The Influence of Social Capital on Political Participation in the Cultural Context of Asia

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INTRODUCTION

Social capital does matter, but is this universally true? This is the question that this paper addresses.

Since the publications of Putman’s much-celebrated book (Putnam 1993) as well as debatable book (Putnam 2000), social capital has become one of the key concepts that have underpinned many analyses of contemporary democracies. While this concept connotes many interrelated things including interpersonal/institutional trust, civic engagement, and the liveliness of horizontal groups, we now know, at least generally, that the affluence of social capital contributes to high performance of democratic practice such as governmental efficiency and high political participation. Yet, due to its multifaceted nature, the concept of social capital remains somewhat ambiguous, especially at its operational level, and the relationships among various dimensions of social capital are certainly under-investigated. Also under-studied in the current literature is a likely interaction between social capital and cultural/social-psychological factors which enable stable and consistent inter-relationships. An exploration into the relevance of these factors would require a cross-country/cross-regional comparison; for example, without a systematic comparative research, one cannot assess
how relevant is the compatibility between social and cultural values to the democratic functioning.

The data collected by East Asia Barometer provides an excellent opportunity to conduct such a comparative investigation in the Asian context. The data set contains, across 8 nations (7 nations excluding China due to lack of important variables), a set of variables that enable us to construct reasonable measures of various aspects of social capital, as well as political participation and attitudinal/behavioral attributes. Utilizing this data, we hope to elucidate the varying patterns with which different assets of social capital contribute to the working of democracy. As part of the ongoing collaborative research project, our immediate task in this paper is to summarize the necessary theoretical background and to report the procedures for transforming the original data into operational variables for comparative purposes. We then proceed to propose our own hypotheses and models, and present our tentative findings regarding the interaction between social capital, cultural values, and political participation.

**SOCIAL CAPITAL**

The conceptual exploration of social capital began in the latter part of the twentieth century, perhaps originally with a thought-provoking discussion by a sociologist, James Coleman. According to Coleman (1988), social capital is regarded as something that promotes activities in a society. For instance, more productive activities can be created by trustful personal relationships, than without them. Trust, therefore, is a form of social capital which works as a precondition for further socially important activities, such as economic transactions.

For political scientists, the book that widely publicized the importance of social capital is Robert Putnam’s “Making Democracy Work”. In this book about local politics in contemporary Italy, Putnam (1993) tried to show, firstly, that social participation improves social skills that are a precondition of social capital. Social participation in voluntary associations leads the participants to experience an associational life that includes encounters with disagreement and conflict, leading to collective problem solving, and this in turn improves their social skills and leadership competence. This positive impact of having in-depth discussions, coordinating voluntary organizations, and cultivating one's management capacity can be pervasive and be applicable to many social contexts.

Putnam’s second point was that social networks within associations as well as in the outside world nourish social trust. The larger the network an individual has, the more frequent the exposure to heterogeneous others during economical dealings or social negotiations, and the greater the chance to access a wide variety of social resources. Both of these things enhance competence when dealing with dynamic societal change and give greater opportunity to learn to discern who can be trusted. These factors are, Putnam argued, intertwined and initiate social activities resulting in affluent and productive communities.
The importance of trust and associational life was also highlighted by contemporary experts in experimental social psychology. A group of researchers in collaboration with Toshio Yamagishi have emphasized that social trust should be distinguished from undifferentiated blind trust in everyone (e.g., Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). By combining findings by Yamagishi and Putnam’s arguments, social participation and networking develops people's judgment about whom to trust and with whom to cooperate, and this enables them to evaluate the competence of others in order to pursue their social goals. In this way, social trust is a developed sense of trust. Yamagishi further proceeded to argue that this social trust allows social system to be less sanction-based and, as a result, helps to reduce the cost of surveillance (Yamagishi, 1990). It could be argued that the citizen's cost of surveillance can also be cut down when the trust is “institutionalized”. Institutional trust motivates the workers in the organization of the institution, influences the citizens to grant higher evaluation on the institutions, and thus creates a positive feedback loop.

It is now generally accepted that these various components of social capital, i.e. the high level of activities and interactions in voluntary associations, reduction of social cost, and social effectiveness derived from the trust upon people and institutions, are all-powerful contributors towards the functioning and deepening of democracy. On the one hand, this line of research clearly represents a revival of “Civic Culture” tradition (Almond and Verba 1963) of democratic research in political science. Arguably, on the other hand, the recent insights into the importance of social capital can also be embraced in the utilitarian, rational-choice approach to the study of democracy, which recently has increasingly focused on the need of rational actors to coordinate their strategies and intentions in bringing out mutually beneficial outcomes (e.g. Weingast 1997).

Despite the expansion and enrichment of the research associated with the concept of social capital, many avenues seem still left open for further inquiries. On the relationship between trust and participation, for example, the evidence presented so far remains far from conclusive. Even if we include social participation as well as political participation in the dependent variable side, the evidence on the impact of trust is mixed at best. Newton (1999), for example, pointed out that social trust is only weakly (positively) related to social participation and even less so with political participation in Europe. In the same book, Norris (1999), by using WVS data from 44 nations, showed party activism (a type of political participation) is only weakly determined by social trust as well as institutional confidence (trust). Also Newton and Norris (2000) found some indication that a weak positive relationship exists between social trust and social participation (they use the term “voluntary activism”). Japanese data showed no indication that social trust or institutional trust has any positive relationship with political participation (Ikeda 2002). These ambiguous and inconsistent results need to be clarified with further accumulation of empirical findings

The existing literature is unclear especially about the relationships between social participation and political participation. Putnam himself is not clear about the relationship be-
tween voluntary civic-organizational activities and political participation. In his original rendering on ‘bowling alone’ (Putnam, 1995a), he implied that the relationship between participation in voluntary organizations and political participation could be empirically demonstrated. In Putnam’s own words: ‘Participation in civic organization inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavours…. These effects, it is worth noting, do not require that the manifest purpose of the association be political. Taking part in a choral society or a bird-watching club can teach self-discipline and an appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration’ (Putnam, 1993). Likewise, he argues elsewhere: ‘Political participation refers to our relations with political institutions. Social capital refers to our relations with one another. Sending a check to a PAC is an act of political participation, but it does not embody or create social capital. Bowling in a league or having coffee with a friend embodies and creates social capital, though these are not acts of political participation’ (Putnam, 1995b). Nevertheless, in his book-length treatment on the subject (Putnam, 2000), Putnam fails to pursue his inquiry fully and never fills the link between social and political participation. He simply juxtaposed two chapters (chapters 2 and 3), treating as if the relationship between social and political participation were a matter of common sense.

One of the few studies focusing on the relationship between voluntary organizational activities and political participation is done by Ikeda (2002a). By using JEDS2000 survey data from a representative sample of Japan, Ikeda demonstrated that activities in horizontal voluntary associations are positively correlated with political participation even after controlling relevant variables. While meaningful and significant, other empirical analyses must be built upon this finding to see whether such a positive correlation exists between political participation and other forms of social participation. Also warranted is a comparative research to see whether the observed relationship holds for other countries under different cultural contexts. Fortunately, the data from the East Asia Barometer project allows us to pursue precisely such a task.

**CULTURE**

The importance of social capital may vary across countries with different cultural backgrounds. It is easy to recognize that civic cultures are different across the world, also the level of social trust and institutional trust fluctuate across the cultures. Then, how do cultural factors affect the impact of social capital? Or, does the salience of social capital override cultural differences in contributing to the working and deepening of democracy? In what follows, we discuss two particular factors of democratic culture: 1) values and 2) ideas about political leadership and authority.
1) Values

One of the cultural factors that may interact with social capital and political participation variables is basic societal values. In the analysis of East Asian democratic experiences, the well-known contrast between collectivism and individualism might be of particular relevance. Collectivism, it is argued, is a psychological tendency to emphasize on group goals (over individual goals) and thus to put preference on group achievement, conformity, or social harmony (over individual achievement, judgment, and well-being). Many observers on Japanese industrial development, for example, pointed out that collectivism was one of the strongest contributing factors for Japan’s success after World War II (see Aoki, 1990 for a review of this claim). A more comparative study is provided by Hofstede (1991), in his book on the analysis of IBM workers in over 50 countries in the East and the West, which emphasizes that collectivism is typical in the East and it characterizes political ideas and behavior in Asian societies (see also Triandis 1989, 1995).

Of course, such a stereotypical generalization faces recurrent criticisms. With regard to Japanese collectivism, for example, some have advanced a persuasive argument that such a societal value was not a product of persistent psychological tendencies but it simply reflected a (time bound) institutional pressure on the societal members to conform in the aftermath of war (Takano & Osaka, 1999). A general and theoretical reevaluation of the concepts of collectivism and individualism is also under way, which casts a serious doubt on the merits of differentiating along the East and West division (Oyserman et al., 2002).

In light of continuing debate, we believe that the matter has to be settled empirically. That is, the significance of societal values must be identified with solid empirical evidence, and it is for this reason that this variable should be taken into account in assessing the relationship between social capital and political participation. We need to know whether people in some specific culture support collectivistic value, and whether the value affects the formation of social capital or the consequences of social capital.

2) Ideas about political leadership and authority

The second cultural factor, whose interactive effect with social capital variables may be of consequence, is the ideas that people hold for political leadership and authority. This cultural dimension is important for our analysis of Asian democratic experiences, because it is said that cultures of the East and the West diverge quite substantially on the idea of authority and in ideals about political leaders. Most typically, Eastern political culture is associated with moralistic, paternalistic and harmony-oriented leader, not a bureaucratic official often found in the Western prototype. In the East, emphasis is on the personality and morally upright characters of the leader, instead of on the development of institutions for leadership (Chu, 1998; cf. Hofstede, 1991, Chap7). This moralistic leader has been supposed to be a paternalistic one who is able to coordinate and control conditions for people with different interests, even though he occasionally resorts to suppress dissent in the name of societal
harmony. In contrast, in the West, dissent is encouraged in public debate (at least formally), and the process of negotiations under democratic institutions reflects mutual dissenting.

Due to the varying preference for different styles of leadership, the expected role of political leaders can differ between the East and the West. Hofstede (1991), for example, shows, with his Power Distance Index that, the preference for authoritarian leadership, reflected in people’s expressions of dissent and acceptance to their superiors, is high in the Philippines (PDI score 94), Hong Kong (68), Thailand (64) Korea (60), Taiwan (58), Japan (54) whereas it is particularly low in the United States (40) and England (35). Hence, it is arguable that Authoritarian type of leadership is traditionally emphasized in the East, and if so this may well affect the functions of social capital variables. By de-emphasizing social participatory values and suppressing possible dissent, Eastern culture may be seen as emphasizing trust in existing institutions, which are perceived as given conditions of the society and therefore deserve to be trusted. In the West, on the other hand, the emphasis is put on freedom of choice and on non-authoritarian leadership style especially in voluntary associations.

DATA AND VARIABLES

The East Asia Barometer project supplies a survey data which includes a number of important variables for the analysis of interaction between social capital, cultural factors and political participation. Before presenting our models and hypotheses, we must report some technical procedures with which we transformed original data into operation-friendly variables for comparative purposes. We must note at the outset that at this preliminary stage, the composite variables in this paper are not necessarily constructed without preparatory analysis on their measurement reliability (we excluded the China data due to the lack of political participation and social participation variables, both of which are essential to this paper).

1) Political participation

Our ultimate dependent variable is political participation. Though the classic civic culture study by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) distinguished four types of political participation, (i) vote, (ii)campaign participation, (iii) local activity participation, and (iv) personal contacts with officials, we divided them into two groups (combining (i) and (ii), (iii) and (iv) respectively). There are some justifications for this category simplification. First, in some countries, the distribution is so skewed to the point where categories themselves turn out to be meaningless (in Thai, for example, the percentage of those who voted was as high as 97%). Second, with the wording of questionnaire related to above (iv), it is impossible to distinguish those who contacted officials for public problems or for personal reasons. Third, we believe our collapsed category has justifiable theoretical meanings in that one mode of our political participation is election related participation, while the other represents an ac-
tive involvement with government officials, politicians and other politically relevant organizations as well as more direct protest movements.

More precisely, the measurement of election participation was the count of the following questions: “Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [the latest year]?” (adopted “yes” answer; Q027), “Thinking about the national election in [year], did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?” (Q029), and “Thinking about the national election in [year], did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?”(Q030).

For active political participation, the following participation experiences are summed up (Yes/No for Q073-Q080 without weighted by frequencies); “Contacted government (administrative) official”, “Contacted officials at higher level”, “Contacted elected legislative representatives at any level”, “Contacted political parties or other political organizations”, “Contacted non-government/civil society organizations (farmers’ associations, trade unions, religious groups, human rights groups, interests groups)”, “Contacted media (letter to newspapers, call-in to radio, TV, etc)”, “Demonstration, strike, sit-in”, and “Other people you have contacted”.

2) Social participation

One of the main components of social capital is participation in various social activities. According to Tsujinaka (2002) who conducted surveys on intermediate organizations in the United States, Germany, China, Korea and Japan, associations are configurable on two dimensions; social-resource dimension and nation-institutional dimension. On this plane, several types of associations are classifiable. We will follow this typology;

Local-community related associations such as residential association or PTA (q019s2 and q019s3; dummy variable name g_comm).
Religious associational sector (q019s11; g_reli)
Advocacy-political associational sector such as volunteer associations, social and civic movement organizations, or candidate support associations (q019s9, q019s10, q019s13; g_adv)
Producer associational sector such as trade associations, agricultural associations, or producer cooperative (q019s4, q019s5, q019s7; g_prod)
Labor union related sector (q019s6; g_labor)
Social service related sector such as consumer cooperative (q019s8; g_socs)

In the spirit of Putnam’s and others’ conceptualization of social capital, we perhaps want to add, to the above list, the following two types of groups both of which are identified in the Asian Barometer data:
Friendship associations such as hobby club, and sports club (q019s12, q019s15; g_hobspo)
Political party (q019s14; g_party)

We will use these group typologies as well as the next two summary measurements;

Number of voluntary organization affiliation (variable name; Fgnum)
Number of informal group affiliation (variable name; Pgnum)

With regard to the former, obviously, the more affiliated, the more social capital respondents are expected to have. We suppose multiple affiliations, which necessarily means access to larger and more heterogeneous information, is a positive function of social capital. The latter, we believe, is an indication of another type of social association which could ferment social capital (cf. Ikeda, 2002); Circle of colleagues who interact out of work, group at community schools or other place of learning, circle of friends who share common hobbies or favourite past times, circle of friends who do business (or investment) together or help out each other in money matters, circle of friends who exchange information and points of view, and informal credit/loan association.

3) Trust
Another important aspect of social capital is trust. In light of the theoretical discussion in the previous section, however, we need to develop a nuanced sub-categorization of this concept.
3-1) social trust (generalized trust)

The East Asia Barometer survey contains a question which asks the respondent to express which of the two were closest to his/her opinion by using a dichotomy scale (Q024), between "One can’t be too careful in dealing with them" and "Most people can be trusted." Since this scale is widely used in longitudinal studies such as World Value Survey, we would adopt it as a measurement of social trust (Gene_trs).

3-2) Institutional trust

As for institutional trust, the question asked the respondent was: "How much trust you have in each of the institutions listed below?" using four-point scales from “None at all” to “A great deal of trust” (Q007-Q018). The list of institutions included court, national government, political parties, parliament, civil service, military, police, local government, newspapers, television, and election commission. We summated all the answers with giving 4 point to the “great deal of trust”, 3 to “quite a lot of trust”, 2 “not very much trust” and 1 “none at all” (variable Inst_trs). Throughout the 8 countries, principal component analyses showed that the 1st component has the large explanation power on the data variance (Japan
30%, Hong Kong 35%, Korea 39%, (China 39%), Mongolia 24%, Philippines 45%, Taiwan 29%, and Thailand 35%), suggesting the measurement construction is valid.

4) Other variables related to trust
In addition to political and social participation and trust, we take into consideration the following variables contained in the East Asia Barometer survey.

4-1) perceived corruption
This variable is related to institutional trust but from the reverse point of view. Although not well established empirically, some have argued that the level of political participation is affected by a widely-publicized misconduct of officials and the consequential pervasive political distrust (e.g. Pharr 2000). Perception of corruption may closely be related to institutional trust. The two questions in the survey (Q114 & Q115) ask the respondent to answer: “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?” and “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government [in capital city]?” The alternatives to answer were both 1 “hardly anyone is involved”, 2 “not a lot of officials are corrupt”, 3 “most officials are corrupt”, and 4 “almost everyone is corrupt”. We thus created a new variable by summing them up (variable Corrupt).

4-2) perceived social connections
Having effective personal network to powerful position in the society could be an alternative way of accessing social resources instead of collective civic engagement; A mechanism implied in social capital arguments was that high trusters are able to discern who could be trustful and then able to increase social capital by associating with others who are trustful, which collectively enhances social resources. On the other hand, having connections to powerful others enables them to bypass the trust-social capital route by directly extracting social resources from those who have power sometimes unfairly and undemocratically. Then having social connections could be negatively related with political participation which is in essence more open to every citizen. In the Asian Barometer survey, Q025 can be utilized to measure such an effect: “I have enough friends and connections so that I can get help if I need it” (variable Connect). (Another possible variable on this measurement was from Q026, but the data was not available in some countries).

5) Cultural factors
As discussed in the previous section, our goal is to reveal the varying patterns with which social capital promotes democracy under different cultural contexts. To explore the importance of cultural factors, we focus particularly on the following two variables.

5-1) values:
Collectivism, often identified as the key societal value in East Asia, can be measured by summating the following two questions (Q068, Q069); “A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him”, and “For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second”. We summated the answers by giving 4 point to “strongly agree”, 3 to “somewhat agree”, 2 “somewhat disagree”, and 1 “strongly disagree” (variable Collect). Both variables are correlated significantly positively (except Mainland China).

5-2) ideas about political leadership

Ideas about political leadership or ideas of governance can possibly vary from the East to the West, as well as across individual countries, according to several dimensions. We pursue four such dimensions which are reflected in the East Asia Barometer survey data.

The first dimension concerns the morality of politicians. In our data, this was measured using a four-point scale, in response to the statements: “You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right” (Q131); and “If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything” (Q138; variable “Moral”).

Second, support for political paternalism was measured using a four-point scale questions, in response to the statement: “Government leaders are like the head of a family. We should all follow their decisions” (Q133); and “The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society” (Q134) (variable “Paternal”).

Third, tendency to suppress dissent was measured by the statements; “We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things” (Q121), and “No opposition party should be allowed to compete for power” (Q122) (variable “Nodissnt”).

Finally, preference for harmony-oriented politics was measured using the statements: “Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups” (Q135), and “If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic” (Q139) (variable “Harmony”).

Principal component analyses on these 8 items showed various patterns of components across countries; Roughly speaking, the morality and paternalism go together mostly; dissent suppression and harmony orientation are separate. Despite these variations, we will go ahead to use the above four measurements for our analysis.

6) Control variables

Some factors exogenous to social capital or cultural variables can be associated with dependent variables, and should therefore be controlled statistically. Such factors are: perceived economic situation of the nation as a whole (summation of Q001-Q003; variable Macroeco), perceived economic situation of the individual him/herself (summation of Q004-Q006; variable Personeco), perceived political efficacy (summation of variables; Q128 and Q129; va-
riable Efficacy), and demographic variables such as country, gender, age, education, and perceived social status in relative term.

MODELS AND HYPOTHESES

Our main target of analysis is two-fold. First, we want to identify the role of social participation (civic engagement) as well as trust on political participation. Second, at the same time, we want to reveal the patterns according to which cultural differences interact with social capital in contributing to the functioning and deepening of democracy. Thus, the basic model consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the processes in which social capital (social participation and trust) affects political participation. The second part attempts to uncover the possible cultural factors intervention.

1) Models

The model for the first part of our inquiry is straightforward, whereas modeling of culture-social capital interaction can be much more complex. As for the latter part of our analysis, we have two basic causal models in mind;

(1) Direct effect model: Even if we control for social capital variables, cultural factors will be directly associated with political participation (independent of the social capital variable).

(2) Aggregate model: Cultural factors may intervene at the aggregate level; for instance, an individual who behaves collectivistically, not because she is collectivist in mind-set but because of the culture in which he/she lives. Then depending on collectivistic nature of culture - measured the aggregate country level where high collectivism (i.e. respondents’ average collectivism is high) - we predict the causal possibilities shown below using hierarchical linear regression models (HLM). The prediction is that: aggregate cultural factor explains individual differences; for example, in collectivistic culture the relationship between social capital and political participation is not statistically significant, whereas in non-collectivistic culture it should be significant. Several possibilities are:

a) Social trust may not be associated with political participation in countries where collectivism is high, whereas this association may become positive where collectivism is low. In highly collectivist country, political participation can be maintained in collective ways, such as when there is conformity pressure to vote. In this case there is no room for individual level of social trust to have some effect. On the other hand, in countries lower in collectivism, political participation would not be facilitated collectively by cul-
tural factors. Thus social trust as an individual and psychological aspect of social capital can have substantial predictive power on political participation.

b) As stated in *Analects* 8-9 (of Confucius), Asian paternalistic values are consistent with the idea that “people should be dependent, not to be informed,” i.e. people should be trustful of the government without being informed, as assumed under deliberate public conception. Then, we may assume that under high paternalistic culture, social trust will not be related to political participation at the individual level.

c) Institutional trust could be negatively related to political participation, because dependable people let governors do their own politics, i.e. institutional trust goes with blind trust in the established political system, meaning a decrease in political participation. On the other hand, under non-paternalistic culture, the positive relationship between social capital and political culture emerges, i.e. institutional trust could be positively related with political participation.

d) As concerning the effect of social participation on political participation, it is possible that under both of collectivistic and non-collectivistic culture the relationship would be positive due to pseudo correlation in the former, and due to a social capital effect in the latter (the former collectivism is related positively both with group affiliation and political participation, causing pseudo correlation).

Though we will also check the cultural impact of other culture-related variables, i.e. morally upright leader preference, suppress dissent orientation, and harmony orientation, we will not explicitly state hypotheses on these variables. As our attempt here is exploratory in nature, we will check these set of cultural variables at EAB whether they have any aggregate level impact on participation variables, i.e. we set these possible aggregate effects as research questions. However, some expectations on the direction of impact could be that:

(1) as the “morally upright leader preference” variable has a relatively high correlation (0.458) with the paternalistic variable, we can posit the same hypothesis as the paternalistic cultural effect as stated in b) above,

(2) as “harmony oriented politics” is conceptually related with collectivism as well as paternalistic leadership, the same predictions as the collectivism and paternalism hypothesis are possible (although the correlations are not very high (=.228, .308 respectively)), and,

(3) as “suppress dissent orientation” is conceptually partially related with paternalistic attitude, the same prediction as the paternalistic cultural effect hypothesis could be possible (the correlation between them is .257).

2) Hypotheses
Based on the arguments above, we propose the following hypotheses.
1a-1. Social trust is positively related with political participation.
1a-2. Institutional trust is positively related with political participation.
1b. Social participation is positively related with political participation.
2a. (Direct effect model of culture) Cultural factors directly positively related with political participation.
2b. (Aggregate effect model of culture) Culture affects the relationship between social capital and political participation at the aggregate level.

3) Procedure of analysis

We will test our hypotheses, firstly on a per country basis, and then go to HLM to include all the countries. It should be noted that the analyses on Mainland China was not possible because it lacked the dependent variable (political participation).

4) Results

Table 1-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>election related participation</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.30</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
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4-1) Test of H 1a-1: **Social trust is positively related with political participation.**

Table 1 shows the results of our ordered logit analyses. Ordered logit analysis is recommended when the dependent variable is ordered and still has limited values (Long, 1997). Here for consistency we used this method throughout the paper.

The dependent variables were election related participation as well as active participation. The leftist column lists the independent variables and control variables.

The results basically reveal that social trust is positively correlated with the election related participation and less so for the active participation; social trust is positively associated with the election participation in Japan, Korea (marginally) and Thailand (with the Philippines as an exception which shows negative correlation). When the active participation was chosen as the dependent variable, it was significant only in Thailand in individual country analyses (though note that Japanese data was p=.103).

Overall, then, we have a weak support for the hypothesis 1a-1.

Having personal connection with powerful others was one of the alternative way to access social resources instead of having high social trust, and we predicted the variable could be negatively related with political participation. The result shows the reverse; The variable is also generally positively correlated with political participation variables, which forces us to guess that there are two routes of political participation; one is general way of trusting others, and the other way is to have more short cut route, which connotes voting may be a reward for those who are powerful (as a return for service utilized through the connection).

4-2) Test of H 1a-2: **Institutional trust is positively related with political participation.**

According to Table 1, institutional trust variable does not seem to be related consistently with political participation overall taking either the election participation or the active participation as the dependent variable. In individual country data analyses there is even a negative relationship in Taiwan for election participation. The negative impact of institutional trust can also be found for Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand when active participation variable is chosen as the dependent variable.

Perceived corruption variable could be a negative indicator of institutional trust. This variable does not show consistent effects either on the two dependent variables. Also noticeable are some anomalies in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mongolia, indicating positive relationship with election participation (Taiwan data also revealed positive correlation for active participation).

Obviously, these counterintuitive results regarding the effect of institutional trust warrant some further investigations.

4-3) Test of H 1b: **Social participation is positively related with political participation.**
Both the associational participation and informal group participation counted by members of affiliations are good predictors on election participation as well as on active participation (Table 1). Especially the former variable is significant with the only exception of the Korean case where the results did not reach significant when the dependent was active participation. Informal group participation variable is less powerful; Mongolia and Philippine data does not reveal significant relationship with both of the dependent variables. Overall, the findings support hypothesis 1b.

A small reservation on this support should be noted. A few of social participation items counted in the index of voluntary organizational affiliation (Fgnum) is tightly connected with political activities, especially in the cases of candidate support organization or political party membership. Those affiliated with those groups are fairly small in number except for Mongolian political party membership, but ideally these should be removed from the social participation list for constructing the index, because they may not be appropriate for “social participation” items. However, the results of the analyses by removing these items did not change the conclusion. Only a part of Mongolian results changed (insignificant in social participation to political participation).

Table 2 shows more detailed analyses on the effects of associational affiliation types. The effects apparently vary from country to country and from one associational type to another. It should be noticed that the signs are positive for most of the signs in individual country analyses. Also if we exclude politics-related associational type such as political party affiliation type and advocacy group type (like candidate support organization), we still see many types of organizations are positively related with political participation.
4-4) Exploring H 2a (Direct effect model)

In order to test the direct effect model of culture, we added cultural variables into the equations in Table 1. The results are shown in Table 3. It is apparent the newly added independent variables did not change the whole landscape of the effects of social capital related variables (social participation and social/institutional trust). Overall, we must conclude that effects of cultural variables, as seen from this direct effect model, are not very strong.
4-5) Exploring H 2b (Mediated effect model)

### Analytical Models

In order to estimate the interactive effect of individual and cultural difference (here by national difference), our analytic approach uses HLM (hierarchical linear modelling). HLM is useful in investigating data that has hierarchical structure when we examine the interaction effects between the variables at the national and individual levels. For example, we can investigate whether factors at the national level, such as collectivism, have interactive effects on the individual process of behaviour and psychology. The direct effect model (H2a) suggested that the direct effects of cultural variables on political participation are not very strong. Still, we may observe large variations in the effects of target variables at the individual level depending on the cultural context. HLM is a statistical tool to differentially

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<td>0.17 ***</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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+: .05<p≦.10, * : .01<p≦.05, **: .001<p≦.01, ***: p≦.001
elucidate these two levels of effects. We analyze individual level data at the level 1, and at the same time, we estimate the level 2 effect of national cultural difference. At the level 2, we estimate the interactive effect of cultural factors that are derived from aggregating individual level variables for each country.

**Level 1 Analysis**

At level 1, we have dependent variables representing electoral and active political participation, which are identical with former analyses. Independent variables and control variables are identical with direct effect model (H2a) except for cultural variables, which in turn are treated as level 2 variables in HLM. Dummy variables representing each country are omitted from independent variables because we introduced a random effect in estimating the grand intercept, which enables us to estimate the variance of intercepts of seven countries directly in the model.

**Level 2 Analysis**

The focal point in this hypothesis is to verify whether cultural variables at level 2 can be determinants of coefficient of the social capital variables on political participation at level 1. At the level 2 analyses of HLM, we focus on the national difference on the relationship found in the level 1 processes. We use collectivism, moralistic leadership, paternalism, non-dissentism, and harmony orientation as cultural variables at level 2, which may affect the variances in the slope of social capital variables on political participation. These level 2 variables are computed by aggregating individual measurement for each country. Variation of cultural variables at country level is shown in Figure 1.
(1) Collectivism

(2) morally upright leader

(3) Paternalistic leader

(4) Support for the suppression of dissident groups

(5) Harmony oriented politics

Figure 1. Cultural values by country
Mongolia, Philippine and Thailand are higher in collectivism than other countries (Figure 1(1)). These three countries are also relatively high in morally upright leader preference, paternalism, suppressing dissent orientation, and harmony orientation, except for Philippines in harmony orientation (Figure 1(2) to 1(5)). On the other hand, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan are relatively low in all these cultural variables, except for Hong Kong and Taiwan in suppressing dissent orientation. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to empirically investigate these cultural differences, it is possible that these differences are associated with the maturity of democracy.

In this article, we investigate the effect of these aggregate cultural differences on the relationship between social capital and political participation at individual level. We first assume the model below.

\[ B = G_1 + G_2 \cdot (\text{COLLECT}) + G_3 \cdot (\text{MORAL}) + G_4 \cdot (\text{PATERNAL}) + G_5 \cdot (\text{NODISSENT}) + G_6 \cdot (\text{HARMONY}) + U_1 \]

- \( B \): coefficient of the social capital variables at the level 1
- \( G_1 \): intercept predicting the \( B \) at the level 1
- \( G_2 \) to \( G_6 \): coefficient of cultural variables on predicting the \( B \) at the level 1
- \( U_1 \): residual term in predicting the \( B \)

**Multilevel Analyses of political participation**

We estimated the model in which all the social capital variables have residual terms. However, this model was not successful because the inter-residual correlations (Tau) are relatively large. Thus we introduced a residual term only in the grand intercept and estimated it as a random effect. The model we estimated is expressed as below\(^1\).

**Level-1 Model**

\[ Y = B_0 + B_1 \cdot (\text{SE002}) + B_2 \cdot (\text{SE003}) + B_3 \cdot (\text{SE005A}) + B_4 \cdot (\text{SE017}) + B_5 \cdot (\text{INST_TRS}) + B_6 \cdot (\text{GENE_TRS}) + B_7 \cdot (\text{CONNECT}) + B_8 \cdot (\text{MACROECO}) + B_9 \cdot (\text{PERSOECO}) + B_{10} \cdot (\text{EFFICACY}) + B_{11} \cdot (\text{CORRUPT}) + B_{12} \cdot (\text{FGNUM}) + B_{13} \cdot (\text{PGNUM}) + R \]

\(^1\) We also estimated models which includes one level 2 variable for each social capital variable. However, only one predictive variable at level 2 cannot explain the variance of slopes of social capital variables at level 1 well enough. Thus we decided to include all the five level 2 variables simultaneously. This also makes it easier to interpret the relative magnitude of level 2 variables in explaining the relative power of social capital variables on political participation.
**Level-2 Model**

\[
B_0 = G_{00} + U_0 \\
B_1 = G_{10} \\
B_2 = G_{20} \\
B_3 = G_{30} \\
B_4 = G_{40} \\
B_5 = G_{50} + G_{51}(\text{COLLECT}) + G_{52}(\text{MORAL}) + G_{53}(\text{PATERNAL}) + G_{54}(\text{NODISSNT}) + G_{55}(\text{HARMONY}) \\
B_6 = G_{60} + G_{61}(\text{COLLECT}) + G_{62}(\text{MORAL}) + G_{63}(\text{PATERNAL}) + G_{64}(\text{NODISSNT}) + G_{65}(\text{HARMONY}) \\
B_7 = G_{70} + G_{71}(\text{COLLECT}) + G_{72}(\text{MORAL}) + G_{73}(\text{PATERNAL}) + G_{74}(\text{NODISSNT}) + G_{75}(\text{HARMONY}) \\
B_8 = G_{80} \\
B_9 = G_{90} \\
B_{10} = G_{100} \\
B_{11} = G_{110} + G_{111}(\text{COLLECT}) + G_{112}(\text{MORAL}) + G_{113}(\text{PATERNAL}) + G_{114}(\text{NODISSNT}) + G_{115}(\text{HARMONY}) \\
B_{12} = G_{120} + G_{121}(\text{COLLECT}) + G_{122}(\text{MORAL}) + G_{123}(\text{PATERNAL}) + G_{124}(\text{NODISSNT}) + G_{125}(\text{HARMONY}) \\
B_{13} = G_{130} + G_{131}(\text{COLLECT}) + G_{132}(\text{MORAL}) + G_{133}(\text{PATERNAL}) + G_{134}(\text{NODISSNT}) + G_{135}(\text{HARMONY})
\]

**Results**

The result of HLM estimation is shown in Table 4. The intercept of coefficients in the table is the mean of coefficients of the independent variable at Level 1, which differs among countries. Therefore, the significant intercept of the coefficient means that the mean of coefficients of an independent variable at Level 1 among countries is statistically different from 0. The significantly positive effect of level 2 variables means that the higher each cultural variable is, the stronger the relationship between the social capital variable and the political participation variable are at the individual level.
As for electoral participation shown in the left half of the table, the intercept of social trust is significantly positive (3.25**). This means that the mean of social trust coefficients at Level 1 among countries is statistically greater than 0. What is more important is the negatively significant effect of collectivism on the slope of social trust (-0.86**). This indicates that the positive effect of social trust in facilitating electoral participation is greater under the cultures lower in collectivism. This clearly supports H2b. As shown in Figure 2, in the lower collectivistic cultures (lower 20%), social trust is positively related with politi-
cal participation. On the other hand, in the higher collectivistic cultures (upper 25%), the relation becomes reverse.

On the other hand, support for moralistic leaders and harmony orientation have positive effects on the slope for social trust. In other words, the facilitating effect of social trust on electoral participation is greater under cultures that support moralistic leaders and harmony orientation, which was unexpected. However, these level 2 effects cannot be seen when we set active participation as a dependent variable - here the intercept of social trust is marginally negative (-3.74+). This contrast suggests that the effect of social trust on electoral participation varies across different cultures, but that active participation does not.

Another noteworthy result is the contrasting effect of support for moralistic leaders and paternalism on the slope of informal group social participation. Support for moralistic leaders facilitates the effect of informal group social participation on both electoral and active political participation (1.82+ and 2.31*). For instance, as is shown in Figure 3, the slope for active participation led by informal group activity is steeper under stronger support for moralistic leader than lower support. On the other hand, paternalistic cultural context suppresses that effect especially for active participation (-0.25**); even those participating in many informal activities in paternalistic culture are reluctant to participate politically (they may be paternalistically dependent on leaders).
Yet another intriguing finding is that the effect of moralistic leader support is consistent over associational/informal social participation, social and institutional trust. The higher the support, the stronger the effects of social capital variables (the exception is on the effect of perceived corruption). This is intriguing because leader support does not lead to less participation and more dependence on the leaders, which is somewhat different from the cultural expectation.

All in all, the analyses and findings here point to the validity of the mediation model of culture, especially the interplay between social trust and culture related variables.

DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE TASKS

In this paper, we have examined the salience of various aspects of social capital and cultural effects in facilitating political participation, using the 7 country survey data from the East Asia Barometer project. While still preliminary, our analyses brought out several intriguing findings. Social trust as well as civic engagement in terms of social participation generally significantly affect political participation, especially election related behavior in the East Asian countries. Moreover, when we introduced cultural variables, the analyses reveal different aspects of the Asian mind; for instance, people are less likely to follow Putnamian patterns in election related participation in Asia than in America; regarding the effect of social trust, the less collectivistic or the more embedded in “traditional” Asian political ideals such as supporting morally upright leaders, the greater the election participation as social trust grows. This connotes a mixture of different set of intermingled psychological motivations than what Putnam assumed. These do not mean that we herald the uniqueness of Asian values, but it does imply that Putnamian logic of democracy could have some limit
of applicability under a different cultural settings. In this final section, we point to some remaining problems to be solved as well as future task on this theme for discussion.

1) Problems to be solved

As was pointed out in the previous section, our measurement of social participation is somewhat contaminated by politically colored group affiliation; Of course many social organizations could have “political color” when they try to attain their own goals; for instance, community organization ask local politicians to help them to solve the problems in their community. Thus sometimes it is difficult to distinguish social participation and political participation. However, still there are differences of gradation of political color in different levels of civic engagement.

Another issue to be discussed is regarding social trust. There is a problem related to the fact that the measurement is a single item and also that its validity is challenged. The latter problem is especially worth considering. Actually, this single item includes two types of judgment: "One can’t be too careful in dealing with them" connotes that the social environment people live in is a secure one (has assurance) (Miller & Mitamura, 2003), which has a much different implication from the notion of generalized trust represented by "most people can be trusted," according to Yamagishi’s trust and assurance contrast. Then in this scale, we are not able to differentiate the two judgments, which means that the assurance side of the answer contaminates the trust measurement. According to Miller and Mitamura, if we measure trust in people using a single trust-not measurement, Americans score higher than Japanese, but if we use the item above, Americans score lower due to the fact that their responses are pulled to the “too careful” end. They claim that this simply reflects the fact that Americans generally live in more “insecure” environment than Japanese, rather than reflecting their level of trust. Thus, we need a more sensitive measurement.

Another problem is the treatment of daily social interaction. As shown by Huckfeldt or Ikeda (Huckfeldt and La due Lake, 1998; Ikeda, 2002b; Ikeda & Richey, 2005), daily social interaction is a resource of social capital for political participation. Unfortunately, however, in this East Asian Barometer we do not have relevant variables. It would be fruitful to investigate the interaction effect of daily social interaction and Asian or more general values on political participation.

Yet another factor of importance, not taken into consideration in this paper, is political tolerance. In the idea of liberal democracy, full political participation means to accept full political participation of others without any reservation, which is an essence of political tolerance. Although we do not have relevant variables at hand, future survey will need a set of tolerance related items.
2) Effect of mobilization

For a fair evaluation of the evidence presented, we would also like to point out the limits of survey based research, which are relevant to our analyses as well. Generally, the survey is geared toward analyzing the mass-level attitude and behavior, setting aside the elite-side of the story in democratic practices. Hence, the findings we have reported on political participation could be partly attributed to mobilization process caused by political activists on the side of candidates or political parties. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) pointed out that the decline of American political participation is not attributable to distrust in politics or government, but more attributable to the demand side of participation, i.e. decline of mobilization by campaign, social movement etc.

In order to show that the findings reported earlier stand significant even when Rosenstone style explanation is taken into consideration, we have added a mobilization variable as a control variable to the equations in Table 1. The mobilization variable is a weighted summation of Q032 to Q042; The question was “During the last national election in [year], did any of the following personally ask you to vote for a particular candidate?”; The alternatives are “family members/relative”, “seniors in a clan or extended family”, “neighbour/friend”, community leaders”, “superior at work/school”, “owners of the firm/unit that you work for”, “member/official of organization that you belong to”, “government official whom you know personally”, “government official whom you don’t know”, “candidate/party activist whom you know personally”, “candidate/party activist whom you don’t know”. For the cases where the data was available (Japan, Mongoria, Philippines, and Thailand), the results clearly revealed that effects of social capital related variables did not change very much, although the mobilization variable is highly significant. We take this as further endorsement for our arguments and findings.

3) General values

Worldwide value studies point to two important dimensions in general values: modernization and postmodernization values (Inglehart, 1997). Especially, postmodernization values are crucial to democracy since they emphasize participation as well as tolerance on dissent (freedom of speech) (Inglehart, 1990; Clark, 1998). On the other hand, modernization values emphasize more basic societal stability, i.e. healthy economic development and maintenance of social order. Concerning social capital, people who are inclined toward postmodernization values are expected to be more supportive of participation and tolerance on dissent, compared to those who prefer modernization values. In the context of Asian culture, then, it is important to find how these general values go together with traditional Asian values.

Unfortunately, we have not measured Inglehart value items in all the countries. However, we have two possibilities of analyses by our present data; one is that Q119 provides a
choice between democracy and economy; this variable will possibly be used as the choice between modernization value and postmodernization value. The other possible analysis is to use Japanese data because in Japanese survey, we obtained Inglehart value items.

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Asian Barometer
A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

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Asian Barometer

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

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