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Confucian Values and Conception of Democracy: An Empirical Study of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong

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Confucian Values and Conception of Democracy: An Empirical Study of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong

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Confucian Values and Conceptions of Democracy: An Empirical Study of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong

Over the last half-century in the West, democracy, and liberty have merged. But today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart across the globe. Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not.

--Fareed Zakaria

I. Introduction

The overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 triggered the third world-wide wave of democratization. Originating in Southern Europe the wave spread to Latin America and Asia in the 1980s reaching Eastern Europe and most of Africa in the 1990s. Observing that countries in Eastern Europe and the Third World filled the ideological vacuum following the collapse of the old regime with liberal democracy, rather than undemocratic alternatives, liberals concluded, over-optimistically as later events would prove, that liberal democratic regimes are universally recognized as the only legitimate regimes for modern societies. Francis Fukuyama even predicted at one point the “end of history” as the era of ideological bipolarity passes; that in the absence of other ideologies, not only have Western liberal democratic regimes emerged as the dominant form of human organization, but we also cannot envisage

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any future alternative.4

Nevertheless, the universality of democratic legitimacy is not to be taken for
granted, as the third wave of democratization is not a significant trend in East Asia.5
The successful promotion of economic development combined with nationalism has
led some leaders of non-democratic countries in East Asia to challenge the Western
notion of basic human rights and question whether further democratization is
necessary or desirable. Thus, they advocate “Asian values,” or neo-authoritarianism,
resisting the liberal democratic ideas of Western society. Publicly, East Asian
political leaders claim that it is not necessary for developing countries to follow the
model of Western development; on the contrary, there is an alternative Asian model of
political economic development.6 Add to this East-West contrast Samuel P.
Huntington’s thesis that post-Cold war conflict will increasingly be the result of
different cultures instead of ideologically or economically derived, and it is clear that
the conflict over development and democratization affects the peace and order of the
future international community.

Will Asian values thwart the current wave of global democratization? First,
Amartya Sen argues that democracy is a cosmopolitan value. It is inappropriate for
influential political figures in East Asia to deliberately advocate Asian values or an
Asian development model as unsuitable for democratic development. Instead, their
purpose is merely to counteract increasing domestic pressures for democratic reform

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Pp 154-165.
and to re-label their undemocratic regimes “democratic.” Second, in several East Asian countries, especially Taiwan, South Korea, The Philippines, and Thailand, rapid economic growth altered other aspects of society; in particular marketization, social mobility, improved education standards, and the flattening of hierarchical power structures. These are the initial successes of democratic transformation. Clearly, traditional cultural elements do not prevent some East Asian countries from experiencing democratic transformations. However, as L. H. M. Lin and Chih-yu Shih point out, “Confucianism with a liberal face” is a more accurate description of East Asian democratization. These processes conflict with traditional social value systems in East Asia. Therefore, the outcome of East Asian democratization is open-ended; currently it is neither liberal nor Confucian. Finally, is there a distinctive set of Asian values? Although much of the literature trend to view Asian values as those beliefs and norms the people of Confucian East Asian countries hold in common, the cultural heterogeneity of Asian makes it impossible to cluster all the Asian countries together and assign it a collective identity. It is much safer to talk about Confucian values, Buddhist values, etc.

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8 According to O’Donnell, the third wave democratization must have two transition: the first is toward democratic government(or democratic transition), the others is toward democratic regime(or democratic consolidation). See Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes”, in Scott Mainwarin, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela(eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 18.
11 Donald K. Emmerson, "Singapore and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate," (Journal of Democracy), vol. 6,
Therefore, the most important questions are what effects do Confucian elements have on the next-stage political transformation, namely, consolidating democracy, in East Asian new democracies? How does traditional Confucianism interact with democratization in East Asian societies? Moreover, will Confucian values become obstacles to the development of democratic orientation? Can liberal democracy take root in East Asian? The purpose of this paper is to understand how elements of the traditional value system in the three culturally Chinese societies interact with people’s perception of democracy in the context of rapid socio-economic transformation and regime transition. We base our empirical analysis on a unique trilateral survey that was implemented in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan under a common framework around 2001-2002.

In the next section of this paper, we briefly review three sets of theory that attempt to explain how Confucian values might complicate democratic development in East Asia. In the following section we develop indices for measuring Confucian values and tapping into people’s conception of democracy and report the empirical distribution across the three societies. In the fourth section we employ multivariate analysis to uncover the causal structural relationship between Confucian values and democratic understanding.

II. Three Theoretical Perspectives

There are three main theoretical perspectives of how Confucian value system might interact with modernization and democratization: they are discussed separately under the labels of modernization, cultural relativists, and communitarianism.

Modernization Perspective

Modernizationists believe that the gap between Eastern and Western cultures will eventually disappear through the processes of global modernization and democratization. They also believe that liberal democratic regimes will replace other forms of political regimes and in turn become the best and only option. Francis Fukuyama argues that any changes in political institutions (the upper structure) will not by any means damage the integrated Confucian social order (the lower structure). Confucian culture can be combined with authoritarianism or semi-authoritarianism, for example Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore; or it can be combined with democratic regimes, such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Furthermore, Fukuyama argues that although Confucianism does not value individualism, it does value education, and mutual tolerance, all of which can be readily combined with democratic regimes. Therefore, Fukuyama proposes that the reason some East Asian countries will become democratic and others authoritarian lies in a crucial factor—the degree of modernization. Increasingly, research on democratization in East Asian countries demonstrates that modernization and industrialization assist the development of democracy. Robert A. Scalapino supports the modernizationists with similar reasoning. The development of East Asian economies, he argues, has led to a flattening of social structures and high social mobilization, all of which are beneficial to democratic development. In a nutshell, Confucian values either pose no obstacle to democratic development; or they do not matter under the overwhelming

transformative forces of modernization.

Many advocates of democracy remain quite optimistic about the future of democracy in East Asia. Marc Plattner suggests although the essentials of liberal thought in the East Asian third-wave democracies are explicitly weak, liberalism will continue to strengthen as the third wave expands. In contrast, the anti-liberal cultural tradition will wane.\textsuperscript{16} In a similar vein, Gerald Curtis argues that civic culture in traditional East Asian society is not solid, as democratization proceeds in this region, it will rapidly cultivate a civic culture that will benefit democratic stability in East Asia.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Cultural Relativists}

People who adhere to cultural relativism argue that the East Asia has vivid paternalistic power and superior-inferior relations, which will never disappear with the modernization of the social economy.\textsuperscript{18} In contrast, rapid social economic shifts will result in an individual sense of insecurity, creating a new form of power-dependency.\textsuperscript{19} In addition, Huntington argues that Confucianism values group interests greater than individual interests, political authority more than individual freedoms, and social responsibility over individual rights. Meanwhile, Confucian society lacks traditions that guard against the consolidation of national power, and thus the concept of individual rights has never existed. Essentially, Confucian thought encourages social harmony and cooperation, avoids conflict,

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{16}] Marc F. Plattner, "From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy," \textit{(Journal of Democracy)}, vol. 10, no.3 (1999), pp 130-3.
\end{itemize}
values the attainment of social order and maintains hierarchical social structures. More importantly, Confucian thought regards society and the country as identical, and thus leaves no space for autonomous social groups. These characteristics of traditional East Asian culture will not assist the development of democracy in the region.²⁰

Fareed Zakaria, the executive editor of Foreign Affairs, proposes that even though East Asian countries can undergo a democratic transformation, democracy still does not seem to lead to constitutional liberalism.²¹ Instead, third-wave democracies in this region will maintain their essentially authoritarian illiberal political culture, and not one of Western liberal democracy.

What is the essence of illiberal political culture? Daniel A. Bell proposes that this culture has three characteristics: the non-neutral state, techno-paternalism, and managed public space and dependent civil society. Where traditional Western liberalism values the common right of the people to choose what kind of policy is the best for themselves, in a non-neutral state, the ruler speculates on which policies are necessary for the people; and as a result, attempts to intervene in any aspects of people’s lives for the ruler’s own reasons. Under techno-paternalism, the illiberal state develops technical bureaucracies for the promotion of rationality and law. Through these instruments the rulers manage the developing country in a similar manner to a firm. When the public space is managed by the state, civil society is dependent upon the state, leaving little space for the development of civil society.²²

Communitarianism

The two perspectives reviewed above accept Western liberal democracy as “the model” when they evaluate democratic prospect of East Asia. The communitarian approach challenges the liberal framework. It embraces democracy but conceptualizes democracy in a fundamentally different way from liberalism. First of all, a communitarian notion of the role of the state deviates from the liberal tradition. According to the latter, the existence of the state is founded upon the social contract and individual values, and thus the aim of the state is to pursue and protect basic individual political rights. At the same time, the state becomes meaningless if it loses its role as a protector of individual rights and freedom. In contrast, communitarianism argues that society dwells within a collective value system and claims that the fulfillment of collective goals is a higher priority than individual interests. Thus society values communal interests over those of individual citizens. The State exists for itself and the communal interest and asks each citizen to sacrifice to meet the collective goal. Next, communitarianism tends to downplay party politics as they view party politics to be merely an institutional arrangement for a few politicians to pursue political power. Finally, communitarians are not interested in the “distribution of power” and liberal “checks and balances,” and instead desire high political participation from members of community.  

Recently communitarians have recognized that Confucian culture values deference to authority, communitarian values, and cooperation, while also emphasizing education, self-discipline and diligence, and respecting the established order, the state, and older generations. These cultural characteristics are similar to

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those advocated by followers of communitarianism as both downplay the relative importance of individualism. Hence, traditional Confucianism is not necessarily any more authoritarian than communitarian; however, neither is it suitable for developing "notions of human rights" nor "the principles of democracy." In reality, there are a number of ideas in Confucian thought, for example "people as the foundation" and "for the people," that are similar to the notion of procedural democracy in Western society. As a result, communitarians suggest that Confucian culture and Asian values will provide a base from which to reinterpret the substantive definition of democracy. Thus, the product of the third wave of democratization in East Asia will be similar to communitarian democracy, transcending the "liberal democracy" of the West.

This paper aims to examine the three theoretical perspectives above. If the modernization perspective is correct, traditional Confucian values will decline significantly and the concept of liberal democratic value will become more prevalent through improved educational standards and generational replacement. However, if the perspective of cultural relativism is accurate, then the socializing effect of modernization and the experience of democratization on the formation of the concept of liberal democracy will be attenuated by the influence of traditional values. Finally, if the communitarian perspective is valid, the citizens under the influence of Confucian values are more likely to acquire a hybrid notion of democracy that

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combines communitarian orientation with the standard liberal democratic view.

III. Research Design and Measurement

Our research involves political systems of significantly different characteristics and divergent trajectories of regime evolution. The socialist regime in Mainland China is characterized by a single-party rule, a transitional economy, and glaring regional disparity in socio-economic development. Taiwan is a relatively open, increasingly competitive polity with a sizable middle class and an export-oriented market economy. Hong Kong is a system dominated by administrative and business elite and its democratization process was truncated during its transition from a former British colony to an autonomous administration region of the PRC. It is the most open economy in the world and most modernized among three Chinese societies, but it also witnesses a growing income gap between the lower and the upper class.

The great diversity in their macro-level socio-political characteristics allow us to explore the effects of system-level attributes, especially that of level of modernization and nature of political regime upon citizens’ conception of democracy before we compare the structural relationship among popular conception of democracy, Confucian values and socio-economic background variables at individual level.

Furthermore, our sampling design for Mainland China enables us to divide the nation-wide survey into two sub-samples: one for the urban residents (with urban household registration) and the other for rural residents. The advantage of doing this is that we can more clearly decipher the influence of the forces modernization while holding the political system and cultural legacy constant.

The empirical data we employ in this paper were collected under the auspice of a
region-wide comparative survey project, known as East Asia Barometer. Under its auspices, comparable surveys were administered across eight East Asian political system during between 2001 and 2002. The trilateral comparison among Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong was designed both as a sub-project of the larger regional survey as well as the sequel to our earlier trilateral survey that administered comparable questionnaire in the three culturally Chinese societies during 1993-1994. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an explanatory note on the survey methodology.

Measuring Confucian Values

Based on the classification developed by Weiming Tu, Francis Fukuyama divides Confucian thoughts into two categories: political Confucianism and Confucian personal ethics. Political Confucianism emphasizes Imperial and gentry power, which together define a ruling social hierarchy as the upper structure of society. On the other hand, Confucian personal ethics stress family values and a system of personal ethics; this is the true essence of Confucian culture. The Confucian personal ethic states that it is imperative to obey family elders. It also stresses that the ultimate objective of one’s personal behavior is honoring the ancestors. In order to not humiliate family members, it is necessary to take on the responsibility of “procreation.” In one’s social life it is also necessary to respect the opinions older generation and educated people, and by doing so a harmonious and well-ordered society is achieved.

In our survey there are six questions corresponding to most, if not all, of the aspects of personal ethics identified. Each question was design around a four-point scale, ranging from “highly disagree”, “disagree” “agree” and “strong agree”. For the sake of statistical analysis, the four response categories are given numerical
values: “highly disagree” for -1.5 points, “disagree” for -0.5 points, “agree” for 0.5 points, “highly agree” for 1.5 points. This conversion allows us to construct a composite index that approximated an interval variable tapping the lingering the influence of traditional Confucian ethnic observed at the individual level. The higher the average scores, the more traditionally oriented. The lower the average scores, the less traditionally oriented.

In Table 1, we compare the mean scores and standard deviations of the six indicators across four samples, the urban region of Mainland China, the rural region of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong as well as the statistics of our 1993 surveys with that of the 2001-2002 surveys. In terms of level of modernization, Hong Kong is clearly the most advanced by any measure among the four, Taiwan the second, urban China the third, and rural China the least. On the hand, in terms of degree of democratization, Taiwan is the most democratic. Hong Kong is lagging behind by quite a wide margin and Mainland China even way behind. Between rural China and urban China there is no significant difference except that grassroots election has been implemented in most part of rural China during the last decade.

Table 1 show that, in terms of macro-level pattern, the six indicators for measuring different aspects of Confucian ethnics are related to the level of modernization of the four localities. But there is not corresponding patterns between the level of Confucian values and degree of democratization. More significantly, this general observation applies to both our 1993 and 2001-2002 data. For instance, for our 1993 data, the average score of the six indicators among residents in rural China is 0.1057. It is followed by -0.0223 for residents in urban China, -0.0625 for Taiwan, and -0.1036 for Hong Kong (on the last row of Table One). This means on average people living in rural China is most traditionally oriented in terms of adherence to Confucian
ethnics while the people in Hong Kong show the strongest detachment from Confucian values. The rank order of the four average scores matches that of their respective degree of modernization perfectly. Our 2001-2002 surveys show almost identical pattern. In 2002, people living in rural China are on average most traditionally oriented, followed by urban China, Taiwan, and then Hong Kong being the least Confucian. Their average scores were 0.1240, -0.0993, -.1294, and -.1485 respectively. At the same time, we should point out that on a -1.5 to +1.5 scale, the differences among the four groups are significant but not very substantial. The elements of similarity coexist with elements of dissimilarity, suggesting the potent influence of their common cultural heritage.

[Table 1 about here]

To substantiate our claim that the six indicators are the manifestation of the same latent construct, we perform some standard psychometric test on our battery of Confucian value-orientation. We apply factor analysis (using the Direct Oblimin method) to the six-item battery across the four groups. As shown in Table 2, only one factor can be meaningfully extracted out of the responses to the six questions for all four samples. In other words, regardless of whether they are mainland Chinese villagers or residents in the most cosmopolitan part of China, i.e., Hong Kong, the value orientations of the people in the three culturally Chinese societies conform to the same factor structure. This provides a very strong evidence of the robustness of our measurement.

[Table 2 about here]

**Popular Conception of Democracy**

The starting point of our causal analysis concerns the peoples’ conception of
“democracy,” a problematic issue that has been taken for granted by most students of democratization. We don’t think this is an issue that can be assumed away; otherwise, our analysis about people’s attitudes and orientations toward “democracy” could be as fragile as a house of cards. In order to find out what kind of perception that the ordinary people hold about “democracy,” we employed the following open-ended question: “To you, what does ‘democracy’ mean?” To this question, respondents were encouraged to give up to three verbal answers. After we recorded all the answers, we developed a very extensive coding scheme to organize the messy data into some workable form. In Appendix 2, we provide the coding scheme that we developed for Taiwan respondents. Similar schemes were applied to the Hong Kong survey and Mainland China survey data.

The conceived vision in the West assumes that democracy always means “liberal democracy,” a political system characterized not only by popular accountability and public contestation through free and fair elections but also by rule of law, separation of power, and the protection of basic freedom of speech, assembly and religion, and private property rights. But rarely did political scientists actually take the effort to find out if popular understanding of “democracy” conforms to this classical “liberal democracy” formulation. It is a heroic assumption that most citizens in established democracy acquire a textbook-like understanding of what democracy means, and even more so when it comes to countries where living experiences under democratic regime are either very recent ones or virtually non-existent. Table 3 shows a distribution of different types of answers that people gave to this open-ended question in three Chinese societies. Essentially we condensed the various verbal answers down to nine substantive categories. Please refer to Part A of Appendix 3 for our rule

for data reduction. Out of the nine categories in Taiwan, 38.6% of the people define “democracy” in terms of some “communitarian notion”, 34.7% of our respondents understand “democracy” as “freedom and liberty;” 15.0% of them understand “democracy” as “political rights, institutions and process;” 11.4% of them defines “democracy” in generic and/or populist terms, and 15.8% of respondents expressed “don’t know” or gave no response to the question. In Hong Kong, 48.0% of our respondents understand “democracy” as “freedom and liberty;” 10.2% of them understand “democracy” as “political rights, institutions and process;” 9% of our respondents understand “democracy” as “social equality and justice;” and 19.9% of them expressed “don’t know” or gave no response to the question.

In urban China, 34.5% of respondents understand “democracy” as “freedom and liberty;” 30.8% of the people defined “democracy” in some “communitarian notions” 18.3% of our respondents understand “democracy” in generic and/or populist terms, 16.4% of them understand “democracy” as “political rights, institutions and process;” 21.5% of the people expressed “don’t know” or gave no response to the question, and a large portion of their answers (37.7%) are not relevant to the question and do not fall into any of the nine substantive categories. In rural China, half (50.7%) of our respondents were not able to give an answer or simply replied “Don’t Know”. Next, 15.5% of our respondents understand “democracy” as “freedom and liberty;” 14.6% of the people defined “democracy” with some “communitarian notions”, 11.6% of them understand “democracy” as “political rights, institutions, and process”, and 10.9% of respondents understand “democracy” in generic and/or populist terms.

The overall pattern of the distribution is quite self-explanatory. First, for residents of rural China lower average level of education and fewer accesses to

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27 Because our respondents were encouraged to give up to three answers, many of them actually gave more than one answers. Therefore the accumulated percentage easily exceeds 100%.
information about the outside world clearly constrained their ability to either to form
some ideas about democracy or simply to express themselves using abstract concepts.
The effect of these cognitive constraints is so overwhelming that the socializing
effects of practice of grassroots democracy in rural China are not readily observable.

Aside from rural China people, we found that only about a half of the people in
the three Chinese societies are capable of associating “democracy” with concepts and
notions that are consistent with the standard view of “liberal democracy”, i.e.,
defining democracy either in terms of “freedom and liberty” or as “a set of political
rights, institutions and procedures.” Between the two categories, substantially more
people associate democracy with “freedom and liberties” than “political rights,
institutions and procedures” across all three localities despite of their divergent
trajectories of regime evolution. Hong Kong people tend to associate democracy
almost exclusively with references to “freedom and liberties” possibly due to their
long history of living under free but undemocratic regime. One the other hand, the
absence of democratic practices did not prevent residents of urban China to acquire a
similar level of understanding as citizens in Taiwan. This suggests the relationship
among political institution, modernization and conception of democracy is quite
complicated.

Furthermore, a substantial portion of people in urban China and Taiwan tend to
define democracy in certain communitarian notions such as “taking care of the
people”, “in the best interest of the people”, “good government”, “citizen duties”, etc.
Except for Hong Kong, the level of “communitarian” conception almost rivals the
appeal of “freedom and liberties” notion, suggesting that there are competing claims
on people’s understanding of democracy. The striking similarities between urban
China and Taiwan might have something to do with a similar history of the presence
of a strong and paternalistic state in the society.
IV. Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, and the Conception of Democracy

In order to explore the structural relationships between Confucian values and people’s conceptions of democracy, we apply Multinominal Logit (MNL) model to our data. Regarding the choice of explanatory variables, our model specification addresses the following theoretical concerns. Firstly, do differences in socioeconomic background variables, such as gender, age, education, account for varying probability of acquiring different types of understanding of democracy? Among the three variables, age and education are oftentimes cited by modernization theorists as the more relevant indicators measuring the effects of modernization at individual level. Secondly, does adherence to Confucian values tend to attenuate the probability of acquiring some liberal-democratic notions about “democracy”, other things being equal? Thirdly, does adherence to Confucian values is more likely to induce the acceptance of communitarian notions about “democracy”?

For the sake of multinominal logit analysis, we have to further condense our data on popular understanding of democracy. For this purpose, a trichotomy of conception of democracy was constructed as our dependent variable. The frequencies shown in Figure 1 indicate (1) the proportion of respondents whose answers cover either liberal and/or democratic dimensions, (2) the proportion of respondents whose answers cover communitarian dimension, (3) the proportion of respondents whose answers contain none of the two elements. Figure 1 shows that in Taiwan 31.0% of our respondent emphasized the liberal and/or democratic dimensions, 37.2% employed some communitarian notions. Meanwhile, 31.8% of our respondents do not think of democracy in either of these terms. In Hong Kong, 49% emphasized the liberal
and/or democratic dimension, only 13.4% employed communitarian notions. Meanwhile, 37.6% of our respondents do not think of democracy in either of these terms. In urban China, 27.9% emphasized the liberal and/or democratic dimensions, 30.8% articulated communitarian dimensions. Meanwhile, 41.3% of respondents do not think of democracy in either of these terms. In rural China, 18.1% emphasized the liberal and/or democratic dimensions, 15.8% referred to the communitarian dimensions. Meanwhile, 66.1% of our respondents do not think of democracy in either of these terms.

(Figure 1 is here)

In our logit model, there are four independent variables ($x$) that explain the expected probability of mass democratic conception ($i$). They include gender, age, education and Confucian values (please refer to Part B of Appendix 3 for details). The expected probability of the model can be expressed as:

$$P_y = \Pr(y = j \mid x) = \frac{\exp(x \cdot \beta_j)}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} \exp(x \cdot \beta_j)}, \text{ where } \beta_i = 0.$$

This model is applied to all four samples. We begin with the Taiwan sample. The Table 4 shows that $\beta$ coefficients estimated using MNL, only education exert explanatory power over the probability of acquiring either liberal/democratic notions or communitarian notions about democracy versus other types of understanding. None of the other explanatory variables, including gender, age, and Confucian values, has any significant influence on the probability of either acquiring liberal/democratic or communitarian conception of democracy among Taiwanese citizens. Those who are better educated are more likely to acquire a liberal-democratic conception of democracy as well as communitarian notions than other notions. This suggests as far as the people in Taiwan are concerned, adherence to Confucian personal ethics does
not inhibit the acquisition of liberal-democratic notion about “democracy”; nor does it induce higher communitarian propensity.

[Table 4 is about here]

We then move to the data from Hong Kong survey. The $\beta$ coefficients estimated using MNL in Table 5 below show that, except for age, the three other explanatory variables, including gender, education and Confucian values all exerted certain significant influences on the probability of acquiring different conceptions of democracy. Women are more likely to acquire communitarian democracy notions (versus either liberal/democratic notions or other types of understanding) than men. Those who have higher education are more likely to develop both liberal/democratic and communitarian conceptions of democracy than people with less education. Finally, those who are more traditionally oriented in personal ethics are less likely to acquire either liberal/democratic or communitarian conception of democracy than other types of understanding (including “Don’t know”).

[Table 5 is about here]

What about our rural China data? The coefficients estimated using MNL presented in Table 6 show that, except gender, all three other explanatory variables, including age, education and Confucian values all have some significant influences on the probability of acquiring different types of conception of democracy among Chinese villagers. Similar to we found in Taiwan and Hong Kong, those who have higher education are also more likely to acquire either a liberal/democratic or communitarian conception of democracy (than other types of understanding). It is quite surprising to find that elders (with ages above 50) are more likely to acquire either a liberal/democratic or communitarian conception of democracy (than other
types of understanding) than middle-aged people (ages between 35 and 50) while the younger generation (under 35) is the least likely group. However, age makes no difference between having liberal/democratic notions versus communitarian ones. Lastly, another unexpected finding is that those who are more beholden to Confucian values are also more likely to acquire a liberal-democratic conception of democracy than either communitarian notions or other types of understanding. This is in stark contrast from what we found among Hong Kong people.

[Table 6 is about here]

Last but not least, we come to our urban China data. The $\beta$ coefficients estimated using MNL in Table 7 below show that, except gender, the other all explanatory variables, including age, education and Confucian values have all exerted some significant influences on the probability of acquiring different types of conception of democracy among urban Chinese citizens. Those who received higher education are also more likely to acquire either a liberal-democratic or communitarian notions about democracy (than other types of understanding). But it makes no difference between the two types of concern. Much like their counterpart in rural China, the elders are also more likely to acquire communitarian conception of democracy than the other types of understanding (but not versus liberal-democratic notions). Finally, those urban residents who have more Confucian value-oriented are less likely to acquire either a liberal-democratic or communitarian conception of democracy (than other types of understanding). This make urban Chinese citizens look more like their counterparts in Hong Kong than their compatriots in the countryside.

[Table 7 is about here]
Overall speaking, only level of education has been consistently a useful explanatory variable in predicating the probability of acquiring different types of democratic understanding. Furthermore, while the goodness-of-fit of our MNL models are all passable, the total predicative power of our independent variables is quite limited, probably a dear price we pay for over-compressing our otherwise very complex and rich dependent variable.

V. Tentative Conclusion

Across the three culturally Chinese societies, while traditional Confucian values are not immutable to the forces of socio-economic modernization, they, nevertheless, have demonstrated its staying power despite of rapid pace of modernization and divergent experiences of democratization. The living experiences under different political systems do not seem to make much imprint on people’s value-orientation in the domain of personal ethnics, notwithstanding the Cultural Revolution in China or the colonial rule in Hong Kong. Brian Girvin once pointed out that when established political culture engages with certain pressure that forces it to change, a specific reaction will occur. The micro-level culture changes first, then the meso-level culture; and finally the macro-level culture that is composed of the values and symbols of collective goals. This latter structure is highly resilient as it is built on the beliefs of the entire society.28

Our multivariate analysis lends some support to the claim of modernization theorists. Education does increase the probability of acquiring a more sophisticated understanding of democracy, in particular one anchored on liberal-democratic notions, across different political systems. However the influence is not as strong as we

28 Brian Girvin, "Change and Continuity in Liberal Democratic Political Culture," in John R. Gibbins
expected. Also, in many cases, education also induce the growth of communitarian notion about democracy, something lies outside the modernization theorists’ framework.

Our analysis yields inconclusive results on the constraining effects of Confucian values. The claim of the proponents of cultural relativism, i.e., adherence to Confucian values tend to inhibit the acquisition of Western liberal-democratic conception of democracy among East Asians, was confirmed in two instances, among Hong Kong people and urban Chinese citizens. It was refuted in one instance, among rural Chinese citizens, but not corroborated in another instance, i.e., among Taiwan people. Also, in the two instances, where the claim was corroborated, the predicator power of Confucian values is quite limited. Therefore it is inconceivable that this entrenched value system might obstruct the development of sophisticated democratic understanding in any substantial way.

Finally, even though the propensity of defining democracy in communitarian terms is equally visible in all three localities, this may not be a unique Chinese, or East Asian for that matter, phenomenon. At least, our multivariate analysis dose not lend any support to the proponents of communitarianism. Confucian values do not a significant impact on acquiring communitarian notions about democracy. In the two instances (among urban Chinese citizens and Hong Kong people) where they did exert some predicator power, the direction of causal relation contradicts their claim. More importantly, the liberal-democratic notions and communitarian concept tend to rise or fall together, rather than mutually inhibiting.

In this sense, there is no reason for a pessimistic view about the future of

democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China. On the other hand, the process of modernization over the long run will transform traditional values albeit at the speed of glacier movement. The only certainty is that with the general rise of education, comes stronger democratic consciousness and deeper understanding.
Appendix 1

A Note on the Methodology of EAB Survey in three Chinese Societies

The East Asia Barometer Survey

The three surveys were administered under the auspices of the Comparative Study of Democratization and Value Changes in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer Survey). The Project was launched in summer 2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The Project is headquartered at the Department of Political Science of NTU in Taipei and under the co-directorship of Profs. Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu of National Taiwan University. The project involves eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Coordination for the surveys was also supported by supplementary funding from National Taiwan University, the Academia Sinica and various national funding agencies across East Asia.

Leaders of the eight local teams and the international consultants collaboratively drew up a 125-item core questionnaire designed for a 40- to 45-minute face-to-face interview. The survey was designed in English and translated into local languages by the national teams. Between July 2001 and February 2003, the collaborating national teams administered one or more waves of this survey in eight Asian countries or territories – namely, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Mongolia, Hong Kong and the PRC – countries that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition.

Taiwan survey. The Taiwan survey was conducted in June-July, 2001, by The Comparative Study of Democratization and Value Changes Project Office, National Taiwan University. The target population was defined as ROC citizens aged 20 and over who had the right to vote. This population was sampled according to the Probabilities Proportionate to Size (PPS) method in three stages: towns/counties, villages/li and individual voters. Taiwan was divided into eight statistically distinct divisions. Within each division four, six, or eight towns/counties were selected; from each of these two villages/li were selected; and in each of these between thirteen and sixteen individuals (not households) were sampled. In the municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung, only li and individuals were sampled.

The sampling design called for 1416 valid interviews. In order to replace respondents who could not be contacted or refused to be interviewed, a supplementary
pool of fifteen times the size of the original sample was taken. If a respondent could not be interviewed, he or she was replaced by a person from the supplementary pool of the same gender and age. 714 of the original sample of 1416 were successfully interviewed for a success rate of 50.4% for the original sample. To produce the other 701 successful cases, a total of 1727 supplementary respondents were contacted. Overall, we attempted to interview a total of 3143 people and successfully completed 1415 interviews for a response rate of 45.0%.

In a chi-squared test, the sample failed to reflect the characteristics of the sampled population on the dimensions of age and education. It oversampled citizens between the ages of 30 and 50, and those with educational levels of senior high school and above. Although the sample passed the chi-squared test for gender, it contained about four percent fewer males and four percent more females than expected. Weighting variables for the sample were therefore calculated along the three dimensions of gender, age, and educational level using the method of raking.29

The questionnaire used in Taiwan was composed of two main parts: the core questionnaire used in all participating countries and a supplemental module employed in the three predominantly Chinese societies of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

The interviews were conducted by 140 interviewers, all of whom were university students. Over 300 students interviewed for these jobs, and we chose among these applicants based on their ability to communicate in both Mandarin and Taiwanese, previous interviewing experience, and our geographic needs. These interviewers were overseen by fifteen supervisors, most of whom had previously served as interviewers in a survey on the 2000 presidential election. All interviewers attended a day-long training session.

64.8% of the interviews were conducted predominantly or exclusively in Mandarin. 14.1% were conducted predominantly or exclusively in Taiwanese. 20.5% of the interviews used a mixture of Mandarin and Taiwanese. The remaining 0.6% were conducted in other languages.

To check the quality of the data collected, we conducted post-tests of all 1415 cases. 15% of these were done in person, and the other 85% were conducted by telephone. Kappa values for all eight of the variables retested ranged between .328 (fair) and .860 (almost perfect). None of the kappa values fell in the “poor” or “slight” ranges, evidence that the data possess a fairly high degree of internal validity.

Hong Kong survey. The Hong Kong survey was conducted in

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29 Raking is a procedure to bring row and column totals of a table of survey estimates into close agreement with independent estimates of those totals by adjusting the entries in the table.
September-December, 2001, by Kuan Hsin-chi and Lau Siu-kai under the auspices of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. It yielded 811 valid cases out of 1651 sampled cases for a response rate of 49.12%. The target population was defined as Hong Kong people aged 20 to 75 residing in permanent residential living quarters in built-up areas. The sampling method involved a multi-stage design. First, a sample of 2,000 residential addresses from the computerized Sub-Frame of Living Quarters maintained by the Census and Statistics Department was selected. In selecting the sample, living quarters were first stratified with respect to area and type of housing. The sample of quarters selected is of the EPSEM (equal probability of selection method) type and is random in the statistical sense. Where a selected address had more than one household with persons aged 20 to 75, or was a group household (such as a hostel), a random numbers table pre-attached to each address was used to select one household or one person. If the drawn household had more than one person aged 20 to 75, a random selection grid, i.e., the modified Kish Grid, was employed to select one interviewee. A face-to-face interview was conducted to complete the questionnaire. The interviewers were recruited from the student body of the Chinese University. Apart from the core items, the questionnaire contained questions unique to the local context of Hong Kong.

SPSS nonparametric chi-square tests were conducted to compare the gender, age and educational attainment of the sample with the same attributes of the target population as reported in the Hong Kong 2001 population census. The gender and educational attainment distributions of the sample did not differ significantly from those of the target population. Raking was used to generate a weighting variable to correct for the underrepresentation of the younger age group (aged between 20 and 39) in the sample.

China survey. The China survey was conducted in March-June, 2002, in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It yielded 3183 valid cases out of 3,752 sampled cases for a response rate of 84.1%. The sample represents the adult population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the survey, excluding those living in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample.

The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) employed in the sample design are counties (xian) in rural areas and cities (shi) in urban areas. In province-level municipalities, districts (qu) were used as PSU. Before selection, counties were stratified by region and geographical characteristic and cities or districts by region and size. A total of sixty-seven cities or districts and sixty-two counties were selected as the primary
sampling units. The secondary sampling units (SSUs) were townships (xiang) and districts (qu) or streets (jiedao). The third stage of selection was geared to administrative villages in rural areas and neighborhood committees (juweihui) or community committees (shequweiyuanhui) in urban areas. We selected 249 administrative villages and 247 neighborhood or community committees in the third stage of the sampling process. A total of 496 sampling units were selected. Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling.

In the selection of PSUs, the National Statistical Bureau’s 1999 volume of population statistics was used as the basic source for constructing the sampling frame. The number of family households for each county or city was taken as the measure of size (MOS) in the PPS selection process. For the successive stages of sampling, population data were obtained from the All China Women’s Association (ACWA), using data collected by that organization for a 2000 survey on women’s status in China. For areas not covered in the ACWA survey, we asked local ACWA chapters to collect sampling data for us. All village and neighborhood committee levels, household registration (hukou) lists were obtained. The lists were used as the sampling frame for the fourth stage of the sampling process.

The response rate for urban areas was lower than that for the rural areas. For urban area, the response rate was 82.5%, and rural areas it was 86.5%.

Weighting variables for the sample were calculated along the three dimensions of gender, age, and educational level using the method of raking.

The questionnaire used in Mainland China varied from the core questionnaire used in other societies in two ways. First, for all the questions in the core questionnaire asking respondents to compare the current situation in their society to that of the authoritarian past, we asked people respondents to compare the current situation to that in Mao’s period. Second, the questionnaire included additional questions used in our 1993 mainland China survey, to facilitate possible cross time comparison.

Retired middle school teachers were employed as interviewers for the survey. Before interviews started, our collaborators in China contacted the association of retired middle school teachers in Dongcheng and Haidian districts in Beijing to ask their help in identifying newly retired teachers. We invited retired teachers aged 55 to 62 to apply for jobs as interviewers. About 150 retired teachers applied, and we chose 67 as interviewers. The interviewers went through an intensive training program, which introduced basic concepts of social science research, survey sampling,
and interview techniques, and familiarized them with the questionnaire to be used in the survey. After a course of lectures, the interviewers practiced among themselves and then conducted practice interviews with residents of a rural village near Beijing. At the end of the training course, interviewers were subjected to a rigorous test.

The mainland team adopted two measures of quality control. First, we sent letters to prospective respondents, stating that an interviewer would come to his or her home to conduct an interview within a month. The letter included a self-addressed envelop and an evaluation form asking the respondent to report 1) whether the interviewer arrived as promised, and 2) the respondent's evaluation of the interviewer's attitude toward his or her job. Second, field supervisors randomly checked 5% of respondents to evaluate the quality of the interview. We informed interviewers about the control mechanisms to deter them from cheating.

Mandarin was used for most interviews. To interview respondents unable to understand Mandarin, interviewers were authorized to hire interpreters.
### Appendix 2: Coding Scheme for Popular Conception of Democracy

**Three-digit codes for Popular Understanding of Democracy**

#### 100 Democracy in generic or populist terms

- **110** Popular sovereignty
- **111** Government of the people

#### 120 Government by the People

- **121** People as their own master
- **122** Power of the people

#### 130 Government for the People

- **131** Putting people’s interest first
- **132** Care for people
- **133** Responsive to people’s need
- **134** Governing in the interest of general welfare

#### 140 Absence of non-democratic arrangements

- **141** No dictator
- **142** No repression

#### 200 Democracy in terms of some key elements of liberal democracy

- **210** Freedom and Civil Liberty
- **211** Freedom in general
- **212** Freedom of speech/press/expression
- **213** Freedom of association
- **214** Political liberty
- **215** Protection of individual/human rights
- **216** Freedom from government repression
- **217** Freedom of participation
- **218** Freedom of belief
- **219** Freedom of individual choice

- **220** Political Equality
One man one vote
Equality before the law/justice
Non discrimination

Democratic Institutions and Process
Election, popular vote or electoral choice
Parliament
Separation of power or check-and-balance
Competitive party system
Power rotation
Rule of law
Independent judicial
Majority rule
Respect for minority rights

Participation and Citizen Empowerment
Ability to change government
Voting
Direct participation
Demonstration
Voice one’s concern

Social Pluralism
Open society
Pluralist society

Democracy in terms of social and economic system
Free Economy
Free market
Private properties/ownership
Free and fair competition
Personal economic opportunities
No central planning

Equality, Justice or Fraternity
321 Social equality
322 Social justice
323 Fraternity
324 Equality of opportunities
325 Social rights or social entitlements
326 Welfare state
327 Socialism
328 Worker participation

330 Socio-Economic Performance
331 Solve unemployment
332 Find anyone a job
333 Providing social welfare
334 Taking good care of the weak

400 Democracy in terms of good government
410 Good Governance
411 Honesty
412 Responsible
413 Openness or transparent government
414 Fair treatment
415 Efficiency
416 No corruption
417 Law-biding government (rule by law)
418 Social stability
419 Law and order

420 Reform in General
421 Political reform
422 Economic reform

500 Democracy in term of individual behaviors
510 Democratic Style
511 Communication
512 Compromise
513 Rational
514 Tolerance
515 Taking into account all parties concerned
516 Freedom within legal limits
517 Respect for others’ rights
518 No extremism

520 Duties
521 Citizen duties
522 Action within the limits of law
523 Law-binding

530 Individualism
531 Respect for individual privacy
532 Independence
533 Self-reliance
534 Having one’s own views
535 Self-responsibility
536 Responsibility for one’s own action/decision
540 Trust

600 Democracy in other broad and abstract terms
610 Political System
611 Governmental institution
612 Decentralization (local self-government)

620 Nationalism and Statism
621 Better country
622 Wealthy state
623 National independence
624 Development of elite
625 Individual less important than nation
**630 Stable and Cohesive Society**
- Patriotism
- Solidarity
- Harmony
- No chaos, anarchy or disorder

**640 Other Lofty Elements**
- World peace
- The commonwealth of the world

**700 Conditions or Prerequisites for Democracy**

**710 Gradualism**
- Incremental
- It takes time
- No radicalism

**720 Prerequisites**
- Democratic aptitude of citizens
- Economic condition
- Level education
- Fit our country’s own conditions

**800 Evaluation of Democracy or Democratic Regime**

**810 Positive Appraisal of Democracy in General**
- The best or the better
- Progressive
- Universal acceptance
- Global trend

**820 Negative Appraisal of Democracy in General**
- Corrupt
- Inefficient
- Unstable, chaotic, anarchy
- Conflict
- Lead to injustice
- Obstruct economic development
- Place too much on individual interests, the worst system
- Does not exist
We cannot have democracy

Positive Appraisal of One’s Own Country’s (Taiwan’s) Democracy

Negative Appraisal of One’s Own Country’s (Taiwan’s) Democracy

Reference or Cognitive Association

Country reference
Like United States, United Kingdom, Japan, etc.
Not like North Korea, etc

Political figures (e.g., Sun Yet-sun, Lee Teng-hui, Abraham Lincoln, etc)

Political parties or groups (e.g., DPP, KMT, etc)

Other associations (state, politics, society)

No substance in answer
Don’t know
No Response
Appendix 3: The Construction of the Variables in MNL Models

Part A: Rules of Data Reduction for Popular Conception of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding democracy as:</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Freedom and liberty</td>
<td>142, 210–219, 222, 223, 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political rights, institutions and process</td>
<td>221, 230–236, 237, 238, 251, 612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Market economy</td>
<td>310–315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social equality and justice</td>
<td>320–334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Individualism</td>
<td>530–536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. In generic and/or populist terms</td>
<td>100–122, 140–141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. In other abstract and positive terms</td>
<td>420–422, 540–612; 640–642, 810–814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. In negative terms</td>
<td>820–829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Others</td>
<td>None of the above and the below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Don’t know, no response</td>
<td>098–099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part B: Constructing Variable for Multi-nominal Logit Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Respondent’s age.</td>
<td>18–35=low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35–50=median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50 and above=high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Respondent’s gender.</td>
<td>1=men, 0=women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Respondent’s year of education</td>
<td>Below high school=low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High school=median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>University and above=high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian Values</td>
<td>Sum of the Respondent’s score on six-item battery of Confucianism</td>
<td>-3.69822–4.01883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Trichotomy of Popular Conception of Democracy</td>
<td>“To you, what does ‘democracy’ mean?”</td>
<td>1= purely liberal or democratic notion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2=communitarian notion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3=others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: We constructing a trichotomy for popular conception of democracy variable by condensing the eleven categories (shown in Part A) even further with the following rules:
1. Liberal/Democratic: answers fall in Category 1 and/or 2 but not 3.
2. Communitarian: at least one answer falls in Category 3.
3. Others: none of the above
Table 2 The Confucianism Dimension in mainland China (urban and rural), Hong Kong and Taiwan (Loadings on First Principal Component in Factor Analysis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>China (urban)</th>
<th>China (rural)</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q064A) Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask</td>
<td>0.59384</td>
<td>0.66750</td>
<td>0.42608</td>
<td>0.57328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q065A) When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends</td>
<td>0.52520</td>
<td>0.40582</td>
<td>0.57744</td>
<td>0.57678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q066A) When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person</td>
<td>0.54003</td>
<td>0.45979</td>
<td>0.55423</td>
<td>0.60700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q071A) If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute</td>
<td>0.56614</td>
<td>0.58072</td>
<td>0.70649</td>
<td>0.53282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q072A) When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother</td>
<td>0.62514</td>
<td>0.65930</td>
<td>0.62953</td>
<td>0.70156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN74EA) Work hard for the fame of family</td>
<td>0.65577</td>
<td>0.58904</td>
<td>0.66709</td>
<td>0.67972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initial Eigenvalues

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.061</td>
<td>1.941</td>
<td>2.163</td>
<td>2.268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KMO and Bartlett’s Test (P-value)

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>801.729</td>
<td>447.242</td>
<td>435.232</td>
<td>853.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;=0.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;=0.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;=0.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;=0.001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of Explained Variance

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.358</td>
<td>32.342</td>
<td>36.044</td>
<td>37.798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Meaning of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding democracy as:</th>
<th>Mainland (Urban)</th>
<th>Mainland (Rural)</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Freedom and liberty</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political rights, institutions and process</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Communitarian notion</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Market economy</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social equality and justice</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Individualism</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. In generic and/or populist terms</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. In other abstract and positive terms</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. In negative terms</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Others</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Don’t know, no response</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1756 for Mainland (Urban), 1427 for Mainland (Rural), 811 for Hong Kong, 1415 for Taiwan.


### Table 4: Influence of Confucian Values on Conceptions of Democracy in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal or Democratic / Others $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
<th>Communitarian / Others $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
<th>Liberal or Democratic / Communitarian $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age(Under 35)</td>
<td>-0.15 (0.26)</td>
<td>-0.49 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age(36-50)</td>
<td>-0.28 (0.24)</td>
<td>-0.38 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.09 (0.03) **</td>
<td>0.16 (0.03) **</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.02) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian Values</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>-0.50 (0.29)</td>
<td>-0.99 (0.29) **</td>
<td>0.49 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1099
LR chi$^2$ = 61.78
Prob >chi$^2$ = 0.000
Log Likelihood = -1157.3494
Pseudo R$^2$ = 0.026

Note: * P<0.05 · ** P<0.01

Table 5 Influence of Confucian Values on Conceptions of Democracy in Hong Kong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal or Democratic / Others $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
<th>Communitarian / Others $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
<th>Liberal or Democratic / Communitarian $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.79 (0.27) **</td>
<td>0.72 (0.25) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Under 35)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (36-50)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.23)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.33)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02) *</td>
<td>0.08 (0.03) *</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian Values</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.10) *</td>
<td>-0.38 (0.15) **</td>
<td>0.17 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.40)</td>
<td>-0.40 (0.55)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 629
LR chi$^2$ = 38.42
Prob >chi$^2$ = .000
Log Likelihood = -600.68149
Pseudo R$^2$ = 0.031

Note: * P<0.05, ** P<0.01

Table 6 Influence of Confucian Values on Conceptions of Democracy in Rural China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal or Democratic / Others $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
<th>Communitarian / Others $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
<th>Liberal or Democratic / Communitarian $\beta$ (S.E.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Under 35)</td>
<td>-0.67 (0.23) **</td>
<td>-0.66 (0.24) **</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (36-50)</td>
<td>-0.65 (0.22) **</td>
<td>-0.80 (0.23) **</td>
<td>0.15 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.11 (0.03) **</td>
<td>0.14 (0.03) **</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian Values</td>
<td>0.32 (0.09) **</td>
<td>0.08 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.11) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>-1.00 (0.31) **</td>
<td>-1.36 (0.33) **</td>
<td>0.35 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 969
LR chi$^2$ = 63.39
Prob >chi$^2$ = .000
Log Likelihood = -915.54219
Pseudo R$^2$ = 0.0335

Note: * P<0.05, ** P<0.01
Table 7 Influence of Confucian Values on Conceptions of Democracy in Urban China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal or Democratic / Others</th>
<th>Communitarian / Others</th>
<th>Liberal or Democratic / Communitarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta ) (S.E.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (S.E.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex(Male)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age(Under 35)</td>
<td>-0.33 (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.67 (0.18) **</td>
<td>0.34 (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age(36-50)</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.41 (0.16) **</td>
<td>0.17 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02) **</td>
<td>0.08 (0.02) **</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian Values</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.07) **</td>
<td>-0.28 (0.07) **</td>
<td>0.01 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>-0.60 (0.27) *</td>
<td>-0.44 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.28)</td>
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N=1473
LR chi\(^2\)= 69.91
Prob >chi\(^2\)=.000
Log Likelihood = -1576.8332
Pseudo R\(^2\)= 0.0217

Note: * P<0.05 , ** P<0.01

Figure 1 Level of Understanding of Liberal Democracy or Communitarianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Mainland (urban)</th>
<th>Mainland (rural)</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Mainland (urban)</th>
<th>Mainland (rural)</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Mainland (urban)</th>
<th>Mainland (rural)</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q064A</td>
<td>0.3194 (0.5535)</td>
<td>-0.1022 (- -)</td>
<td>-0.2991 (- -)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.2729 (0.5454)</td>
<td>-0.0801 (- -)</td>
<td>-0.3008 (- -)</td>
<td>-0.3421 (0.6095)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.5923 0.0221</td>
<td>-0.3008 -0.043</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q065A</td>
<td>-0.3161 (0.5181)</td>
<td>-0.1094 (- -)</td>
<td>-0.3646 (- -)</td>
<td>-0.4100 (0.5894)</td>
<td>-0.2475 (0.5087)</td>
<td>-0.0381 (- -)</td>
<td>-0.1844 (- -)</td>
<td>-0.3326 (0.6303)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0686 0.0713</td>
<td>0.1802 0.0774</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q066A</td>
<td>0.0320 (0.5502)</td>
<td>0.2174 (0.5158)</td>
<td>0.2341 (0.5620)</td>
<td>0.0149 (0.6429)</td>
<td>0.1708 (0.5281)</td>
<td>0.3124 (0.4868)</td>
<td>0.1815 (0.5417)</td>
<td>0.0860 (0.6719)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1388 0.095</td>
<td>-0.0526 -0.1009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q071A</td>
<td>0.2441 (0.5666)</td>
<td>0.4654 (0.4659)</td>
<td>-0.0850 (0.5984)</td>
<td>0.3317 (0.6100)</td>
<td>0.1513 (0.5856)</td>
<td>0.4170 (0.5211)</td>
<td>0.1509 (0.5514)</td>
<td>0.2143 (0.6299)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0928 -0.0484</td>
<td>-0.0659 -0.1174</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q072A</td>
<td>-0.0845 (0.6002)</td>
<td>0.1430 (0.6013)</td>
<td>-0.1930 (0.6011)</td>
<td>0.0255 (0.6860)</td>
<td>-0.0683 (0.5839)</td>
<td>0.1256 (0.5879)</td>
<td>-0.1509 (0.5702)</td>
<td>0.0557 (0.7030)</td>
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<td>0.0162 -0.0174</td>
<td>0.0421 -0.0812</td>
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<td>CN74EA</td>
<td>Work hard for the fame of family</td>
<td>-0.3314</td>
<td>0.0199</td>
<td>-0.2131</td>
<td>-0.0377</td>
<td>-0.3294</td>
<td>0.0072</td>
<td>-0.2857</td>
<td>-0.1740</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.0127</td>
<td>-0.0726</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4831)</td>
<td>(0.5640)</td>
<td>(0.5555)</td>
<td>(0.6322)</td>
<td>(0.4961)</td>
<td>(0.5763)</td>
<td>(0.5228)</td>
<td>(0.6562)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0223</td>
<td>0.1057</td>
<td>-0.1036</td>
<td>-0.0625</td>
<td>-0.0993</td>
<td>0.1240</td>
<td>-0.1485</td>
<td>-0.1294</td>
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<td>-0.0766</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
