How Taiwanese Citizens View Democracy: Change and Continuity in Democratic Attitudes and Values in Taiwan’s Democratic Consolidation

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HOW TAIWANESE CITIZENS VIEW DEMOCRACY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES AND VALUES IN TAIWAN’S DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Jack Chen-chia Wu, Mark Weatherall, and Yu-tzung Chang

INTRODUCTION

The paper provides a comprehensive overview of change and continuity in popular attitudes toward democracy since Taiwan emerged as one of the successful cases in the third wave of democratization. The island’s gradual transition to democracy began with the lifting of martial law in 1987. In 1992, Taiwan held the first full reelection of the Legislative Yuan since the retreat of the Republic of China government to the island at the end of the Chinese Civil War, and then in 1996 Lee Teng-hui won Taiwan’s first ever popular election for president for the ruling Kuomintang (KMT). In the year 2000, Chen Shui-bian achieved victory for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after a split in the KMT camp, marking Taiwan’s first peaceful transition of power. When the KMT won back the presidency in 2008 after eight years of DPP rule, Taiwan underwent its second peaceful power rotation, passing Huntington’s (1991) “two-turnover test” for democratic consolidation. Taiwan now holds free and fair multiparty elections for all levels of government. The island’s political regime clearly meets the minimum requirements of democracy such as free and fair elections, universal adult suffrage, and multiparty competition (Chu et al. 2008; Coppedge and Reinicke 1990). Looking at the Freedom House evaluation of civil and political rights on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), Taiwan has progressed from a combined score of 5 in 1998, to an average combined score of 3 between 1992 and 1996 and 2 between 1996 and 2000. Since 2001, Taiwan’s combined score has remained at 1.5, ranking it alongside the long-established democracies in the West. 1 Accordingly, the island has been widely praised for following its “economic miracle” in the 1960s and 1970s with a “political miracle,” becoming Asia’s most successful third wave democracy.

The paper makes use of data from the Asian Barometer Survey (hereafter ABS) over three waves (carried out in 2001, 2005 and 2010) to examine democratic consolidation in terms of changes in mass attitudes. 2 We look at both normative (indirect) support for democracy as an

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1 Freedom in the World 2012, see http://www.freedomhouse.org
2 For the background and methodology of ABS, please see http://www.asianbarometer.org.
ideal and practical (direct support) for democratic regimes on the dimensions of democratic beliefs, democratic norms, and democratic behavior. These dimensions reveal how democratic values and democratic practices gradually take root in the lives of ordinary people, or in other words, how democracy becomes fully consolidated within society. It should be noted, however, that the first wave of the ABS survey took place in 2001, several years after the transition to democracy and following the first transfer of power, while the most recent survey was carried out nearly ten years later after the KMT had returned to presidency. Practical support for democratic regimes in particular is subject to the effect of partisan preference (Huang, Tsai, and Chang 2008) as well as fluctuations caused by actual events on the ground. While the trend over the three surveys does show that democracy a pattern of democratic consolidation in Taiwanese society in terms of normative support for democracy, the picture for practical support for democracy is more mixed. In short, the performance of democracy in Taiwan does not always meet the expectations of the island’s citizens.

The paper consists of three main parts. First, we combine important indices of democratic consolidation to create a measurement framework to assess normative (indirect) support for democracy and practical (direct support) for the democratic regime on the dimensions of democratic beliefs, democratic norms, and democratic behavior using data from the three waves of the ABS. The second part looks at normative and practical orientations towards democracy on the three levels (beliefs, norms, and behavior). To measure normative (indirect) support for democracy, we look at support for democracy as an idea, support for liberal democratic norms and detachment from authoritarianism, and evaluation of democratic governance. For practical (direct) support for democracy, we look at assessments of the level of democracy and satisfaction with democracy, trust in institutions, and involvement in politics. The third part presents two alternative perspectives, looking at how ordinary people understand democracy and democratic consolidation at the level of elite and organizational norms.

MEASURING DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: MASS ATTITUDES AND VALUES

Countries that have passed the “two turnover” test might appear to be consolidated democracies. However, a second peaceful alternation of power does not mark the end of the democratization process. For new democracies, status as a “liberal democracy” or “consolidated democracy” does not mean that the quality of democracy has achieved the level of the established democracies in the West. Indeed, Huntington (1996: 9) has argued that for third wave democracies "the problem is not overthrow but erosion: the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it."
This raises the question of how to achieve a stable, consolidated democracy. New democracies face the “negative” challenge of “democratic preservation” – preventing a reversal to semi-democratic or authoritarian rule. But they also face the “positive” challenge of “completing democracy” and “deepening democracy” – delivering a high quality democratic regime. At the most fundamental level, the old authoritarian rulers must be willing to peacefully hand over power to the election winners when faced with a defeat at the polls. For Huntington (1991), democracy is consolidated after a second peaceful transfer of power – although of course a democratic reversal is still possible even at this stage. Linz and Stepan (1995) measure democratic consolidation on three dimensions: behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional. On the behavioral dimension, democracy is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to overthrow the state or resort to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state. On the attitudinal dimension, democracy is consolidated when a strong majority of the population believes that democratic institutions and procedures are the most appropriate way to govern society and support for antisystem alternatives is marginal. On the constitutional dimension, democracy is consolidated when government and nongovernment actors are subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict by the laws, procedures, and institutions of the new democracy. Essentially, democracy is consolidated when, in the famous words of Guiseppe di Palma, it has become the “only game in town” (Linz and Stepan: 1996: 5-6).

However, the above accounts have been criticized for a narrow focus on the formal institutions of democracy and presence of liberal democratic norms. Karl (1995) has called the exclusive focus on electoral institutions while ignoring the actual operation of democratic politics “the fallacy of electoralism.” Huber and her colleagues move beyond the narrow focus on elections and liberal democratic norms by identifying three different types of democracy: formal, participatory, and social democracy. Formal democracy combines electoral and constitutional features: regular free and fair elections, universal suffrage, accountability of the state's administrative organs to the elected representatives, and effective guarantees for freedom of expression and association as well as protection against arbitrary state action. However, formal democracy does not entail an equal distribution of actual political power or social policies that reduce social and economic inequality. This account therefore puts forward two further categories: high levels of participation without systematic differences across social categories (for example, class, ethnicity, gender) and increasing equality in social and economic outcomes. A system that meets the first four requirements plus the fifth requirement is called a participatory democracy; a system that meets all six requirements is called a social democracy (Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephen, 1997:}
Similarly, Schelder (1998: 93) identifies “advanced democracies” that possess some positive traits above the minimum requirements for liberal democracy. Here Schelder turns his attention to the “positive challenge” for new democracies of “completing democracy” and “deepening democracy” – in other words delivering a high quality democratic regime.  

Prior the 1990s, research on the third wave democracies was primarily interested in the interactions between socioeconomic change and elite policies and the importance of institutional choice for democratic consolidation (Klesner, 1998). It was generally believed that a transformed socioeconomic context and new institutional arrangements would encourage elites to redefine their roles and change policy direction. Changes in mass political culture would then follow adjustments at the elite level (Rustow, 1970; Przeworski, 1986; Di Palma, 1990). However, Dahl (1997) has argued that a democracy not supported by a democratic political culture at the mass level is crisis prone and under the constant threat of regression back to authoritarianism. Shin (1994) has also pointed out while the previous waves of democratization show that democracy can be created even when the public do not support it, such a democracy will not be consolidated and will face the constant threat of sliding back to authoritarianism. Work on Southern Europe by Gunther et. al. (1995) also shows that “resocialization” – changing old beliefs, habits, and behaviors – is a perquisite for democratic consolidation. This literature asks us to “bring the people back in” and think about democratic consolidation in broader terms than elite strategies, institutional choice, and socioeconomic structure. It shows that the beliefs and attitudes of ordinary people is also an important variable when we try to explain democratic consolidation. After all, the continued development and deepening depends on “empowering the people.”

Diamond (1999) has established operational indicators of democratic consolidation at both the elite and mass levels. According to Diamond, the consolidation of democracy requires

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3 Schelder classifies democratic regimes into four types. He also identifies two negative (ensuring democratic stability and preventing regression to nondemocratic regime) and three positive (attaining progress towards liberal or higher quality democracy) types of democratic consolidation: (1) Preventing democratic breakdown: reducing the possibility of breakdown so that people are confident that democracy will continue to exist in the future; (2) Preventing democratic erosion: preventing a slow breakdown to a semi-democracy or hybrid regime between authoritarianism and democracy; (3) Completing democracy: the challenge of attaining full democratic rule, moving away from some "diminished subtype" of democracy toward a "nondiminished" democracy. Democratic completion requires the removal of authoritarian legacies and transformation into liberal democracies that can effectively guarantee basic civil, political, and human rights; (4) Deepening democracy: moving further on the continuum of democracy by pushing "liberal democracy" towards "advanced democracy"; (5) Organizing democracy: Establishing democracies specific rules and organizations of democracy. Here, the focus is shifted from the procedural minima for democracy to the concrete rules and organizations that define the various forms of democracy.
“broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine” (Diamond 1999, 65). Diamond has suggested viewing this complex process in terms of six domains, which are defined by two dimensions and three levels. Consolidation takes place on two dimensions, normative and behavioral, and at three levels, political elites, organizations (such as parties, movements, and civic organizations), and the mass public (Diamond 1999, 68-69; also see Linz and Stepan 1996, 5-7).

The three waves of the ABS in Taiwan provide a rich source of data on democratic consolidation at the mass public level. The rest of this paper therefore focuses on mass attitudes across the normative and behavioral dimensions. According to Diamond, democracy at the level of mass attitudes is consolidated on the normative dimension when “[m]ore than 70 percent of the mass public consistently believes that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, and that the democracy in place in the country is the most suitable form of government for the country. No more than fifteen percent of the public actively prefers an authoritarian form of government.” On the behavioral dimension, democracy is consolidated when “[n]o antidemocratic movement, party, or organization enjoys a significant mass following, and ordinary citizens do not routinely use violence, fraud, or other illegal or unconstitutional methods to express their political preferences or pursue their political interests” (Diamond 1999, 69).

On the basis of Diamond’s framework and mass attitudes towards democracy as surveyed by the three waves of ABS, we divide mass attitudes to democracy into six domains, split into two dimensions and three levels. The two dimensions are normative support (or indirect support for democracy as a whole) and practical support (or direct support for the current democratic regime), while the three levels are beliefs (or values), norms (or institutions), and behavior. The framework is shown in Table 1 below:

[Table 1 about here]

For normative support on the level of beliefs or values, we want to measure support for democracy. In public opinion surveys, however, this dimension of democratic support is often measured by agreement that democracy is the best form of government or the most preferred political system. In this study we select four indicators: preference for democracy, desire for democracy, perceived suitability of democracy and perceived efficacy of democracy. Practical support on the level of beliefs or values is measured using orientations to democracy-in-practice, although use of these measurements is still contested (Canache et al.
The first measurement of practical support is the perceived supply of democracy as a political regime, while the second measurement of practical support is satisfaction with democracy.

Next, support for the norms and institutions of democracy is derived from the diffusion of elite values to the mass public. Normative support on this level can be measured by support for liberal democratic norms and detachment from authoritarianism. To measure support for liberal democratic norms, we look at support for key liberal norms associated with the idea of limited government: checks and balances, the rule of law (a law-abiding government) and social pluralism (a pluralist civil society). Detachment from authoritarianism is measured by rejection of three indicators of orientation towards authoritarianism: eliminating elections and parliament in favor of strongman rule, restricting political participation to a single party, and installing military rule. To measure direct support for democratic institutions and norms, we look at trust in political and public institutions. For political institutions, we measure trust in the three main branches of government: the executive, legislature, and judiciary. Since Taiwan has a powerful presidency, we also add an item measuring trust in that institution. For public institutions, we measure trust in other important organizations with a direct relationship to the functioning of democracy, including political parties, civil service, newspapers, and electoral commission.

Finally, on the behavioral level, Diamond uses several negative indicators - including lack of support for nondemocratic alternatives and rejection of illegal methods to pursue political preferences and interests. For this paper, we instead put forward some positive indicators. On the normative support dimension, we look for positive assessments of key items of governance. These are used to indicate a tendency to act in accordance with established democratic procedures. In this study we select five indicators: control of corruption, electoral competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, and freedom. For the practical support dimension, we measure citizens’ involvement in politics by looking at interest in politics, political competence, and political efficacy. Since Almond and Verba’s (1963) groundbreaking work, these indicators have been key variables in scholarship on political culture. From a theoretical perspective, we would expect democratic opening to lead to increases in citizens’ interest in politics, political capability, and feeling of political efficacy.

**DEMOCRATIC ORIENTATIONS IN TAIWAN**

**Normative Support for Democracy**

Normative support for democracy is reflected in a belief that democracy is ultimately
preferable to all other forms of government. The Second World War was ultimately a conflict between dictatorship and autocracy, but after the Allied victory the ideological conflict between the democratic West and the communist East continued until the breakdown of the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s. With the ending of the Cold War and the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization, Francis Fukuyama (1989) famously heralded the “end of history” and the triumph of the fundamental values of liberal democracy. However, although values from the Western liberal democratic tradition are upheld by both elites and the mass public in Taiwan, the development of value systems in Taiwanese society is also influenced by an East Asian Confucian and Legalist cultural heritage and the island’s more recent colonial and authoritarian legacies. This section looks at support for democracy and evaluation of democratic performance among the Taiwanese public.

Support for democracy can be measured using the following indices: preference for democracy, desire for democracy, perceived suitability of democracy, and perceived efficacy of democracy. Combining affective and cognitive orientations, we measure overall support for democracy.

**Preference for democracy**

The first index of affective orientation to democracy is preference for democracy. To measure preference for democracy, we calculate responses to the item “democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government” from the ABS survey. These results indicate the extent to which the Taiwanese public views democracy as a universal value. Figure 1 shows that the Taiwanese public increasingly regards democracy as preferable to any form of government; the numbers giving a positive answer increased from 40% in 2001 to 47% in 2006 and 50% in 2010, an increase of 10%. Many scholars have argued that the legacy of successful economic development under authoritarianism could hinder support for democracy in the region. Indeed, in 2010, a very substantial minority (around 24%) of the Taiwanese population still believed that authoritarian government can be preferable under certain circumstances. Although the ABS data shows that “authoritarian nostalgia” is slowly waning as support for democracy as the most preferable form of government increases, the existence of a significant minority who might support non-democratic alternatives in some situations remains cause for concern.

**Desire for democracy**

The second index of affective orientation to democracy is desire for democracy. The ABS series asked respondents indicate where they want their country to be now on a 10-point
dictatorship-democracy scale. A score of 1 means “complete dictatorship” whereas a score of 10 indicates “complete democracy.” Since the mid-point of the scale lies between 5 and 6, those in the top half (6 or above on the scale) may be regarded as expressing desire for democracy. As Figure 1 shows, the level of democratic aspiration was 72% in 2001, but had grown to 85% in 2010. These encouraging results indicate that aside from a small and declining minority, Taiwanese citizens want their country to be a democracy.

**Perceived suitability of democracy**

The first index of cognitive orientation to democracy is perceived suitability of democracy. To measure perceived suitability of democracy the ABS series asked respondents to indicate the level of suitability of democracy for their country on a 10-point scale. A score of 1 means “completely unsuitable” whereas a score of 10 indicates “completely suitable.” As with the dictatorship-democracy 10-point scale, those in the top half (6 or above on the scale) may be seen as expressing a belief in suitability of democracy. As shown in Figure 1, popular belief in the suitability of democracy has steadily gained strength over the last decade, rising from 59% in 2001 to 68% in 2006 and 74% in 2010. This confirms the socializing effect of participation in democratic process as suggested by institutionalists.

**Perceived efficacy of democracy**

The second index of cognitive orientation to democracy is perceived efficacy of democracy. To measure perceived efficacy of democracy, the ABS series asked respondents to choose between two statements: “democracy is capable of solving problems of our society” and “democracy cannot solve our society’s problems.” In Taiwan, popular confidence in the efficacy of democracy started out from a low level of 47% in 2001 but has visibly strengthened during the last decade rising to 55% in 2006 and 59% in 2010.

Taiwanese citizens’ support for democracy has increased steadily over the last decade across all measures. This growth is even more impressive when we consider the intense divisions over national identity in Taiwanese society, the political conflict that characterized most of

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4 The ABS 2010 survey asked respondents to indicate where they want their country to be in the future on a 10-point democracy scale. A score of 1 indicates “completely undemocratic” whereas a score of 10 indicates “completely democratic.” Hence, data from the latest ABS may not be comparable with data from the other surveys.
the decade, and a series of political scandals, most notably the arrest and imprisonment of former president Chen Shui-bian on corruption charges. On affective orientation to democracy, while preference for democracy started from a low level, in the most recent survey it has increased to 50%. Desire for democracy started from a higher level and has continued to strengthen. On cognitive orientation to democracy, perceived suitability of democracy has increased by 15% over the last decade, reaching 74% in 2010. At the same time, perceived efficacy of democracy has also increased from under 50% in 2001 to nearly 60% in 2010. To sum up, each of the four indicators (two affective and two cognitive) show an increase of greater that 10% for the decade, demonstrating a steady strengthening in normative support for democracy among the Taiwanese public.

Practical Support for Democracy

We now turn to the question of practical support for democracy in the everyday lives of Taiwan’s citizens. To measure this, we look at the perceived extent of democracy and satisfaction with democracy. These indices give us an insight into how ordinary Taiwanese think their democracy is performing.

Perceived extent of democracy

To measure the perceived extent of democracy, the ABS series asked respondents to indicate where their country is under the present government on a 10-point dictatorship-democracy scale. A score of 1 means “complete dictatorship” whereas a score of 10 indicates “complete democracy.” Since the mid-point of the scale lies between 5 and 6, those in the top half (6 or above on the scale) may be seen as locating the country in the democratic territory. As shown in Figure 2, 73% of respondents rated the present system above 6 on the 10-point scale in 2001, 74% in 2006 and 68% in 2010. The perceived supply of democracy in Taiwan has actually declined over the past decade. This drop is more striking when we look at the numbers who regarded Taiwan as a full democracy. In 2010, only 12% of respondents placed the island in the category of full democracy (9 or 10), representing a decline from 20% in 2001. These results come despite expert assessments which regard Taiwan as a full or nearly full democracy. While the desire for democracy among ordinary Taiwanese is increasing, Taiwanese people are becoming less likely to regard their country as a democracy. The widening gap between desire for democracy and perceived supply of democracy may be the

5 In ABS 2010 a score of 1 indicates “completely undemocratic” whereas a score of 10 indicates “completely democratic.”
result an increasingly critical citizenry.

Satisfaction with democracy

Although its meaning is contested, satisfaction with democracy has been used to measure how citizens evaluate democratic performance. The ABS series used a four-point verbal scale, with 1 indicating “very satisfied” and 4 “not at all satisfied.” In order to make the scales comparable with other items from the survey the four values were collapsed into two categories: satisfied and dissatisfied. Figure 2 shows that the level of democratic satisfaction in Taiwan has been on an upward trend, registering 48% in 2001, 57% in 2006 and 68% in 2010, while the gap between the extent of democracy and satisfaction with democracy has also steadily narrowed over the last decade.

[Figure 2 about here]

Although Taiwan’s citizens are now less likely to regard their country as a full democracy (9 or 10 on the scale), they are increasingly satisfied with their country’s democratic performance. While the growing satisfaction with democracy is encouraging, Taiwanese citizens’ own views of their democracy still does not match expert assessments.

Democratic Norms and Institutions

Norms and institutions act as a mediator between the level of democratic beliefs and the level of democratic behavior, and both guarantee and advance democratic values. They also ensure that the behavior of actors (whether they be elites, the mass public, or organizations) meets democratic standards. In short, institutions are essential to the effective functioning of democratic society. Norms and institutions can be assessed by looking at a number of indices; to measure normative support we look at positive support for three key principles of liberal democratic government (checks and balances, rule of law, and social pluralism) as well as rejection of non-democratic alternatives. To measure practical support, we look at mass support for political and public institutions. By combining these measures, we provide an overall picture of democratic orientation on the level of norms and institutions.

Practical Support for Democratic Norms and Institutions

Support for Liberal Democratic Norms

A key aspect of a democratic system is an institutional design which limits the power of the
government and ensures protection for human rights. Liberal norms and rules protect individuals from the arbitrary use of government power. Checks and balances, the rule of law (a law-abiding government) and social pluralism (a pluralist civil society) are key liberal norms associated with the idea of limited government (Rosenblum 1995; Foweraker and Krznaric 2000). In this section we examine the extent to which ordinary citizens in Taiwan are supportive of these norms.

Checks and balances: Checks and balances separate powers into independent branches of government and provide mechanisms to ensure horizontal accountability. To measure support for checks and balances, the ABS series asked respondents if they agreed with the following statements: “When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch” and “If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.” The former measures support for an independent judiciary, while the latter measures support for legislative oversight.

First, support for an independent judiciary accounted for 54% in 2001 and 59% in 2010. However, support for legislative oversight accounted for only 34% in 2001 and 38% in 2010. This low level of support is probably due to an extremely low level of popular trust in the legislature and the appalling partisan gridlock between the DPP-controlled executive and KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan during the eight-year Chen Shui-bian presidency.

By combining responses to both questions, we seek to ascertain overall commitment to checks and balances. Those who disagreed with both statements accounted for only 16% in 2001, 22% in 2006 and 26% of electorate in 2010. On average, only one-quarter endorsed the liberal norm of checks and balances. This finding suggests that their greater support for democracy as an abstract idea may not be firmly based on acceptance of checks and balances, one of the hallmarks of liberal democracy.

[Table 2 about here]

Rule of law: As Rose and his colleagues (1998) have pointed out, the liberal conception of rule of law is more than formal legality used as a means of social control. It emphasizes constraining arbitrariness and the abuse of power, namely that government leaders abide by laws and the constitution. To measure support for the rule of law, the ABS series asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: “When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation” and “The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if they have to ignore the established procedure.” Negative
responses to both questions indicate support for a law-abiding government.

As shown in Table 2, first, those who disagreed that “It is ok for the government to disregard the law” accounted for 68% of the electorate in both our 2006 and 2010 surveys, rejecting deviation from rule of law even during hard times. In addition, on average, three-quarters rejected arbitrary use of government power even if it is intended to overcome a crisis. Next, those who disagreed that it is more important for political leaders to achieve goals even if it entails the violation of procedures accounted for 76% in 2001 and 83% in 2006. Furthermore, three-quarters rejected the notion that political leaders may bypass the established procedures to achieve goals. By combining responses to both questions, we seek to ascertain overall commitment to the rule of law. Those who disagreed with both statements accounted for 50% of the Taiwanese electorate in 2001 and 60% in 2006.

Social pluralism: Social pluralism or a pluralist civil society is not directly related to the norms justifying the authority structure. However, since civil society serves as a safeguard for civil liberties and societal accountability, social pluralism is considered one of the liberal norms associated with the idea of limited government. To measure support for social pluralism, the ABS series asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the following statements: “Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups” and “If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.” Negative responses to both questions indicate support for a pluralist civil society. As presented in Table 2, first, those who disagreed that the organization of many groups would disrupt the harmony of community accounted for 34% in 2001, 37% in 2006 and 42% in 2010, indicating that at most only two in five Taiwanese embraced the idea of a vibrant and diverse associational life. Second, in 2001 only 24% agreed that the competition of ideas would lead to social disorder, although this figure increased modestly to 31% in 2006 and 32% in 2010. By combining responses to both questions, we seek to ascertain overall commitment to a pluralist civil society. Only small minorities embraced a pluralist civil society, with only 14% in 2001, 19% in 2006 and 23% in 2010 disagreeing with both statements.

To sum up, only the rule of law has been widely embraced by the majority of Taiwan’s citizens. Significantly, the idea of checks and balances and a pluralist civil society was only endorsed by a minority of citizens. Furthermore, citizens’ reservations about liberal norms are persistent, showing little change over the decade.

Detachment from Authoritarianism
To measure rejection of authoritarian rule, the series asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the following statements: “We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things” and “The army (military) should come in to govern the country.” The ABS series also asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement “Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.”

In Taiwan, a great majority rejected strongman rule even during the most turbulent years of Chen Shui-bian’s administration (see Figure 3). In 2001, 68% of respondents rejected strongman rule and this detachment has gained strength slightly during the last decade rising to 77% in 2006 and 79% to 2010.

[Figure 3 about here]

Second, overwhelming majorities rejected the statement that the military should come in to govern the country. The intensity of this popular rejection is also much stronger with almost half of the population strongly disapproving in 2010. These results are not surprising since Taiwan has no history of military rule. Last, opposition to single-party rule is also evident, but relatively weak. Those who rejected single-party rule accounted for less than 70% of the electorate in 2001, a smaller number than those who rejected either strongman rule or military rule (see Figure 3). However, rejection of this non-democratic alternative has strengthened over the last decade, to 77% in 2006 and 79% in 2010.

During the authoritarian period under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, strongman rule was embedded in a partially institutionalized hegemonic party (Chu 1999). The fact that rejection of single-party and strongman rule is weaker than rejection of military rule is a reflection of this historical legacy. However, large and growing majorities reject all three nondemocratic alternatives, suggesting that for most Taiwanese, democracy is now “the only game in town.”

**Trust In Institutions**

**Political institutions**

Trust in political institutions has been widely used as an indicator of political support for the regime at the institutional level (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Miller and Listhaug 1999). We focus on the four major political institutions: the presidency, the national government, the parliament, and the courts. We combined the scores for “a great deal of trust” and “a little trust” into an overall figure for positive trust in the institutions. The scores, reported in Figure 4a show that none of the political institutions achieved trust levels above 50% on any of the
three waves of the ABS. Trust in the parliament was particularly low, scoring at or less than 20% across the three waves of the ABS. Trust in the national government started higher at 40% in 2001, but had declined to 32% by 2010. Trust in the presidency was only measured in 2006 and 2010, falling from 29% to 24% during the period. The decline in institutional trust may be due to the corrosive effects of negative reporting in the media and the narrowing of political competition, as well as the emergence of more critical citizenry who are less willing to defer to the authority.

[Figure 4a about here]

*Public institutions*

To function effectively, democracy relies on a myriad of public institutions. Unlike other regime forms, democracy allows for the existence of a public space outside of government. The existence of this public space means that the government no longer has a monopoly on public decision making. Diverse social actors can organize to advance their own agendas and interests, ensuring a more pluralist form of public debate and policy making. In addition, an effective and accountable civil service independent of politics is necessary to deliver public services and good democratic governance. Perhaps the most distinctive public institutions of modern democracy are political parties, which are expected to aggregate and mediate diverse interests as well as form governments. Although parties are of course political actors, strictly speaking they are free associations formed in the public sphere. Next, a free independent and pluralistic media is necessary for a sustainable democratic society. Finally, the perceived neutrality of the national electoral commission (in Taiwan the Central Election Commission) is essential for elections that all sides accept as free and fair.

Unfortunately, the ABS series only measured trust in non-governmental organizations in 2001. The series did however measure trust in political parties, the civil service, newspapers, and the Central Election Commission across all three waves. Figure 4b shows that trust in political parties is low across the three waves of the survey, falling slightly from 16% in 2001 to 14% in 2010. This result may reflect intense competition between two increasingly polarized political camps. Trust in the civil service declined from 53% in 2001 to 41% in 2006, but rebounded to 48% in 2010. However, trust in newspapers was lower in 2010 (22%) than 2001 (33%). In contrast, trust in the Central Election Commission is on an upward trend, increasing from 46% in 2001 to 54% in 2010. Overall, trust in three of the four public institutions measured was lower in 2010 than 2001, with only the Central Election Commission bucking the trend. This decline in trust in public institutions mirrors the similar fall in trust for political institutions reported in the preceding section.
Overall, in terms of democratic orientation at the regime level, indirect support for democratic norms has been consistently strong over the past decade. Large majorities of the Taiwanese population reject nondemocratic alternatives. Looking at the core institutions of democracy, the rule of law has enjoyed relatively high levels of support across the three surveys. Support for checks and balances and social pluralism has also grown steadily, albeit from a low starting point. However, when we look at practical support for the current institutions of democracy, the picture is very different. Support for both political and public institutions is on a downward trend. There is a danger in the future that the perceived weak performance of democratic institutions will erode support for democracy on other levels, threatening Taiwan’s democratic consolidation.

**Mass Behavior**

The final level of democratic consolidation is behavioral. In Diamond’s framework, consolidation on the behavioral level is measured by lack of a significant mass following for antidemocratic movements, parties, or organizations and a rejection of illegal or unconstitutional methods such as violence or fraud to express political preferences or pursue political interests (Diamond: 1999, 69). In this paper, we look at evaluations of democratic governance as an indirect measure of democratic behavior at the mass level; when citizens believe that they can effectively express their political preferences or pursue their interests through democratic institutions, they will be less willing to support anti-system alternatives or resort to illegal or unconstitutional methods.

**Evaluation of democratic governance**

Since regime performance is a multidimensional phenomenon, it is appropriate to distinguish between major dimensions of democratic performance. Based on availability of data and comparability across time, we focus on five dimensions of democratic performance: control of corruption, electoral competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, and freedom.

*Control of corruption:* We measure evaluations of corruption at both the local government and national government level. Those who replied that hardly anyone or not a lot of local officials are corrupt accounted for 30% in 2006 and 31% in 2010. The results for the national government were very similar; in 2006 29% replied that hardly anyone or not a lot of local officials are corrupt, rising to 32% in 2010. The view that corruption is widespread in both
local and national government should be of concern since perceived corruption is known to corrode popular support for democracy (Chang and Chu 2005).

[Table 3 about here]

Electoral competition: To measure evaluation of electoral competition we chose two questions: one asked respondents whether they agreed that the mass media offered parties and candidate equal access to the mass media at election time. The other asked how often elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties or candidates. For the first question, 63% in 2006 and 71% in 2010 replied either “strongly agree” or “agree.” For the second question, 52% in 2006 and 57% in 2010 replied that elections always or most of the time offer the voters a real choice. Therefore, a majority viewed elections fair and competitive, but a significant minority remained skeptical of the significance of elections. Combining responses to both questions show that only one-third (36% in 2006 and 43% in 2010) considered elections both fair and meaningful.

Vertical accountability: To measure evaluation of vertical accountability we chose two agree-disagree format questions: “People have the power to change a government they don’t like” and “Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its elections.” For the first question, those who replied either “strongly agree” or “agree” accounted for 60% of respondents in 2006 and 56% in 2010. For the second question those who answered either “strongly disagree” or “disagree” accounted for 34% in 2006 and 39% in 2010. Combining responses to both questions reveals that only around one in five respondents (22% in 2006 and 20% in 2010) favorably evaluated the provision of vertical accountability.

Horizontal accountability: To measure evaluation of horizontal accountability we chose two questions: one asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement “When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.” The other asked to what extent the legislature is capable of keeping the government (or government leaders) in check. For the first question, 38% in 2006 and 48% in 2010 replied either “strongly disagree” or “disagree.” For the second question, 52% in 2006 and 47% in 2010 replied either “very capable” or “capable.” Combining responses to both questions shows that only 25% in 2006 and 31% in 2010 favorably evaluated the provision of horizontal accountability.

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6 Instead of this question the third wave of ABS used the following questions: “When government leaders break the laws, there is nothing the courts can do.”
Freedom: To measure evaluation of freedom we chose two agree-disagree format questions: “People are free to speak what they think without fear,” and “People can join any organization they like without fear.” For the first question, 73% in 2006 and 74% in 2010 replied either “strongly agree” or “agree.” For the second question, 78% in both 2006 and 2010 chose either “strongly agree” or “agree.” Combining responses to both questions indicates that 67% in 2006 and 68% in 2010 gave positive evaluations on the freedom dimension.

Overall, citizens in Taiwan give very low assessments on the rule of law and political accountability. The regime does fare better on civil and political rights as well as electoral competition, although a significant minority of respondents believe that elections fail to offer the voters a meaningful choice.

Involvement in Politics

Political interest: Political interest is a measure how involved in the political process citizens feel. In the literature on political culture, it is generally believed that more democratic political cultures lead to greater interest in politics among ordinary citizens. In the ABS series, to measure evaluation of political interest we chose one agree-disagree format question: “How interested would you say you are in politics?” The results show a relatively low level of interest in politics, with around 30% replying “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree” in the three surveys (see figure 5).

[Figure 5 about here]

Political capability: Citizens have increasingly given a positive assessment of their own political capabilities over the last decade. Positive responses (“strongly agree” or “agree”) to the item “To measure evaluation of political capability we chose one agree-disagree format question: “I think I have the ability to participate in politics” increased from 28% in 2001 to 39% in 2010 (see figure 5).

Political efficacy: To measure evaluation of political efficacy we chose one agree-disagree format question: “People like me don’t have any influence over what the government does.” Political efficacy measures whether citizens believe that are able to influence government decision making. Combining negative responses to the item (“strongly disagree” and disagree,” we find that Taiwanese citizens generally have a low view of their own political efficacy. The item was not included in the 2006 survey, but the results in 2001 (29% giving negative responses) and 2010 (28% giving negative responses) showed similar low levels to the political interest item.
From the ABS items on political involvement, it is clear that practical support for democracy on the behavioral level is still at a low level. Scores for items measuring political interest, political capability, and political efficacy were low, and only the political capability item showed an increase across the decade. However, when we a hard measure of participation in politics – voter turnout – the picture is different. Although turnout in presidential elections has declined somewhat (from 82.69% in 2000, 80.28% in 2004, 76.33% in 2008, and 74.38% in 2012), it is still fairly high when compared with other democracies, especially when one considers that Taiwan does not provide any facility for early, absentee, or proxy voting. Turnout for elections to the Legislative Yuan was also typically around 60%, before jumping to 74.72% in 2012 after the election date was moved to coincide with the presidential election.

This relatively high level of actual political participation but low scores on political interest, political capability, and political efficacy presents a puzzle for researchers. They suggest that while citizens are enthusiastic participants in the democratic process, a deeper sense of civic identity has still yet to develop. They reveal one of the key predicaments of Taiwan’s democratization – a continued wariness among many citizens towards getting more deeply involved in politics.

TWO SUPPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES

How Do Taiwanese Citizens Understand Democracy?

In order to more accurately capture complex attitudes towards democratization, beginning in 2006 the ABS survey asked respondents to choose which mutually exclusive item they regarded as a characteristic of democracy. For the 2010 survey, this battery was expanded and respondents were asked presented with four groups containing a total of four separate statements related to political competition, political freedom, governance, and social justice.  

7 The items in Figure 6 have been rearranged according to category. The response items in the original survey are as follows:
A: “People choose the government leaders in free and fair election,” “People are free to express their political views openly,” “Government does not waste any public money,” “Government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor.”
B: “The legislature has oversight over the government,” “People are free to organize political groups,” “Government provides people with quality public services,” “Basic necessities, like food, clothes and shelter, are provided for all.”
C: “Multiple parties compete fairly in the election,” “Media is free to criticize the things government does,” “Government ensures law and order,” “Government ensures job opportunities for all.”
D: “The court protects the ordinary people from the abuse of government,” “People have the freedom to take
For each group the respondent was asked to select the one statement which he or she regarded as the most essential characteristic of democracy. The results are shown in Figure 6 below.

[Figure 6 about here]

This new battery gives us a great deal of information about how citizens understand democracy. Our initial analysis suggests that governance and social justice understandings of democracy are prevalent in Taiwan, making up a combined total of over 70% of responses to Statement B and Statement C. In addition, the political freedom item was selected by only small minorities on each of the four groups of statements. However, political competition was selected by more than one in four respondents for group A and D. Taiwanese citizens tend to attach more importance to the deliverables of democracy (good governance and social justice) at the expense of key liberal democratic norms (political competition and political freedom). We expect that as democracy becomes more consolidated, the responses to these items will be more balanced. This is an area worthy of attention in the future.

**Performance on Objective Indicators of Democracy: Elite and Organizational Norms and Behaviors**

Due to data availability, this paper has focused on democratic consolidation at the mass level. However, Diamond’s framework is also concerned with norms and behaviors at the elite level. Although we have no directly comparable indicators of consolidation at the elite level, international assessments of democracy from organizations including Polity IV, Freedom House and the World Bank confirm Taiwan’s steady institutional progress toward liberal democracy.

The Polity IV Project reports polity scores by subtracting scores of the autocracy indicator from those of the democracy indicator. The scores of each indicator range from 0 to 10, giving an overall range of -10 to +10. Taiwan’s polity score increased from -7 before the lifting of martial law in 1988 to +7 by 1992, reaching the maximum score of +10 in 2006.\(^8\) Freedom House scores paint a similar picture, with Taiwan reaching a score of 1.5 by 2001, indicating the island’s progression beyond electoral democracy.\(^9\) The World Bank Worldwide Governance indicators measure democratic governance across six dimensions on a range of part in protests and demonstrations,” “Politics is clean and free of corruption,” “People receive state aid if they are unemployed.”

\(^8\) See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

\(^9\) Freedom in the World 2012, see http://www.freedomhouse.org
-2.5 to +2.5. Although these indicators lack comparability over time, Taiwan has achieved positive scores on each dimension since 1996, indicating significant progress in democratic governance.

In short, these expert assessments show the emergence of a successful and stable third wave democracy that compares favorably to other countries in the region. However, despite these positive assessments, there is still considerable cynicism at the mass level about whether democracy can deliver desired outcomes.

**CONCLUSION**

Taiwan is the first culturally Chinese democracy, and provides a possible model for other nondemocratic Chinese societies, most notably mainland China. In addition, Taiwan’s experience confirms the importance of modernization, institutional change, and cultural factors in democratic consolidation. Satori (2009) has pointed out that previous research has focused on the question of “how much democracy” while paying little question to the more fundamental question of “what is democracy.” Applying the Western concept of democracy to non-Western concept involves the problem of “concept stretching” (Sartori 1970) Therefore, the extent to which Western liberal democracy can take root in Taiwan and the form it will take is a theoretically interesting question with implications beyond the island.

In addition, Taiwan is a case of “democratization backward.” The island began with the outer form of democracy (elections) before fully developing the essential elements of the modern state necessary for democracy, including the rule of law, pluralism, an institutionalized civil society, and an accountable government (Rose and Shin 2001). With the fully developed framework of the modern state, the process of democratization remains incomplete and high quality democracy is not possible. Taiwan still has some progress to make in this area.

Finally, more empirical research is needed on how to improve Taiwan’s democracy. Greater civic participation in politics and support across society for liberal democratic freedoms, political rights, limited government, democratic accountability, and the rule of law should change elite behaviors as politicians become aware of the reality that illegal or corrupt practices will be punished by voters. Civil society therefore plays an indispensible role in improving the quality of democracy. A well-developed civil society and active citizen participation in politics can shape the incentives of politicians and political parties, providing effective limitations on the misuse of government power.
REFERENCE


### Table 1 Democratic Consolidation in Mass Attitudes

<table>
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<th>Belief (or Values)</th>
<th>Normative Support</th>
<th>Practical Support</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(indirect)</td>
<td>(direct)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>Preference for democracy</td>
<td>Level of democracy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desire for democracy</td>
<td>Satisfaction of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suitability of democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficacy of democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms (or Institutions)</td>
<td>Support for liberal democratic norms</td>
<td>Trust in political institutions;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>checks and balances</td>
<td>president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the rule of law</td>
<td>executive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social pluralism</td>
<td>legislature</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Detachment from authoritarian</td>
<td>judiciary</td>
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<td></td>
<td>strongman rule</td>
<td>Trust in public institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>single party</td>
<td>political parties</td>
</tr>
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<td>military rule</td>
<td>civil service</td>
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<td>newspapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Behavior</td>
<td>Evaluation of democratic governance</td>
<td>Involvement in politics</td>
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<td>control of corruption</td>
<td>political interest</td>
</tr>
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<td>political capability</td>
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<td>vertical accountability</td>
<td>political efficacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>freedom</td>
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Figure 1  Support for Democracy

Figure 2  Evaluation of Democratic Performance

Table 2  Support for Liberal Democratic Norms

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Checks and balances</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch (Disagree)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>If government is constantly checks by the legislature, if cannot possibly accomplish great things (Disagree)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Rule of law</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law even in order to deal with the situation (Disagree)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if they have to ignore the established procedure (Disagree)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social pluralism</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups (Disagree)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic (Disagree)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
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</table>

Entries are percentage.
Figure 3  Rejection of Nondemocratic Alternatives

Figure 4a  Trust in Political Institutions


Figure 4b  Trust in Public Institutions

Table 3  Evaluation of Democratic Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>change</th>
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<td><strong>Control of corruption</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly anyone or not a lot</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of local officials are corrupt</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly anyone or not a lot</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>of national officials are</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>corrupt</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral competition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties/candidates</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>have equal access to the mass</td>
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<tr>
<td>media during elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elections offer the voters</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>a real choice between</td>
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<tr>
<td>parties/candidates</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td><strong>Vertical accountability</strong></td>
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<td>change the government</td>
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<td>Between elections people</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>have ways of holding</td>
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<tr>
<td>government accountable</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td><strong>Horizontal accountability</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>When the government breaks</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>laws, the legal system can</td>
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<td>do something</td>
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<td>The legislature is capable of</td>
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<td><strong>Freedom</strong></td>
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<td>People can join any</td>
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<tr>
<td>fear</td>
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<td>68</td>
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</table>

Source: ABS Taiwan Survey 2006 and 2010
Figure 5  Involvement in Politics

Figure 6  Essential Characteristics of Democracy

Source: ABS Taiwan 2010