional settings in the poor areas in mainland China, development based on collective enterprises fossilized traditional institutional setting political process in mid-developed areas.

Second and most important one is that the findings demonstrate that it is the change of institution associated with economic development, rather than economic development per se that transforms people's political behavior. As our analysis shows, people living under different institutional settings are mobilized by decisions of different level of government to participate in politics. This is not only confirmed by our comparison of political behavior for people in different societies, but also by our comparison of political behavior for people in different areas within mainland China. Such a finding leads to an important conclusion: It is the free market economy, rather than economic development, that causes the transformation of governmental functions and such transformation is the cause of the change in people's political behavior. We argue that the empirical relationship between economic development and political participation specified by modernization theorists are, in fact, spurious.

Third, economic development increases sociological and psychological resources as suggested by the theory but not others. Our analysis shows that general level of education, income, white collar job, political information, and political interests vary with economic wealth. However, economic development and the increases in sociological resources associated with economic development do not make people to become efficacy, regardless of institutional environment. Since resources are found to play different roles in places of different institutional settings, expansion upon sociological and psychological resources does not necessarily lead to an
increase in political participation in a society as suggested by modernization theorists.
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Notes: Seen in comparative perspective, American voter turnout presents an interesting paradox. Americans seem to be more politically aware and involved than citizens in any other democracy, yet the levels of voter turnout in the United States are consistently far below the democratic average. In comparative perspective, the American registration rules, electoral system, and party systems inhibit voter participation, outweighing by far the attitudinal advantage.


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Figure 1. General level of political participation in regions of different levels of economic development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean per capita GDP of the sampling counties and cities in the region</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents who have participated in at least one political act</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>82%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>87%</td>
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<tr>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1993 mainland China survey. N for poorest region is 611, for the poor regions is 635, for mid-income regions is 630, for rich region is 635, and for the richest regions is 649. r = .83. Significant at .0001 level.
Figure 1. General level of political participation in regions of different levels of economic development

Source: 1993 mainland China survey.
N for poorest region is 611, for the poor regions is 635, for mid-income regions is 630, for rich region is 635, and for the richest regions is 649. 
$r = .83$. Significant at .0001 level
Figure 2. Economic development and political participation in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

Sources: 1993 mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong surveys.
N for mainland China=3,160, for Taiwan=1,402, and for Hong Kong=892
Figure 3. Economic development and alternative modes of political participation in mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong
Figure 4. Economic development and alternative modes of political participation in mainland China

Sources: mainland China 1993 survey.
Note: all the differences revealed here are significant at .01 level, except adversarial activities which is not significant.
Figure 5. Institutional settings and political participation in mainland China

Source: mainland China 1993 survey.

Note: there is no significant difference in protest among areas of different levels of economic development. All the other differences are significant at .001 level, except adversarial activities which is not significant at .05.
Figure 6. Speed of economic development and participation in mainland China

Sources: mainland China 1993 survey.
Note: there is no significant differences in Protest among rareas of different levels of economic development.
All the other differences are significant at .001 level, except adversarial activities which is not significant at .05 .
Table 1. The demographic characteristics of people residing in areas of different level of economic development in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables Averages of</th>
<th>Regions of different developmental levels in mainland China (mean GDP per capita)</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Industrialized Democracies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>2,420</td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td>5,814</td>
<td>14,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4,999</td>
<td>88.0 (651)</td>
<td>81.9 (582)</td>
<td>62.8 (406)</td>
<td>59.0 (344)</td>
<td>36.9 (175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-9,999</td>
<td>10.5 (78)</td>
<td>14.2 (101)</td>
<td>25.4 (164)</td>
<td>30.5 (178)</td>
<td>36.5 (173)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>1.5 (11)</td>
<td>3.9 (28)</td>
<td>11.8 (76)</td>
<td>10.5 (61)</td>
<td>26.6 (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.0 (192)</td>
<td>14.0 (100)</td>
<td>18.4 (119)</td>
<td>16.1 (94)</td>
<td>12.3 (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>44.9 (332)</td>
<td>45.1 (321)</td>
<td>36.3 (234)</td>
<td>35.3 (234)</td>
<td>27.1 (128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>19.8 (146)</td>
<td>29.2 (208)</td>
<td>27.1 (175)</td>
<td>26.6 (167)</td>
<td>30.0 (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>8.1 (60)</td>
<td>9.7 (69)</td>
<td>14.6 (94)</td>
<td>13.2 (77)</td>
<td>23.5 (111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13+</td>
<td>1.2 (9)</td>
<td>2.0 (14)</td>
<td>3.6 (23)</td>
<td>6.7 (39)</td>
<td>7.2 (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond lower (9th grade)</td>
<td>9.3 (69)</td>
<td>11.7 (83)</td>
<td>19.9 (117)</td>
<td>19.9 (116)</td>
<td>30.7 (145)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>64.7 (478)</td>
<td>46.1 (328)</td>
<td>38.0 (245)</td>
<td>30.8 (179)</td>
<td>18.8 (89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar jobs in work force</td>
<td>4.3 (32)</td>
<td>9.6 (68)</td>
<td>16.7 (108)</td>
<td>17.9 (104)</td>
<td>23.8 (113)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanization***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural village</td>
<td>95.8 (709)</td>
<td>88.1 (627)</td>
<td>80.5 (520)</td>
<td>69.2 (403)</td>
<td>50.2 (238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small town</td>
<td>2.6 (19)</td>
<td>4.9 (35)</td>
<td>4.2 (27)</td>
<td>1.0 (6)</td>
<td>5.7 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small to medium city</td>
<td>1.6 (12)</td>
<td>7.0 (50)</td>
<td>11.9 (77)</td>
<td>8.4 (49)</td>
<td>21.1 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big city (population above one million)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3.4 (22)</td>
<td>21.3 (124)</td>
<td>23.0 (109)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All differences are significant at the .001 level.
Table 2. Distribution of cultural orientation of people in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regions of different developmental levels in mainland China (mean GDP per capita)</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>2,420</td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td>5,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having some information</td>
<td>61.1 (452)**</td>
<td>62.2 (443)**</td>
<td>68.0 (439)**</td>
<td>73.9 (431)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score on political information index</td>
<td>1.19 (739)**</td>
<td>1.30 (712)**</td>
<td>1.57 (646)**</td>
<td>1.80 (582)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Interests</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having some interest in politics</td>
<td>60.2 (445)**</td>
<td>74.0 (527)**</td>
<td>76.6 (494)**</td>
<td>80.2 (467)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score on political interest index</td>
<td>2.08 (739)**</td>
<td>2.78 (712)**</td>
<td>3.21 (646)**</td>
<td>3.66 (582)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Efficacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept: “I think I understand well major political problems our country faces.”</td>
<td>31.0 (193)</td>
<td>33.4 (202)</td>
<td>29.8 (161)</td>
<td>34.9 (175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept: “I consider myself very capable of participating in politics.”</td>
<td>20.1 (130)</td>
<td>21.7 (138)</td>
<td>23.4 (132)</td>
<td>22.6 (122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score on internal efficacy index</td>
<td>-.53 (585)</td>
<td>-.49 (569)</td>
<td>-.52 (509)</td>
<td>-.44 (484)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Efficacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject: “People like me have no say in what the government does”</td>
<td>51.6 (337)**</td>
<td>46.7 (308)**</td>
<td>43.8 (251)**</td>
<td>54.2 (291)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject: Government officials don’t care too much about what people like me think.”</td>
<td>31.5 (206)</td>
<td>31.9 (188)</td>
<td>25.8 (141)</td>
<td>31.5 (158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score on external efficacy index</td>
<td>-.18 (603)**</td>
<td>-.23 (573)**</td>
<td>-.33 (510)**</td>
<td>-.13 (477)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditionalism index &amp; relationship with authorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern (in percent)</td>
<td>6.9 (35)**</td>
<td>10.9 (68)**</td>
<td>13.8 (73)**</td>
<td>13.3 (72)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score</td>
<td>-1.25(614)**</td>
<td>-1.06 (607)**</td>
<td>-0.97(544)**</td>
<td>-1.00(495)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Institutional effects in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan as well as in areas of different level of economic development in mainland China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Regions of different developmental levels in mainland China (mean GDP per capita)</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,334 2,420 3,443 5,814 14,042</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>12,066</td>
<td>24,528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Impacts of different levels of government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local Government (in percent)</th>
<th>Central Government (in percent)</th>
<th>Mean score on government impact index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.0 (222)***</td>
<td>6.0 (192)***</td>
<td>.73 (739)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.7 (233)***</td>
<td>23.5 (154)***</td>
<td>.72 (712)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.7 (192)***</td>
<td>32.6 (210)***</td>
<td>.79 (646)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36.1 (210)***</td>
<td>34.6 (233)***</td>
<td>.95 (582)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.5 (220)***</td>
<td>48.1 (228)***</td>
<td>1.28 (474)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.2 (1077)</td>
<td>31.7 (999)</td>
<td>.87 (3153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.7 (585)</td>
<td>34.4 (482)</td>
<td>.97 (1402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55.3 (493)</td>
<td>69.6 (621)</td>
<td>1.77 (892)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Membership in political parties and organizations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political parties (in percent)</th>
<th>Membership of organizations (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.2 (83)***</td>
<td>4.3 (132)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.7 (133)***</td>
<td>13.9 (99)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.1 (136)***</td>
<td>17.2 (111)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.6 (143)***</td>
<td>28.4 (165)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.4 (125)***</td>
<td>43.0 (204)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.7 (620)</td>
<td>19.4 (611)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.3 (290)</td>
<td>36.9 (517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.4 (5)</td>
<td>20.4 (182)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fear of political persecution**

If criticizing government, concerned that someone would report to the authorities (yes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.6 (345)</td>
<td>55.5 (365)</td>
<td>54.0 (328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55.4 (287)</td>
<td>58.9 (261)</td>
<td>54.8 (1586)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.1 (670)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1993 surveys.
Missing data are excluded from calculations. All differences are statistically significant at least at the .001 level, except the one with * which is significant at the .05 level.
We use to questions to measure impacts of government. They are: "How much effect do you think the local government where you live has on your daily life?" and "How much effect do you think the central government has on your daily life?"
Fear of political persecution: "If you criticized the government in conversation where you live or work, would you be concerned that someone would report you to the authorities?"
Table 4. Predicting overall participation by institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Different areas in mainland</th>
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<th>China</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(mean GDP per capita)</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>3,527</td>
<td>11,080</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impacts of government on people’s lives</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danwei</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.20***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
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<td>.08</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.26***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational membership</td>
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<td>Voluntary association</td>
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<td>.82***</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.66***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.62***</td>
<td>1.28***</td>
<td>1.08***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terror</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
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<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td>-.51</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>.87</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.59)</td>
<td>(.58)</td>
<td>(.60)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>3031</td>
<td>1,153</td>
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<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
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Note: Age and age square also included in the equation.
### Table 5. Impacts of Socioeconomic Status, Gender and Age on Overall Participation and Political discussion in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mainland China</th>
<th></th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Beta</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (No education)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
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<td>.30</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.31)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
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<td>.57</td>
<td>.11*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
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<td>.67</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.18)</td>
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<td>(.24)</td>
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<td>(.35)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>1.84</td>
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<td>(.26)</td>
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<td>(.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>.10***</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
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<td>(.00)</td>
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<td>(.00)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Squared</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.10***</td>
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<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (Blue collars)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collars</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
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<td>(.02)</td>
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<td>(.00)</td>
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<td>Gender (Male)</td>
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<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td>(.63)</td>
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<td>(.73)</td>
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<td><strong>R2</strong></td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sample size</strong></td>
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<td>966</td>
<td>727</td>
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Table 6. Amount of participation explained by SES in different societies

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>Variance Explained by SES (Percent)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>German</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Five Nation Average</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mainland China</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kong Kong</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

Sources: The data for the relationship between SES and participation in other societies is acquired from {Nie, Powell, et al. 1969 #437 /ft "", 818"}. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Different areas in mainland Mainland Taiwan (mean GDP per capita)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>3,527</td>
<td>11,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.08***</td>
<td>.16***</td>
<td>.07**</td>
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<td>Occupation</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
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<td>-.54***</td>
<td>.41*</td>
</tr>
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<td>White collar</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.22</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>.00*</td>
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<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00**</td>
</tr>
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<td>.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Different areas in mainland</td>
<td>Mainland</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(mean GDP per capita)</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>3,527</td>
</tr>
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<td>Psychological Involvement in Politics</td>
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<td>.03</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.42***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.24*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reciprocal relationship</td>
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<tr>
<td>with authorities</td>
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<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td>.86</td>
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<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>1,085</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Age and age square also included in the equation.
### Table 9. Predicting overall participation by sociological and psychological resources

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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Poor Areas</th>
<th>Middle income Area</th>
<th>Rich areas</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Mean GDP per Capita conversion with PPP method)</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>3,527</td>
<td>11,080</td>
<td>5,484</td>
<td>12,066</td>
<td>24,528</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Beta</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sociological Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09 (.02)</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04 (.01)</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.00 (.02)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>.23 (.14)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.50 (.16)</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>-.75 (.30)</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.07 (.09)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.04 (.22)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>.01 (.27)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.54 (.23)</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>-.02 (.21)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.18 (.13)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.32 (.24)</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.20 (.15)</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collars</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Psychological Resources** |           |        |       |        |      |        |      |        |     |        |     |        |
| Information     | -.06 (.07) | .03    | -.07 (.07) | -.04  | -.17 (.09) | -.10  | -.11 (.04) | -.07** | -.04 (.05) | .03 | .00 (.07) | .00 |
| Interest        | .24 (.03) | .26*** | .21 (.03) | .26*** | .14 (.04) | .21*** | .18 (.02) | .24*** | .09 (.02) | .15*** | .15 (.02) | .24*** |
| Internal efficacy | .50 (.09) | .16*** | .32 (.10) | .10** | .45 (.12) | .16*** | .43 (.06) | .14*** | .28 (.07) | .14*** | .38 (.11) | .11*** |
| External efficacy | -.09 (.08) | .03  | -.16 (.10) | -.05  | .15 (.11) | .05  | -.05 (.05) | -.02 | .01 (.06) | .00 | .25 (.07) | .11** |
| Authority relations | .34 (.09) | .11*** | .23 (.10) | .08* | -.09 (.10) | .03  | .21 (.05) | .08*** | .09 (.04) | .07* | .12 (.06) | .08* |
| (Constant)      | -.150 (.46)** | -.94 (.53) | -.88 (.60) | -.88 (.29) | .68 (.64) | .94 (.57) |     |        |     |        |     |        |

| N              | 1,223     | 1,094  | 842   | 3,294  | 957   | 892   |

Note: Age, age square, and gender are also included in the equation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Poor Areas (Mean GDP per Capita conversion with PPP method)</th>
<th>Middle income Area</th>
<th>Rich areas</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, age square, gender, occupation</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>3,527</td>
<td>11,080</td>
<td>5,484</td>
<td>12,066</td>
<td>24,528</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06 (.03)</td>
<td>.10***</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.14 (.07)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.15 (.07)</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>-.19 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.25 (.03)</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.19 (.03)</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.17 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.48 (.09)</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>.28 (.10)</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.14***</td>
<td>.41 (.06)</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>-.20 (.10)</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.02 (.05)</td>
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<td>.16 (.10)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.17 (.05)</td>
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<td>Impacts of government</td>
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<td>Grassroots</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.44 (.11)</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.15 (.06)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.10**</td>
<td>.06 (.14)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>.08 (.12)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.21 (.12)</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.04 (.07)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Organization</td>
<td>.16 (.24)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.57 (.21)</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.14 (.11)</td>
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<td>Party membership</td>
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<td>.97 (.20)</td>
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<td>.74</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>.73 (.11)</td>
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<td>.14</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04 (.08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td>-.68 (.55)</td>
<td>-.130 (.67)</td>
<td>.86 (31)**</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td>1.65 (.68)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N     | 1,121 | 1,007 | 766   | 3,029  | 840   | 720   |
R²    | .19   | .21   | .16   | .15    | .17   | .18   |
Table 11  The Relationship between Socioeconomic Resources and Psychological Orientation (Informed about politics and interest in politics) in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

Note: Age, age square, gender, and occupation are also included in the equation.
Table 11. The Relationship between Socioeconomic Resources and Psychological Orientation (Informed about politics and interest in politics) in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
<th>Informed about Politics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Education (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
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<td>1.23***</td>
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<td>(.11)</td>
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<td>7-9</td>
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<td>1.71***</td>
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<td>10-12</td>
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<td>(.11)</td>
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<td>13+</td>
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<td>2.58***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family economic situation (less than $5,000)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-10,000</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10,000+</td>
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<td>.21**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation (Blue collars)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Farmers</td>
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<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collars</td>
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<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization (rural village)</td>
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<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small to medium city</td>
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<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big city</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.54***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients in regression equation with dummy variables for each group except the base-line in each category, with standard errors in parentheses. The baseline category is presented in parentheses following the heading of each category. These figures represent increment in people’s psychological resources relative to base-line group in each category with the change of sociological resources.
Asian Barometer Survey
A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

Working Paper Series


The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

For more information, please visit our website: www.asianbarometer.org


