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The State of Democratic Governance in Asia

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The State of Indonesia Democratic Governance:
A Popular Assessment

By

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I. Introduction and Summary

Indonesian democracy is quite recent. It revived only a decade ago after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. It is too early to predict whether it will be consolidated. Indonesia is rather unique because its population is predominantly Muslim while democracy in such a society is very rare.

Public opinion surveys may help reveal how deep democracy is in Indonesian hearts and minds, and may shed light on the extent to which Indonesian democracy will be consolidated.

So far, public opinion surveys indicate that support for democratic institutions among Indonesians is very great. Most are satisfied with the way democracy works in the country. This satisfaction and support which are crucial for democratic legitimacy and in turn for its consolidation are associated significantly with governance qualities, which are good relative to other Asian democracies.

The governance quality which stands out most in Indonesian public opinion compared to that of other Asian democracies is freedom. Judged on the basis of public opinion, Indonesia is the freest country in the Asian democracies under study. However, this freedom is under a threat due to the emergence of conservative Muslim politics.

II. Historical Background

The current Indonesian democracy is relatively recent. It revived after Sukarno’s and Suharto’s dictatorships, which lasted for about forty years (1959-1998). Suharto’s New Order collapsed ten years ago. The first Indonesian democracy emerged in the 1950s, but failed to consolidate. It was a parliamentary democracy.

Needless to say, under the parliamentary system, strongly influenced by European democracy (specifically the Netherlands), the role of the presidential office and of President Sukarno himself was not that significant. The parliamentary system alienated President Sukarno, widely acclaimed as the leader of the nation because he was given a symbolic role only. In addition, the military were also given an insignificant political role, though they felt that they had made a major contribution to the independence of Indonesia. Some military figures had been involved in separatist movements which threatened the new nation, and had been put down by the national armed forces leadership. The parliamentary period was also characterized by ideological conflict between Islamic and secular parties. The Islamic parties insisted that Indonesia become an Islamic state, while the secular parties rejected this aspiration.
The accumulation of these problems ended with a presidential decree to abolish parliamentary democracy in 1959. A civilian dictatorship under the leadership of President Sukarno was the alternative to parliamentary democracy. Sukarno was supported by the military and the Communist party.

In the context of the Cold War, President Sukarno tended to be sympathetic to the Communists, a growing political force in the period 1959-1965. The military reacted against the growth of communist influence. Confrontations between the Army and the Communist ended in an army takeover under the leadership of General Suharto in 1965.

Under military authoritarianism political freedom was dead for about 30 years, but the economy in that period was fairly good. Average annual economic growth was about 6%. However, the Asian monetary crisis in 1997-98 deeply affected the Indonesian economy and the regime was unable to resolve the problem. Economic growth dropped dramatically to minus 13%, mass protests and riots forced President Suharto to resign. He and was succeeded by Vice-President Habibie in 1998.

President Habibie was quite successful in bringing about economic recovery and in responding to the demands of students and other reformists for political reform. Under his government, the first democratic election in the second period of Indonesian democracy was held. Forty eight political parties participated in the election; none won a majority vote. The system was a variant of a parliamentary system even though the head of government was called President, because he was in fact selected by the parliament like a prime minister.

Under President Habibie, amendment of the constitution was started, followed by a series of other amendments under his successors, Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid and President Megawati Sukarnoputri, which ended with the establishment of a truly presidential democracy. The first direct presidential election was held in 2004, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected President.

Yudhoyono was nominated by a small party, Partai Demokrat, which gained only about 7% of the seats in the parliament, a concern to many observers. He was able to build a grand coalition by accommodating most of the significant parties in his cabinet. However, many observers believe that this coalition has been responsible for his difficulty to run the government even though it has been quite stable. President Yudhoyono has often been judged an indecisive leader, and many, especially his coalition partners, have begun to be discontented with his administration.

Indonesia is currently a multiparty presidential democracy. It is built on the basis of a multi-religo-ethnic society and on economic hardship, a condition it inherited and which it has not yet been able to overcome. Can this democracy survive? Can people’s positive sentiment toward democracy help Indonesian democracy become consolidated regardless of the problems?

III. Sociopolitical Profile

Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world after China, India, and the USA. The total population according to the last national census is 226 million. The population is scattered across thousands of islands, but most heavily concentrated on Java island. The country is also very
diverse in terms of ethnicity. There are hundreds of ethnic groups, none of them predominant (above 50%), even though the Javanese is the largest (about 41%).

Indonesia is also the most populous Muslim country in the world. Muslims constitute about 87% of the population. However, some Indonesians claim that Indonesian Islam is quite different from mainstream Islam. It is more heterodox or syncretic (abangan) than orthodox. To quote Ernest Gellner, Indonesian Islam represents “low” rather than “high” Islam (Gellner 1974). This characteristic of Indonesian Islam is believed to produce more tolerant Muslims, and to be more conducive for democracy, which is alien to most predominantly Muslim societies in the world. Indonesia has often been mentioned by journalists and students of democracy to challenge the popular claim that Islam is not compatible with democracy.

Regardless of its predominantly Muslim population, Indonesia is dominated by “secular political parties” at least on the surface. The total number of seats of Islamic parties in the parliament is about 18%. However, students of Indonesian politics should be careful with the fact that many “secular” parties have proposed “Islamic policies” in many municipalities or provinces in the country. Local governments have often been forced to adopt religion-based laws by conservative Muslim groups. The influence of Islam in Indonesian democracy is, albeit slowly, growing. The most secular party, the PDIP, for example, has reacted to the growing importance of Islam in Indonesian politics by establishing an Islamic wing of the party, called Baitul Muslimin. A few days ago, the government made a controversial decision against Ahmadiyah, an Islamic sect. Pressed by conservative Muslim groups, the government prohibited the sect even though the constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of faith and religion. This growing influence of conservative Islam on Indonesian politics will probably shape what variant of democracy is likely to grow in the country.

Indonesia is a multiparty democracy. In the last legislative election in 2004, 24 political parties participated in the election, and the vote was spread widely among them. No single party won a majority vote. The largest vote gained by a party was Partai Golkar’s 21.6%. The smallest vote was gained by Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB) or the New Indonesian Party at 0.58%. This distribution of votes indicates a highly fragmented party system. If we use the Laakso-Taagepera formula, the effective number of party in current Indonesian democracy is 8.5, meaning it is very fragmented. Indonesia is currently a very fragmented multiparty presidential democracy (cf. Liddle and Mujani 2007).

In addition, Indonesian democracy has been characterized by the presence of an anti-corruption campaign waged by the government. Regardless of its outcome, which is still far from the public’s expectation, the campaign has at least become shock therapy for public officials to be more aware of the rule of law. The establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission, or Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi (KPK), has created a new atmosphere for governance. There have been many high public officials such as legislators, governors, mayors, etc., who were arrested for corruption. Law enforcement of this quality had never happened under the autocracies. However, because the corruption is deeply rooted in the polity, it is still a major problem for Indonesian democracy.

Dissatisfaction with democratic performance has often been voiced by intellectuals and the mass media. The Indonesian media, which is one of the freest in Southeast Asia, is very critical of the government and with the performance of our democracy. They tend to define democracy more in
terms of achieving economic equality. Indonesian democracy has therefore been judged by the extent to which social welfare has improved.

Since the collapse of the Indonesian economy due to the Asian monetary crisis in 1997, the economy has actually, albeit slowly, recovered. In 1998, one year after the monetary crisis, Indonesian economic growth dropped to minus 13%, having achieved 6% average growth under the authoritarian regime of Suharto for about 30 years. The growth last year was about 6.3%. However, the quality of this moderate growth is not that good, as indicated by its low capacity to absorb new employees. In 2007 the unemployment rate is still high, 9.11%, and the poverty rate is also still high, 16.58%.1

Politicians, intellectuals, and the media have started questioning the benefit of democracy for the poor. Can Indonesian democracy consolidate, or even survive, in a situation of socio-economic hardship?

IV. Popular Evaluation

How do ordinary citizens evaluate Indonesian democracy, i.e. democratic performance and their preference for democratic values and institutions? Popular evaluation of democratic performance such as how the rule of law has been implemented may help understand how Indonesian democracy works.

A. Rule of Law

When people were asked to evaluate whether the court always punishes the guilty, the great majority gave a positive response (77.8%). This figure is quite high compared to some democracies in Asia. However, when asked whether the national government abides by the law, a still strong majority gave a more pessimistic response (60.7%). They still see a lot of corruption among officials as reflected in their response to the second item. The third, fourth, and fifth items, related to controlling corruption by government itself, show a more moderate figure. Overall public opinion is slightly positive toward the government on this issue.

Q 104. Our current courts always punish the guilty … (%)

Q104: Strongly agree or somewhat agree (%)

II-Q113: How often do national government officials abide by the law? (%)

II-Q113: Always or most of the time (%)

Index of law abiding government (-1~+1):
Q117: How widespread is corruption in local and national … (%)

108. Is the government working to crack down on corruption and root out bribes?
Overall, public opinion about law abiding and controlling corruption has been slightly more positive. This public opinion is in strong contrast though the opinion of the best-informed (and ostensibly more competent) groups in Indonesian society, such as activists, intellectuals, and the mass media, or with international institutions, which regularly monitor rule of law performance and judge that Indonesia is one of the worst countries in the world on this issue.
This public opinion is likely to have been shaped by the increasingly intensive campaign against corruption in the last five years, especially by the KPK. As stated above, these campaigns had never been attempted by previous governments. Many public officials have been arrested and sent to jail.

B. Competition

Rule of law is important in democratic governance. However, it is not the core of democracy. You can have good performance on the rule of law without a strong democracy. Singapore and Malaysia are examples of non-democracies which have a stronger performance in implementing the rule of law.

Political competition is the core of democracy. Indonesia is more democratic than Singapore because it is more competitive in recruiting key public officials. Freedom House has ranked Indonesia as a fully free country. One important reason behind this judgment is political competitiveness. This judgment is consistent with public opinion.

114. How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates? (%)

Q114. Always and most of the time (%)
Compared to other Asian democracies, Indonesia has more positive public opinion concerning electoral competitiveness. This perception was shaped partly by the fact that Indonesian elections since the eve of reformation in 1999 have been free and fair according to the assessment of various institutions and agencies, nationally and internationally, and partly by the fact of relatively new and still only a small number of elections under the current democracy. The people are still overwhelmed by their current political freedom after forty years under authoritarianism.

Perception of election competitiveness according to party-ID (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feel close to a particular party</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not feel close to any party</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1598

Party-ID or identification with a particular party makes no difference in the evaluation of electoral competitiveness. This is partly because of the characteristics of voting itself. Most people participated in voting regardless of their attachment to political party. Non-partisan democrats are likely to have emerged in the new Indonesian democracy. Anti-party sentiment is growing among the people, and the mass media has been very cynical about political parties, which is likely to shape popular sentiment.

II.105. Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period (%).
II.105: Strongly agree or somewhat agree (%)

II.Q43. On the whole how would you rate the last national election? (%).

II.Q43: Completely free and fair or free and fair with minor problems (%)
Overall, democratic performance measured by electoral competitiveness is good in Indonesia, and public opinion is consistent with this conclusion. Indonesian electoral competitiveness is probably among the finest in the world today. Having held several national elections, Indonesia are now having local elections. Hundreds of local leaders such as mayors and governors have been elected directly. The process and outcomes of the elections are good. Violence has been relatively insignificant in these elections.

C. Participation

Q.38. Voted in the last election held September 2004 (%)
Consistent with public opinion about electoral competition, public opinion on voter turnout is also high. It is one of the highest in Asia. Nine of ten Indonesians reported that they participated in the last election.

II.Q.40. Attended a campaign meeting or rally (%)

II.40: Yes (%)
II. Q41. Persuaded others … (%)

II.Q41: Persuaded others: Yes (%)

However, public opinion about other forms of related electoral participation, e.g., campaigning and persuading others, is only moderate. People need more time, probably money, skills, networks, and other political resources to participate in these political activities and therefore public opinion on the activities is much lower than on voting. Overall political participation among Indonesians has been moderate.
Index of electoral participation (-1~+1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Index Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political participation according to gender and education level in Indonesia (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>High school</th>
<th>College or higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the last election</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting or rally</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuaded others</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no significant difference in voting rate between male and female and between high school and college education background. However, these demographic characteristics make a significant difference in attending meetings or rallies and in persuading others to vote for a particular party or candidate. Males, relative to females, are more active in the two forms of political participation. However, more educated Indonesians tend to be less active in these two forms of political participation. This may be an indication of more mobilization than participation in political activities. Lower class status, defined by education level, is more available for political mobilization. In Indonesia, a political meeting or rally is like a popular festival which attracts the lower classes.

D. Political Interest
II-Q49: Political interest
Political interest is believed to be a crucial component of democratic culture. Democracy is not likely without political participation, and political participation is helped by political interest among the masses as their psycho-political capital.

As mentioned previously, electoral participation is high in Indonesia. However, this positive phenomenon is not very consistent with people’s interest in politics. Indonesians are among those Asians who are less interested in politics. Indonesians are also one of the lowest national groups in Asia in their exposure to political news. This indicates that their electoral participation was produced by mobilization rather than voluntary participation.

II.Q49: Very or somewhat interested (%)
II-Q50: Follow news about politics and government (%)

II-Q50: Everyday or several times a week (%)
E. Political Efficacy

The lower rate of political interest among Indonesians is quite consistent with the rate of political efficacy which is another component of democratic culture. Most Indonesians do not believe that they have political efficacy.

II-Q127. I think I have the ability to participate in politics
II-Q127: Strongly or somewhat agree (%)

II-Q128. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated … (%) 

II-Q128: Strongly or somewhat agree (%)
Overall, Indonesians are among those Asians who are not efficacious in politics. Can Indonesian democracy be consolidated without popular political efficacy and political interest? All Asians in this study do not feel efficacious in politics regardless of the democraticness of their regime.

F. Vertical Accountability

However, public opinion on vertical accountability is more positive. Overall, Indonesians are more optimistic in their perception about vertical accountability. They believe that they can change a government they don’t like, and that their government is accountable between elections, and rarely withholds important information.

This positive perception is likely to be shaped by the facts that elections are effective enough to actually bring about political change, and that the mass media is very free.
II.Q103: People have power to change a government they don’t like (%)

II-Q103: Strongly or somewhat agree (%):

II-Q106. Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions (%)
II-Q106: Strongly or somewhat agree (%)

II-Q112: How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view? (%)

II-Q112: Always or most of the time (%)
G. Horizontal Accountability

Public opinion on horizontal accountability is also positive. Most Indonesians believe that the legal system can handle relevant problems, and that the legislature is effective in controlling the government. This public opinion is shaped by the fact that the legislature is much stronger nowadays. Many observers have even claimed that Indonesian democracy is too heavy on the legislative side which often constrains the effectiveness and efficiency of governance. In addition, this opinion is shaped by the fact that presidents in the current multiparty Indonesian democracy never have strong support in the legislative branch of the government. Presidents necessarily come from a minority party as the result of an extremely fragmented party system. President Wahid came from the PKB (National Awakening Party) whose seats in the parliament were only about 10%. President Megawati came from a stronger party, the PDIP, but their seats were still far from a majority. President Yudhoyono came from a small party whose seats in the parliament are only 7%.

This weak presidency in terms of its support in parliament makes the executive very open to legislative control. The president has to take into account very seriously other parties’ interest in his or her decision making processes.
II-Q107: When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do. (%) 

II-Q107: Strongly or somewhat agree (%) 

II-Q115. To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check? (%)
H. Freedom

Freedom is the core of democratic governance. Indonesia is more democratic than Singapore for example because it is freer in politics even though its rule of law is probably weaker than Singapore.
Compared to previous political freedoms and civil liberties such as freedom of the press, freedom of speech and to join organizations, Indonesia is nowadays much freer. Many groups in the society have even started to be concerned that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. They claim that Indonesia is too free nowadays.

This condition of freedom is approved by public opinion. About nine of ten Indonesians believe that people in the country are free to speak and to join any organization of their choice. This approval is one of the highest in Asia.

However, students of Indonesian politics have started to fear that freedom is declining, especially religious freedom. About 87% of the population are Muslims. The fundamentalists and conservatives who often claim to represent the Muslim population have become more aggressive in fighting for their specific Islamic agendas in order to be supported by the government and the legislatures as public policies. Their leaders control the definition of who should be a Muslim and who should not, who is religious and who is not. This control has begun to become monopolistic because some of their religious positions have become public policies such as the prohibition for females to be in public after 8 p.m. to control prostitution. This case happened in Kota Tangerang, a city close to the national capital. The central government has just made a decision that members of Ahmadiyah, an Islamic sect, are not allowed to do any religious activity because the sect’s tenets deviate from Islamic orthodoxy. They will not be allowed to exercise their faith if they continue to deviate from Islamic orthodoxy. They are not even allowed to call themselves Muslims. The fundamentalists and conservatives claim that the Ahmadiyah believes that Mirza Gulam Ahmad is a prophet who lived after the Prophet Muhammad hurts Islam. Therefore they are not allowed to be called Muslims or believers.

There are many other cases in local government which threaten religious freedom. Unfortunately, Public opinion surveys are not very helpful on this issue.

II-110: People are free to speak what they think without fear

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. 110: Strongly or somewhat agree (%):

Q.111: People can join any organization without fear (%):

II.Q111: Strongly or somewhat agree (%)

Index of freedom (-1~+1)
I. Equality

Unlike freedom, equality is perceived to be a more serious problem even though a majority of people still have positive opinions on equality issues. A majority of Indonesians believe that everyone in the country is treated equally by the government. They also believe that most people have the basic necessities of life.

Overall, public opinion is positive on equality issues even though the mass media and the political opposition are likely to rate equality very low. In fact, this public opinion is quite consistent with the Indonesian Gini index which indicates that the socioeconomic gap is quite low compared to those in many Asian democracies.

II.Q108: Everyone is treated equally by the government (%):
II.Q111: Strongly or somewhat agree (%)

II-Q109: People have basic necessities like food, clothes, … (%)
J. Responsiveness

Responsiveness is a crucial component of democracy. What makes a democracy different from other regimes, to quote Robert Dahl (1971), is its responsiveness to the public.

Public opinion in Indonesia is moderate in assessing the extent to which the government is responsive to the people. About 4 to 5 of every 10 Indonesians believe that the government responds to what people want. About 7 to 8 agree that the government is likely to solve the crucial problems faced by the people.

Overall, Indonesian perceptions about government responsiveness are quite positive, more positive than other Asian perceptions. These positive perceptions are partly shaped by the fact that Indonesian democracy is quite recent after a long authoritarianism which suppressed popular aspirations.

II-Q116: How well do you think the government responds to what people want? (%)
II.Q109: Very or largely responsive (%)

II-Q102a: How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five year? (%)

II.Q102a: Very likely or likely (%)
V. Overall popular assessment of governance

Having depicted one by one the crucial components of democratic governance, we can now draw a more general picture of democratic quality from Indonesian public opinion. It should be stated clearly that overall popular assessment of democratic governance quality indicates that the quality is relatively good. Most people feel that they are free, have competitive elections, are treated equally by the government, feel that the government is accountable, responsive, law-abiding, and fighting against corruption. At the same time, however, they are less politically efficacious and less interested in politics.

Public opinion indicates that Indonesian democracy has at least up till now been on the right track. However, this positive assessment about democratic quality is likely to be influenced by the fact that Indonesian democracy is quite recent after a long period of tight control through dictatorship. The people are not competent enough to assess fully the crucial problem in Indonesian democracy, i.e. the difficulty in implementing the idea of separation between church and state.

Index of governance quality: Summary

VI. Quality of governance and regime legitimacy

In political science theory, quality of governance is believed to be the cause of democratic legitimacy, i.e. general satisfaction with democratic performance and with support for democracy. Prior to assessing the correlations, we need to describe the extent to which they are satisfied with the democratic performance of their government and support democratic institutions.

A. Democratic Satisfaction
II-Q93: Satisfaction with democracy

About six of ten Indonesians are very or fairly satisfied with democratic performance. This rate of satisfaction is quite moderate. It is higher than in Asian consolidated democracies such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. This satisfaction is partly shaped by the fact that Indonesian democracy is quite recent.
B. Support for democracy (%):

In addition to a moderate satisfaction rate in terms of democratic performance, Indonesians are mostly positive about their democratic institutions. About nine of ten Indonesians want democracy to be the Indonesian political system. They oppose uncompetitive party systems as undemocratic. In addition, about eight of ten Indonesians think that democracy is suitable for Indonesia, and disagree with autocracy or rule by a strong leader. A lower percentage (62%) disagree with military rule.

Overall, Indonesians express a high degree of support for democratic institutions, and this is a source of popular legitimacy for democratic consolidation in the country.

1 = want our country to be democratic
2 = Democracy is suitable to our country
3 = A strong leader decide things: Strongly disapprove or disapprove
4 = Only one political party: Strongly disapprove or disapprove
5 = The army should govern

Index of support for democracy (0~5)

The Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic satisfaction</th>
<th>Democratic support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law-abiding</td>
<td>.162**</td>
<td>-.081**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling corruption</td>
<td>.232**</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>.211**</td>
<td>.086**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral participation</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.222**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical accountability</td>
<td>.084**</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal accountability</td>
<td>.186**</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>.070**</td>
<td>.133**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>.122**</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>.247**</td>
<td>-.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economic condition</td>
<td>.186**</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family economic condition</td>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>.082**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlations are significant at .01 level (two-tailed)

VII. Conclusion
How important is quality of governance for democratic satisfaction and for democratic support? The correlation tests indicate that most of the governance qualities have positive and significant correlations with democratic satisfaction. Economic factors are also crucial to democratic satisfaction. However, many components of governance quality and national economic condition are not associated significantly with support for democracy. Freedom and political interest are crucial to support for democracy.

To conclude, democratic performance and legitimacy depend on governance quality, and support for democracy depends especially on freedom and political interest. This indicates that support for democracy and its legitimacy is threatened as freedom in the country is declining. The threat is coming.