Winner-loser Gap and Democratic Legitimacy

Tse-Min Lin
Associate Professor, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, USA
tml@austin.utexas.edu
&
Chin-En Wu
Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica
chinen@gate.sinica.edu.tw
&
Feng-Yu Lee
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University
fylee323@ntu.edu.tw

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Introduction

In many new democracies, there are significant gaps between the winners and losers of elections. The gaps could include regime legitimacy, popular commitment to popular democracy and satisfaction with democracy, trust in political institutions, and democratic principles. In this paper, we first demonstrate the winner-loser gap across the East Asian countries using three waves of EAB surveys. We then observe the general trends in regime-legitimacy gap and then focus on the third wave to discuss gaps in political trust and democratic values. Comparing the three waves allow us to explore whether the winner-loser gaps shrink over time, especially for the countries that experienced democratic transition in the third-wave democratization.

In addition to demonstrating the winner-loser gap across countries in various dimensions, we also want to know why the gap varies across countries. We examine both political and economic conditions. For the political condition, we examine whether people perceive the election fair and free, and the extent the party competition has a level playing field. Citizens are more likely to accept both the rules and the results of the game if they perceive the election free and fair. For the
economic condition, we examine how perceived equal opportunities mediate the winner-loser gap. One important source of the winner-loser gap is the expectation that the new government is going to enact policies that cater for its supporters but may alienate its opponents. One may reasonably assumes that an economic issue is one of the main social cleavages in most countries. A perceived equal opportunity is likely to ameliorate the anxiety about unfair policies and reduce the gaps in citizens’ political attitudes.

To examine the winner-loser gap, we need to determine who winners are and who losers are. There are two possible ways to do so. We first define winners as those who voted for parties or candidates that won the last national elections, and losers as those whose favored parties or candidate lost the elections. There are many instances where several parties jointly endorse one candidate. In these cases, we define all parties in this camp and their supporters as the winner. The name of the winning and losing parties and the electoral types are listed in the Appendix. The second definition of winners as indicated are those citizens who feel close to the party or parties that win the last election. The winner-loser gap following the two definitions turns out to be quite similar.

China did not hold elections that directly elect the president or National Assembly members. Vietnam does not allow non-communist candidates to run for the parliamentary election until 2011. Cases from the two countries are not included in our discussion. In some other cases, especially in the first two rounds of surveys, we do not have data about respondents’ voting choice, but we do ask respondents' party preferences. This information provides a proxy for vote choice, but it only allows us to observe the political attitudes of those who are close to the ruling party and those who are close to the opposition party. The non-partisan voters are set to be missing. Note that in the third wave, Singapore is the only country that holds national election
but vote choices are not absent. We use party-identification of Singapore respondents as the proxy for winner and loser.

**Winner-Loser Gaps**

**Literature Review**

In his classical work, Easton (1965) distinguishes between diffuse support and specific support. Diffuse support refers to a generalized acceptance of the rule of the political system. The essence is that citizens are willing to accept or tolerate the outputs that the system produces, especially regarding the election outcomes. Specific support refers to the generalized support for specific political actors. It is mainly based on the system outputs and therefore are more susceptible to short-term changes in system output. In the short run, entrenched diffuse support among citizens can weather the short-term system output (Anderson et al. 2005). Enduring disappointment with the system output, however, may weaken popular support for the system (Dalton 2004). Norris (1999) later distinguished regime support, regime satisfaction, and trust in political institutions. Regime principle is about the agreement with the idea that democracy is the best form of government. Regime satisfaction examines how democracy actually functions in the eyes of citizens.

Although the level of regime support is crucial for the stability of the system, an equally important dimension is the variance of attitudes among citizens. A society highly divided in terms of democratic support is not healthy. The loser’s consent to the election outcome is critical to stability of democracy. Absence of the commitment may lead to renege from democratic principles and support for government turnover that do not follow democratic procedures (Nadeau and Blais 1993; Anderson et al. 2005; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). On the other hand, the winners may tend to
overlook any abuse of power by the ruling party, resulting in the erosion of
democratic institutions (Moehler 2009). A significant winner-lose gap also makes
cooperation between parties difficult (Sani and Sartori 1993).

One important attribute of the attitude discrepancy is the winners and losers of
election. Under democracies, winners and losers can be defined by their vote choices
or party identification. The losers tend to express less confidence in the governments
(Anderson and LoTempio 2002) and be disappointed with the way democracy works
and even indicate less support for democracy (Anderson and Tverdova 2001). Relying
on Lijpart’s consensus and majority concept, Anderson and Guillory (1997) find that
winner-loser gaps are smaller when a political system approaches the consensual
model because of power sharing. Some studies argue that the status of election
winners and losers ought to be considered as dynamic rather than one-shot, since
past winning experience can mediate the pain of current election lose (Moehler and
presidential and Congressional elections in the U.S. and find that people vote for both
presidential and congressional losers have the lowest trust in government. Moehler
and Lindberg (2009) find that whether the process of election is peaceful and whether
it is free and fair are not associated with the level of polarization in public attitudes
about democratic legitimacy. Jou (2009) who studies East Asia find that although the
losers are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy, they are equally
committed to democracy.

Regime Legitimacy

As seen in Figure 1, across the region voters who vote for the winning parties are
more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works. Japan has one of the
smallest gaps, which is likely to be associated with the longer history of democratic
experience. In Thailand, the winner-loser gap does not exist. The main reason is that
the winning party is outlawed by the constitutional court one year after the election.
The opposition party controls the ruling power. Under this situation, it becomes
difficult to identify who is truly the winner.

Several countries with hybrid political regimes tend to exhibit a very significant
winner-loser gap. The most significant cases include Cambodia, Malaysia, and Hong
Kong, and to a lesser extent Singapore. In these countries, party competition faces an
unlevel playing field which often gives the ruling party a disproportionate advantage.
These countries are often characterized by distorted electoral formulas that create
huge vote-seat disproportionality, media controlled by the state, election frauds, and
the abuse of state power that intimidates the opposition candidates. Because of this
reason, the vote shares of the opposition parties are often much smaller than the ruling
parties. The voter and leaders of the opposition parties are hence very upset about the
functioning of democratic systems, resulting in a significant winner-loser gap.

A huge gap is usually an unhealthy sign because the losers do not give their consent to the overall practices and the rule of the game. In the hybrid regime, for example, the losers are disappointed with the practices of the system not only because losing the election but also about the unfair rules of the game. That is why they are particularly unhappy about the practices of democracy. However, they are actually not against democratic principles; instead, they yearn for a full-fledged democracy. The winner-loser gap in these countries does not pose a threat to democracy; instead, it denotes a firm voice that demands democratic reforms.

We can also use party identification as the distinction between winners and losers. Winners are defined as those citizens who feel close to the party or parties that won the last election. As seen in Figure 2, the winners have the highest levels of satisfaction, the losers are satisfied the least, and respondents who do not feel close to any party are in between.

Figure 2 Satisfaction with the Way Democracy

Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3
We can compare three waves of satisfaction gap by using vote choice as the definition of winners and losers. We do not analyze the countries that are included only in the third wave. As Figure 3 demonstrates, except for Thailand, in most countries, the satisfaction gaps do not exhibit a shrinking trend. Thailand has a unique situation where the losing and winning parties are switched after the election, making the trend difficult to interpret. Overall, we do not witness a smaller satisfaction gap between the winners and the losers over the course of the three surveys. We can also use respondents’ party identification as the definition of winners and losers. We still do not see a clear trend of shrinking gap. This is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 3 Changes in Democratic Satisfaction Gap, Vote Choice

Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3
As for the popular support for democracy, while the overall gap is smaller we are still able to identify some pattern. As shown in Figure 5, in most countries, the winners do not express higher support for democracy than the losers. This suggests that the public's satisfaction level do not translate into support for democracy. This is a healthy sign for the stability of democracies in this region in that the winners do not appreciate the system more and the losers do not resent the system more. Only in Mongolia the winners are more likely to support for democracy.
In Taiwan, South Korea, and several hybrid regimes, especially Hong Kong, the winners even endorse democracy less. As indicated, in hybrid political regimes the opposition parties face an unlevel playing field that gives the ruling party a disproportionate advantage. The voters of the opposition party demand changes in the current system and are more likely to be sincerely committed to democracy than the winners. Note that democracy could mean different things to different people under hybrid regimes. Some people may refer to the Western-style democracy while others may refer to their current regime as democracy. Thus, agreeing the idea that democracy is the best form of government may imply two different things: demanding democratic reforms or maintaining the status quo. For example, the legislative council election in Hong Kong includes 35 seats elected by popular vote in geographical constituencies and 35 seats elected by businessmen and professionals groups in functional constituencies. The Pro-Beijing Camp in the election comprise of mainly the
business elites who can secure majority seats by seizing almost all the occupational seats. The Pro-Establishment Camp wins majority of popular votes in geographical constituencies but are unable to secure the occupational seats. The pro-Beijing Camp in general prefers the institutional status quo.

The winners in South Korea and Taiwan are mainly the voters who support Grand National Party and KMT and the smaller parties aligning with them. Those two parties are the same party that rule South Korea and Taiwan before democratic transition. The political stability and economic prosperity under the authoritarian rule induce a strong sense of authoritarian nostalgia among many Koreans and Taiwanese even until today, especially within the voters of the two center-right parties. This is essentially the reason that winners of the election turn out to endorse democracy less. In other new East Asian countries the economic records under authoritarian regimes are mixed or poor, therefore the nostalgia effect is relatively weak. On the other hand, democracy in Japan has decades of history. The winner-loser gap of democratic support is comparatively smaller.

We can also compare three waves of democratic-commitment gap. We first use vote choice as the definition of winners and losers, which is shown in Figure 6. We also exclude the countries that are included only in the third wave. Most of the hybrid regimes are not included in the first or second waves of surveys. We are not able to see the trend in these countries. Overall, we do not witness a smaller commitment gap between the winners and the losers over the course of the three surveys. But the data show that the little-tigers anomaly, i.e., winners being less committed to democracy, is present only in the third wave survey. In South Korea and Taiwan, the two conservative parties lost two consecutive elections over the course of the first two surveys. The national elections before the third wave survey bring the two conservative parties back to the governments.
This is why the negative winner-loser gap occurs in the third wave surveys. We can also use party as the definition of winner and loser, which is shown in Figure 7. We do not see a clear trend of shrinking satisfaction gap.

**Figure 6 Changes in Democratic Support Gap, Vote Choice**

![Graph showing changes in democratic support gap related to vote choice across waves.]

Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

**Figure 7 Changes in Democratic Support Gap, Party ID**

![Graph showing changes in democratic support gap related to party ID across waves.]

Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3
Trust in Institutions

The winner-loser gap also appears in people's trust in political institutions. As seen in Figure 8, the loser's trust in national government is significantly lower in most East Asian countries. The gap in Japan is relatively smaller, likely because the reason that Japan has a longer history of democracy. For the same reason mentioned above, the trust gap in Thailand is much smaller. Among the new democracies, Indonesia also has a smaller trust gap. This is likely due to the president’s high popularity among all sectors of the society.

The public trust in president or prime minister exhibits a significant winner-loser gap, as seen in Figure 9. Hong Kong stands out as an important case where the voters of the winning party express a much higher trust in the chief executive and national government than the voters of the opposite. The situation reflects that a significant chunk of Hong Kongese distrust the chief executive and national
Democratic Principles

The winners and losers of elections also differ in their attitudes toward some democratic principles, especially the idea of limited government. In a question the EAB asked "government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions". In most countries, as reported in Figure 10, the winners are less inclined to reject this idea. Especially among the hybrid regimes, the voters of the opposition parties strongly oppose such idea. In addition, we also find that in many countries, especially in Hong Kong and Malaysia, the losers are more likely to oppose the idea that letting a morally upright political leader to decide everything. The pattern in reported in Figure 11.
Figure 10 Unconditionally Follow Government Leaders

Figure 11 Morally upright political leaders decide everything

Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

Next, about checking power of the legislature, the winners and losers of elections also have distinctive perspectives. In a question ABS asked respondents
their views about the following statement: “if the government is constantly checked, monitored or supervised, by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.” As reported in Figure 12, the winners in general do not endorse the idea of strong legislative oversight, while the losers favor the opposite. A strong parliament may restrain the ability of the government to act, annoying the winners. In sum, compared to the winners, the losers of the election in general prefer more constrains on the executive branches and strong overseeing power of the legislature.

In another EAB question, the statement is: “the government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.” As seen in Figure 13, in general, the attitudinal difference is not large or significant in most countries. It suggests that both winners and losers agree that civil liberty is the domain that government should not intervene. Only in Hong Kong, the losers strongly reject such idea. This is because that many citizens concern the potential

![Figure 12 Strong Legislative Oversight is bad](image-url)
intervention in the exercise of civil liberty by the government power over the past few years. One notable example is the introduction of National Security Act.

![Figure 13 Governments Decide Which Idea to Be Circulated](image)

Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

The Factors That Mediate the Winner-loser gap

Level Playing Field and Legislature Oversight

Next, we examine how people perceive the fairness and free of the recent national election. A level playing field boost the legitimacy of the election result, inducing the losers to be more willing to accept the election results, have greater satisfaction with the way democracy works, and agree to the rule of the game under democracy.

First we examine the role of perceived fairness of elections. In a question ABS asked: how free and fair would you say the last national election was? A perceived free and fair election can definitely increase the legitimacy of the winning side. This is likely to alleviate the discontent of the losers. As shown in Figure 14, we witness a smaller winner-loser gap among voters who perceived the election as free and fair in
countries like in Mongolia, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Cambodia, and Malaysia. Among these countries, the mediating effect of perceived fairness of election is even more clear in the hybrid regimes. Since the fairness of elections are seriously questioned and election fraud is a prevalent issue in many hybrid regimes, the perceived fairness clearly mediate how winners and losers view the democracy.

As a related issue, we look at the role of mass media as the information it selects and distributes can decisively affect electoral results. As shown in Figure 15, in several countries, the winner-loser gap is smaller among respondents who agree that political parties or candidates in their countries have equal access to the mass media during the election period. These countries include South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand. However, the mediating effect of equal access to mass media is smaller compared to the perceived fairness of election.

![Figure 14 Election Free and Fair](source: Asian Barometer Wave 3)
Next, we examine the role of legislature oversight. The respondents who believe that the legislature is capable of keeping government leaders in check have smaller winner-loser gap. The idea is simple. Once the losers believe that the executive power of the winning party will be constantly checked by the parliament, then the probability that the ruling party will abuse their power decreases. The pain of losing election will bother them less. As shown in Figure 16, the relationship applies to most of the countries in this region, such as Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Cambodia, and Malaysia.¹

¹ In addition, in countries where their citizens believe that between elections, they have no ways to hold governments responsible for their actions have bigger winner-loser gaps. Examples include Cambodia and Malaysia.
Income Levels and Equal Opportunity

Next, we examine the mediating effect of economic factors including income levels and perceived equal opportunities. Beginning with household income, it is assumed that the rich could exert considerable influence on decision-making no matter which party holds the power. Therefore, the winner-loser gap is going to be much smaller among the high-income citizens. Considering another factor, this is not necessarily the case. The rich are equally concerned about the economic policies such as income redistribution and regulations that different parties propose. The winner-loser gap is not necessarily smaller within the wealthy countries.

Empirically, Figure 17 shows that the winner-lose gap is the largest among the highest income quintile in Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Cambodia. Philippine also have a significant gap but the numbers of losers are too small, so we exclude it from our discussion. The large gap is likely because in these countries the richest group are involved in election in terms of making campaign contribution,
mobilizing others to vote, and following election news. In other words, they have a high stake, either material or emotional, in the election. This is essentially the reason the winner-loser gap is the highest in the wealthy group.

One concern of the losers is that the government may allocate resource unfairly to favor its own supports, which in turn enlarge income inequality and endanger the equality of opportunities. However, if the public perceives that the rich and the poor are treated equally in the society, then an important element of equal opportunity is preserved. If this preservation is assured, then economic policy changes due to party turnover would be small. In other words, they do not need to worry too much about who is in power. As seen in Figure 18, in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Cambodia, respondents who perceived that rich and poor people are treated equally by the government have smaller satisfaction gap. In other words, the perceived equality of opportunity mediates the winner loser gap. ²

² In a related question, ABS asks whether all citizens from different ethnic communities in Country X are treated equally by the government. We find that in Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Cambodia, the
The mediating factors could include the country-level factors, for example, the length of democracy, the margin of the election, disproportionality, and the constitutional institutions. The idea is that larger electoral margin, lower disproportionality of the election, and consensual model are likely to reduce winner-loser gap in a country. Empirically, these factors are, however, not significantly associated with winner-loser gap. In ABS, the total number of countries with effective national election is eleven only. It renders the empirical test of the country-level factors rather difficult. A cross-regions comparison may be warranted.

Winner-loser gaps do shrink among people who perceive all ethnic groups enjoy the equality before the law. In Malaysia and Philippine, the stories are different, though. The winners who believe that all ethnic groups are treated equally by the government perceive the system as fair, enabling them to be very satisfied with the way democracy works. In contrast, losers who share the same belief about ethnic equality are still disappointed with the election results. A significant winner-loser gap are therefore created.
References


## Vote Choice, Wave 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Election</th>
<th>Winner(=1)</th>
<th>Loser(=0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Hong Kong</td>
<td>Did not ask respondents’ vote choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. China</td>
<td>No general elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Philippines</td>
<td>Did not ask respondents’ vote choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Taiwan, 2000 Presidential Election</td>
<td>Chen Shui-bian</td>
<td>James Soong, Lien Chan, Hsu Hsin-liang, Lee Ao</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Phak Chat Pattana(National Development Party) joined the coalition government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in December 2001. However, the first wave of Asian Barometer Survey in Thailand was conducted in October-November 2001 when Phak Chat Pattana was still an opposition party, so it is included in the loser list.

## Vote Choice, Wave 2

<table>
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<th>Country and Election</th>
<th>Winner(=1)</th>
<th>Loser(=0)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Hong Kong</td>
<td>Did not ask respondents’ vote choice</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 3. Korea  
2004 National Assembly Election | Uri Party | Grand National Party, Democratic Party, Democratic Labor Party, United Liberal Democrats |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. China</td>
<td>No general election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5. Mongolia  
2005 Presidential Election | Nambaryn Enkhbayar | M. Enhsaikhan, B. Jargalsaikhan, B. Erdenebat                                   |
| 6. Philippines  
2004 Presidential Election | Maria Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo | Fernando Poe, Jr., Panfilo Lacson, Raul Roco, Eddie Villanueva                  |
| 7. Taiwan  
2004 Presidential Election | Chen Shui-bian | Lien Chan                                                                        |
| 8. Thailand  
2006 House of Representatives Election* | Thai Rak Thai | “Vote for no vote”, “Non-valid vote”, other parties                               |
| 9. Indonesia  
2004.04 People's Representative Council Election | Democrat Party, Golkar, PBB, PKPI, PBR | PDI-P, PAN, PKB, PKS, PDP, PKPB, PNIM, PPDI…etc.                                |
| 9.1 Indonesia  
2004.07 Presidential Election 1st round | Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (He won the first round with 33% of the vote.) | Megawati Sukarnoputri, Wiranto, Amien Rais, Hamzah Haz                           |
| 9.2 Indonesia  
2004.09 Presidential Election 2nd round | Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono | Megawati Sukarnoputri                                                             |
| 10. Singapore                  | Did not ask respondents’ vote choice     |                                                                                  |
| 11. Vietnam                    | Did not ask respondents’ vote choice     |                                                                                  |
| 12. Cambodia                   | Did not ask respondents’ vote choice     |                                                                                  |
| 13. Malaysia  
2004 House of Representatives election | Barisan Nasional : UMNO, MCA, MIC, Gerakan, PBS, PBB, SUPP | Barisan Alternatif: PAS, PKR left the coalition: DAP                             |

*Due to the opposition boycott of the election, the respondents who answered “vote for no vote” or “non-valid vote” are seen as the supporters of the opposition political parties.
## Vote Choice, Wave 3

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country and Election</th>
<th>Winner(=1)</th>
<th>Loser(=0)</th>
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<tr>
<td>4. China</td>
<td>No general election</td>
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<td>5. Mongolia 2009 Presidential Election</td>
<td>Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj</td>
<td>Nambaryn Enkhbayar</td>
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<td>6. Philippines 2004 Presidential Election</td>
<td>Maria Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo</td>
<td>Fernando Poe, Jr., Panfilo Lacson, Raul Roco, Eddie Villanueva</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Taiwan 2008 Presidential Election</td>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou</td>
<td>Hsieh Chang-ting</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Thailand 2007 House of Representatives election **</td>
<td>Phak Palang Prachachon, Phak Pracharat, Phak Chart Thai, Phak Pua Paendin, Phak Matchima Thippathai</td>
<td>Phak Prachatipat(Democrat Party), Phak Bhum Jai Thai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Singapore</td>
<td>Did not ask respondents’ vote choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Vietnam</td>
<td>Did not ask respondents’ vote choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 12. Cambodia  
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 13. Malaysia  
2008 House of Representatives election | Barisan Nasional: UMNO, MCA, MIC, Gerakan, PBS, PBB, SUPP | Barisan Rakyat (People's Front): PAS, PKR, DAP quit BN: SAPP, SNAP |

*Before the Social Democratic Party left the ruling coalition in May 2010, it had been a ruling party for several months since the 30 August 2009 Japanese House of Representatives election, so it is still classified as a member of winner camp.

**Some Thai respondents answered “Phak Thai rak Thai” or “Phak Puea Thai” which had been dissolved or not formed yet in the 2007 Thai general election. Due to the same political stance, the respondents who answered “Phak Thai rak Thai” or “Phak Puea Thai” are classified into the winner camp as the respondents who answered “Phak Palang Prachachon (People's Power Party)”.

***The coalitions were actually formed after the People's Representative Council Election in order to nominate candidates for President and Vice President. The winner/loser camps are classified based on the result of the presidential election held in July 2009.